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Co-Creating Strategy and Culture in New Technology Regimes on the Internet: How New 




One of the least understood aspects of knowledge management in organizations research and 
innovation is to explain how new technology paradigms facilitate the creation and adoption of 
new regimes and business practice of innovation by old and new firms. When innovation 
regimes are started up by cohesive communities of collaborators, born-online and born-global, 
the relationship is even less understood. My research explores how some of the largest fashion-
technology start-ups on the Internet create and spread new technology and practice in digital 
marketing and e-commerce to vertically integrated, transnational fashion industry leaders. My 
dissertation bridges innovation and economic sociology with international business and strategic 
management to explain how Ron Burt’s “good ideas” are actually generated and meaningfully 
reapplied by new entrants in the organizational practice of established incumbent fashion firms 
from Europe and the US. The fashion industry is an extreme case-study offering an ideal context 
to investigate these emergent processes, revealing the dynamic relationship between innovation 
and change. The research posits that executives in established organizations in this context can 
manage the tension between challenge and opportunity of adopting disruptive practice by 
learning to manage collaboratively the parts of their value chains that are most affected by the 
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PART I: THE WEB IS A COLLABORATIVE TIES VILLAGE–PRODUCTION OF 
CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE INTERNET. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “A fashion, once started,  
marches relentlessly to its doom.” 
Herbert Blumer (1969)  
"More and more major businesses and industries are being run on software and delivered as 
online services—from movies to agriculture to national defense. Many of the winners are Silicon 
Valley-style entrepreneurial technology companies that are invading and overturning established 
industry structures. Over the next 10 years, I expect many more industries to be disrupted by 
software, with new world-beating Silicon Valley companies doing the disruption in more cases 
than not."  
Mark Andreessen (co-founder of Netscape)  
1.1 The Incumbent’s Dilemma 
One of the least understood aspects of knowledge management in the sociology of 
innovation, technology and innovation management, and international business is to explain how 
new technology paradigms transforming into behavior and the adoption of new business practice 
by new and old firms. When new innovation regimes are started up by cohesive communities of 
collaborators born-online and born-global with founders who share multiple points of access to 
technology and social capital with the teams of other emerging enterprises, the relationship 
between producing and disseminating knowledge and creativity inside and outside the 
burgeoning community is even less understood. This dissertation explores the creation and 
transfer of new business and cultural practice in the fashion industry— one of the oldest creative 
contexts on historical record where innovation and change are traditionally understood as 
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symbolic mechanisms and sociological categories of a functionalist order (Simmel 1904; Sapir, 
1931; and Larig and Larig, 196l).  
The fashion industry offers a unique context for the study of innovation and change. While 
the work on fashion done by early sociologists has increased our understanding of “human group 
life” (Blumer, but 1969: 275), the study of fashion as a phenomenon of fundamental sociological 
importance has not been advanced beyond the periphery of the “abnormal and irrational” (ibid: 
275). Blumer (1969) was the first sociologist on record to propose that fashion holds significant 
import, because its consequences can influence the “central content of any field in which it 
operates” (ibid: 277). Blumer proposed that given this profound sociological consequence, 
Simmel’s (1904) mechanism of “trickle down” which proposes that fashion would diffuse from 
elites to lower classes by social “imitation”, should instead be conceptualized as a process of 
massive “collective selection”. The many linked actors constitutive of this process, wholesalers, 
publications, and buyers, are more likely to be guided by the “direction of modernity” (1969: 
280) rather than by class distinction.  
Simmel (1904) has suggested correctly that for many fashion organizations class distinction 
has had profound importance. Class distinction perpetuates the choices of fashion houses for 
extreme dependence on “outsider” elites. The culture and practice of clothiers in this industry, 
since the 1950s, is increasingly matched with established creative rules of institutional conduct 
that have emerged over much iteration between fashion organizations and their large vertically 
integrated institutional partners- merchants, such as Neiman Marcus, and paper publications, as 
Vogue Magazine. These institutions significantly influence the behavior of fashion 
organizations, without ever actually participating in the design, production, or branding of 
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apparel products. The direction of modernity for fashion firms has taken a course of dependence 
on ritualized rules of culture and practice.  
Fashion firms are also the purveyors of what Ronald Burt and colleagues call a “strong 
culture” (1994). As creative organizations, fashion firms consistently require compliance from 
outsider communities to the creative process, in particular, the end-consumer. Further 
significance for the strength of incumbents’ organizational culture is the lack of Marketing 
Departments and the reliance on Communications Divisions on informing the public about new 
trends. This feature of their Simmelian desire for distinction allows fashion organizations to 
perceive their behavioral practice of cultural rigidity as bona fide resistance to other potential 
entrants, who may acquire legitimacy in the minds of their important institutional partners.  
The commercial and brand-related dependence on wholesalers and fashion publications has 
become a powerful cultural deterrent to the adoption of new technology in fashion firms, along 
their entire value chains, including in such key areas as production, marketing, and distribution. 
Simmel is essentially correct that it is this particular path-dependence to preserve received social 
norms of elite demarcation that has guided producer firms in this industry to make amazingly 
identical choices with regard to design, marketing, distribution, and sales over the past 50 years. 
The documented propensity of fashion organizations to imitate each other’s choices propels even 
the latest research to study the collectively adhered to mechanisms for the development of 
particularized practice, such as adornment, “the making” of models and the production of 
“tastes” and “styles” as  a homogenous response from a community of insider elites (Godart, 
2012, Mears, 2010). 
Social relationships between fashion brands and their largest clients – Neiman Marcus, Saks, 
Nordstrom, or La Rinascente - are deeply contextual and up to 80-95% of their annual revenue 
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comes from selling apparel to these retail partners. Fashion executives are cautious to depict their 
supply relationships with these enormous accounts as a form of routinized cultural dependency. 
Contrary to the Simmelian notion of reproduction of social elites in incumbent populations, 
fashion executives have reported that since the 1980s their organizations have attempted to mint 
a marketing culture of their own coupled with independent distribution structure.  
The arrival of new distribution channels and marketing regimes on the Internet has further 
complicated the executive choices facing this industry. At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the fashion 
industry got a “twin” sister in the emerging field of online fashion, which began to be populated 
with new, born-global, online fashion–technology start-ups. Journalistic accounts at the time 
suggested that these entrepreneurial ventures were veritable “gods-of-the-gaps” that emerged to 
“fill the void left by the big brands” (Walmsley, 2008). The fledgling young Internet 
entrepreneurs used online technology to start their own fashion-technology businesses, grappling 
with competing ideas of how to validate themselves as brand destinations and marketing 
channels without access to fashion organizations, publications, or retailers. These newcomers 
were not direct competitors to brick-and-mortar fashion firms. However, their executives were 
able to found a competitive advantage on a new cultural identity based on dual competency, both 
in fashion and technology.  
The founders of these organizations frequently referred to their entrepreneurial creations as 
“the new fashion brands” and referred to their business as a new generation of fashion business. 
Executives in fashion technology startups on the Internet typically arrived from financial and 
investment banking backgrounds and frequently reported to have been culturally influenced by 
the early digital pioneers Amazon and eBay. The new firms were well positioned to explore the 
emerging intersection of Internet technologies in online retailing and online publishing. They 
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could deliver to consumers both a fashion product and an editorial about the product, combining 
the two ubiquitous institutional advantages of brick-and-mortar wholesalers and fashion 
magazines. Online fashion retailers (or, e-tailers) explored their newly minted dual cultural 
identity to acquire fashion product from fashion brands and to market and create their own 
brands in the process. Firms in this emerging space, online retailers, social – commerce 
publishers, bloggers, affiliates and curator platforms- argued that their unique positioning on the 
new channel permitted them to enable new sources of cultural value for brick-and-mortar fashion 
brands.  
Simmel (1904) has argued that by virtue of their significant dependence on elite 
reproduction, incumbents in fashion organizations would not be dissuaded from maintaining 
their familiar cultural behavior to depend on trusted outsiders. Fashion organizations are 
believers in ritual. In fact, fashion incumbents would find the validity of arguments by outsiders, 
such as “fashion – technology” organizations, to be a fallacy of proposition.  
An example of this culture is that fashion organizations lack explicit commitment to 
commercial results, and yet structure their operations to reflect extreme reliance on profit 
generation from their institutional allies. Wholesalers, such as Neiman Marcus, continue to be 
commercial lifelines for fashion brands and traditional paper glossies, such as Vogue, endure in 
their ability to introduce and endorse brands through advertising and editorials.  
Ronald Burt and colleagues (1994) have argued that the value of a strong culture varies 
inversely with the level of competition in the external environment and that a strong culture 
would be most valuable in hypercompetitive environments, as the Internet. For fashion industry 
firms, however, maintaining a strong culture at the expense of flexibility would be an unsound 
recipe. The deterring aspects of strong culture in the fashion industry complicate the response of 
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incumbents to novelty. Potential change in the structure of competition, such as the emergence of 
new paradigms, industries, practices and firms, would not only be unacknowledged or ignored by 
fashion organizations (see, Christensen, 1997), but will be vigorously opposed by incumbents. 
When strong culture pairs up with what March (1991) has called “low aspirations for learning,” 
the opportunity to miss the value of new practice, advanced or embraced by competitors or peers, 
would be high.  
The combination between strong culture and low aspirations for learning can have 
disadvantageous consequences to incumbents within creative industries and particularly 
staggering examples are developments across other creative industries, such as the publishing or 
music industry (Narasimhan and Peterson, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2013). This creative tension at the 
intersection of novelty and resistance to change is superbly positioned to help understand under 
what circumstances incumbent organizations with strong culture come to accept business 
practices and knowledge from organizations outside of their institutional field of vision. The 
question can help revisit the Simmelian hypothesis that social reproduction of class distinction 
and trickle-down are the igniting forces responsible for the behavior of creative firms.  
1.2 Culture, Competence and Organization: A Comparative Framework 
This research studies the process and mechanism of organizing for online fashion 
entrepreneurs, and the impact of the emerging ecology on old, creative incumbent organizations 
in brick-and-mortar fashion industry. While similar comparative studies in innovation, such as 
Christensen (1997), Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) and Christensen and Raynor (2003) are 
interested in placing dissociative incumbent behavior and slowness to change in the context of 
maladaptive practice, I look at the intersection between two types of organizations born and 
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residing on different channels for value creation, but involved with essentially the same function, 
and the options for beneficial collaboration between them.  
Brick-and-mortar fashion brands and fashion-technology entrepreneurs on the Internet 
represent a distinct case-study in which two fundamental theoretical assumptions can be 
combined. Simmel (1904) and Clayton Christensen (1997) lay out the first argument for cultural 
default of incumbent behavior. Existing players in an industry will indelibly fail to appreciate 
how novelty or disruption will affect them or understand how to adapt to it, due to particular 
ritual and business logics that inhere in these organizations. Newcomer firms are able to take 
advantage of the disruption by creating value in new cultural ways and by using new practice.  
The second proposition is that technology-fashion enterprises are creators and enablers of 
beneficial practice in their new domains and can influence how established organizations with 
strong culture approach the online channel. Beneficial practice refers to the ability of creators 
and users of new technologies to “nurture” and educate potential adopters of the value of new 
practice (Shah and Tripsas, 2007; Garud and Karnøe, 2003). This dissertation proposes that due 
to their exclusive access to contextual knowledge of the new field, online organizations in the 
emerging field of digital fashion are uniquely culturally positioned to help co-create a new 
identity for incumbents. The actual behavior of organizations in industries held by powerful 
cultural and institutional constraints can break-up the Simmelian (1904) mechanism for 
collective legitimation through “imitation” and learning from outsiders to the incumbent 
community. This assertion supports Blumer’s (1969: 280) interpretation of modernity, according 
to which the fashion mechanism is “transcending and embracing the prestige of the elite group 
rather than stemming from that prestige”. 
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Online start-ups in the emerging field of digital fashion are not bound by institutional rules 
and companies within it can co-construct flexible routines that are contextually constrained only 
by their peers. This situation creates advantages for collaborators and allows establishing 
dominant position in interpreting the use of new technology as well as pitching it to outsiders to 
the community. If there is momentum for learning that takes place between incumbents and new 
technology-fashion organizations, the process requires of new elites to deliberately develop 
creative apparatus in e-commerce and marketing and translate it to old elites. This type of 
beneficial collaboration would be difficult to construct because it requires the kind of trust that 
the obscurantist ritual culture of fashion brands prohibits.  
The “peer pack” approach to change in fashion incumbents informs us that only when 
actively guided, could traditional organizations here accept a proposition of cultural novelty in 
their behavior on a new domain (see, e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zuckerman, 1999). If 
key insiders in the community of digital fashion can successfully engage with fashion brands to 
embrace new cultural identity through the use of practices in digital commerce and marketing, 
these new entrepreneurs would enjoy a cultural and structural position of significant importance 
to the brick fashion industry. Vedres and Stark have pointed out how key members of business 
communities can be embedded in multiple cultural and business environments and that this 
structural position allows them to access and share contextual information from diverse 
organizational pools to which they have similar access (Vedres and Stark, 2010).  
Deep investigative accounts of organizational change in online organizations and their 
intended collaborative maneuvers with established brick-and-mortar organizations are scarce. 
Researchers in entrepreneurship and innovation have documented that an Internet mode of 
organizing in “diverse communities” has inherent beneficial qualities, placing the new domain 
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for value creation on a cultural advantage from other fields (see, cf. Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
Shah and Tripsas, 2007). The “beneficial” effects of learning and dissemination of innovation 
and new knowledge to other community members, including incumbents, are rarely 
investigated.  
The two categories of business organizations in this dissertation are online technology 
fashion organizations and brick-and-mortar fashion brands. Online fashion retailers are 
technology-fashion firms that have designed key parts of their value-chain, such as commerce, 
marketing, and branding, exclusively for the digital channel. They develop proprietary 
technologies for the back and front end parts of their value chains and come up with creative 
ways to display and promote branded fashion merchandise from brick-and-mortar fashion 
brands.  
Online retailers often collaborate with social-commerce publishers; a broad category that 
includes online blogs and bloggers (
1
), online social-shopping destinations (ShopStyle, 
Polyvore), social networks (Facebook), and online magazines (Refinery 29.com, Nylon 
Magazine.com, Vogue.com, Elle.com, Style.com). These companies are enablers of beneficial 
innovations and consider themselves to be editorial platforms for the production and diffusion of 
fashion related content. The new entrepreneurs create new beneficial business practice, such as 
curation and community branding. The new practices extend beyond the traditional function of 
online retail into branding, product curation, and editorial content creation.  
                                                          
1
 A typical Top 10 blog listing of personal blogs includes in the community of digital fashion the 
following players: Jak & Jil (blogger: Tommy Ton), Hanneli (blogger: Hanbeli Mustaparta), Sea of 
Shoes (blogger: Jane Aldridge), The Man Repeller (blogger: Leandra Medine), Gala Darling (blogger: 
Gala Darling), Karla’s Closet (blogger: Karla Deras)  The Selby (blogger: Todd Selby), B.Jones 
Style (blogger: Beth Jones), Trop Rouge (blogger: Christina Caradona, Natalie Off Duty (blogger: Natalie 
Suarez), Bleach Black (bloggers Kristin and Valerie), Fashion Toast (blogger: Rumi Neely). Later in the 




1.3 Dissertation Questions and Research Outline 
This dissertation research pairs Blumer’s original hypothesis that fashion organizations 
participate in a collective selection process with James March’s (1991) argument that openness 
to change in organizations is partly contingent on their aspirations for learning. In the case of 
“low aspiration” regimes, the ability of established organizations to learn is also contingent on 
the ability of outsider type newcomers to influence the adaptive choice of incumbents by virtue 
of their access to multiple contextual pools of knowledge (Vedres and Stark, 2010).  
The analysis considers these contributions in light of Karl Weick and contributors submission 
in 2005, in which Weick argued for “restat[ing] sensemaking in ways that make it more future 
oriented, more action oriented, more macro, more closely tied to organizing, meshed more boldly 
with identity, more visible, more behaviorally defined, less sedentary and backward looking, 
more infused with emotion and with issues of sensegiving and persuasion” (Weick et. al., 2005: 
409). The research uses an ethnography method and considers these hypotheses and 
contributions with the following questions: 
1) How is cultural legitimacy constructed in the fashion industry as the primary contextual 
space where changes in product and culture impact the micro-sociology of any field in which 
social action is present? 
2) Can creative organizations with low aspirations for learning be turned around by cultural 
“outsiders” to collaborate and learn about advances to their cultural identity and business 
practice from newcomers?  
3) How can newcomers to creative industries build cultural legitimacy in established 
organizations, such as fashion, media, or retail? What repertoires of action are successful in 
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changing the practice of organizations representing entirely different systems of belief and 
business practice?  
4) How are persuasion and evaluation accomplished when two groups are not assumed to share 
the same system of values and practice? 
1.4 Dissertation Outline  
Chapter 2 is a vignette and lays out major external institutional and internal cultural changes in 
the fashion industry that have surfaced in the last 25 years. The analysis shows an industry that 
represents an extreme case-study of adapting to innovation and change. The financial crisis in 
2008 two 2010 had a powerful revealing effect to outsiders to the fashion community just how 
far the pendulum of cultural constraint could swing in these creative organizations, when even 
under extreme circumstances, fashion executives were pressed to respond to the destructive 
requests for more revenue and less apparel product of their powerful “insider” brand makers.  
Hungered for revenue, between 2008 and 2010, the large institutional partners of fashion 
firms, Neiman and Saks, restructured their brand portfolios toward advancing and buying lesser 
known and cheaper brands. The rhetoric of large department stores was to require fashion houses 
substantially different designs; “[…] something that consumers can’t get anywhere else.” Price 
was dissociated from the construction of the “luxury” identity of the industry that Simmel long 
ago associated with the imitation advantage of fashion organizations. The ritual culture had its 
unintended consequences. Fashion firms eventually bounced back from being financed by their 
factor companies to being regularly paid by their wholesale accounts. However, the newly 
minted rhetoric of wholesalers invented during the crisis reliably damaged the treasured internal 
cultural division of labor in fashion firms, by demanding that Head Design teams –typically in 
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charge of design – would think of “wearable” and cheap production designs that came to be 
recommended by their financial planners.  
Fashion shows are an important indicator of this dissociative behavior. Designed to obscure the 
commercial and cultural dependence of incumbents in this industry on their commercial lifelines, 
the wholesalers, fashion shows were and today remain the only element of practice that fashion 
brands can control. The “old” elites are afraid of depleting interest from their brand makers, the 
commodification of the fashion market, and the diminishing cultural and commercial returns of 
the old elite relationship.  
Chapter 4 reveals the circumstances of emotionally infused sensemaking action, under which 
three distinct behavioral characteristics of the industry could be exposed. Executives in the three 
brands in the analysis, “A”, “B”, and “C” –distinct and valued representatives of the business – 
exhibit “indifference”, “fear”, and “excitement” faced with the discovery of a new digital 
channel that requires to follow rules of actual commercial significance without the treasured 
brand-wielding opinion of wholesalers and paper media.  
The transition of fashion brands to an Internet culture engulfs a period that starts in the end of 
2009 and continues to date. This period of creative vulnerability coincides with the rapid 
development of Internet technologies in e-commerce and online marketing and the emergence of 
new kinds of companies claiming to be technology and fashion brands; a distinction that did not 
exist prior to 2006. The historical path of the fashion industry to accepting new technology and 
culture was not one of least resistance. Executives very slowly changed their rhetoric and 
eventually approached the Internet as a new channel for commerce and branding. The cognitive 
realization for change led high-fashion incumbents featured in this analysis to take practical steps 
to adopt new organizational practice, which for the first time was aligned with their rhetoric by 
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looking out for clues from one very unlikely category of new partners: online technology-fashion 
entrepreneurs. This latter activity required that the creative firms open up to collaboration with 
new organizational entities, whose validity, as hypothesized, the former had originally discarded 
en masse. 
Chapter 5 reveals the narrative of born-global startup fashion-technology entrepreneurs on the 
Internet. The analysis details the culturally significant evolution of fledgling entrepreneurial 
paths that for less than a decade have come to interpret the value of their firms as culturally 
equivalent or even superior to the contributions of traditional fashion partners, such as Vogue 
and Neiman Marcus. Ranging from 10 to 2-year old, the histories of these entrepreneurs show 
that the goals and the trajectory of their evolving beliefs were to create a new culture and 
practice intended for consumption by new elites - both consumers and established brands who 
switched to an Internet culture of distribution and marketing on the Internet. The narratives of 
executives in this direction have evolved in the direction of considering their own organizations 
as the new institutional partners of fashion firms.  
Blumer was right in 1969. The cultural logic on which new players in digital fashion built their 
businesses between 2000 and 2012 was to impress upon a selective audience of old elites. The 
need to draft away apparel merchandise from the institutional accounts of wholesalers and into 
the online websites of e-tailers. New online fashion – technology businesses, asserted their 
founders, were the new institutional elites that surrounded fashion firms on the new channel. 
They argued to be more selection oriented than fashion brands themselves. ”We wanted to 
almost be anti-selection”, as the CEO of a US-born sample sales fashion retailer noted. 
One of the collective advantages for online entrepreneurs in digital fashion was the 
realization that to be successful, they have to recombine their practices in marketing and 
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commerce with the rigid, old culture of their potential clients. The early fashion – technology 
players did not have access to other “born online” counterparts that would eventually coagulate 
into the nurturing community of practice in digital fashion after 2008. The culture and practice of 
the community developed organically and was shared through the “vines” of digital 
collaboration. The weaknesses in marketing and technology into e-commerce pioneers –Bluefly 
and eLuxury - evolved into explicit strengths of later social commerce and e-tail fashion-
technology firms.  
The deep contextual story of DigiVog in chapters 6 and 7 shows how the creative ignition 
and recombination of online technology allowed DigiVog’s founders to conceive of their brand 
as a new fashion brand that happened to be operating with the aid of e-commerce and e-
marketing. DigiVog went culturally and organizationally ahead of fashion-technology peers. 
DigiVog’s founders conceived of their enterprise originally as an “incubator of ideas for the 
transitioning of the culture of fashion brands online”. The company founded its business as a 
creative pure play platform for developing competence that captured the intent of brick-and-
mortar fashion firms to not only sell their merchandise online, but also restructure their 
marketing and commerce operations for the Internet.  
Today, DigiVog is the only fashion – technology firm in online fashion that has been able to 
advance rhetoric and practice that incumbents consider to be beneficial for the future value of 
their brands. Aside from the originality of the construction of this proposition, DigiVog’s team 
offered new sources of digital marketing advantage to its fashion clients and has consistently 
reinterpreted Internet technology to its clients as it continued to discover new sources of value to 
fashion brands online. 
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The multi-disciplinary focus of the firm included value chain expansion into e-retail, e-
marketing and e-publishing. In the emerging field of digital fashion these are key strengths that 
permitted DigiVog to co-participate in the creation of community competence for the emerging 
field. DigiVog is the ethnographic equivalent of the network concept of a “multiple insider”. The 
firm created an ingenious cultural infrastructure for its partner brands by tapping into contextual 
sources of value at the level of the community that translates to these established businesses the 
business and culture of fashion on the Internet.  
Chapter 8 explains the mechanisms through which the sharing of tacit knowledge between social 
publishers and merchant brands has introduced long-term beneficial practices in the digital 
ecology. These new practices in curation and community branding are introducing fashion 
brands to the utility of methods they never would have approved had their routines not evolved 
beyond the Simmelian desire to reproduce for cultural distinction.  
1.5 Research Contributions  
This research confirms Weick et. al.’s proposal (2005) that sensemaking fills important 
gaps in organizational theory and presents evidence that a sensemaking process in which new 
and established participants engage in sharing of knowledge serves as a springboard to 
organizational action. The study strengthens the foundational argument to redefine sensemaking 
as a microsociological organizational practice to be studied in future industry-based 
investigations by using the heuristic elements of the sensemaking framework. The research 
corroborates to the following propositions: 
(1) The governing principle of ecological organizing on the Internet is based on digital 
collectivities.  
(1.1) Collaboration is a native feature of Internet born organizations.  
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 (2) Online entrepreneurs in the emerging field of digital fashion organize into community of 
innovators that collaborate and use action-oriented sensemaking.  
 (2.1) In the absence of institutions governing the behavior of emerging startup fashion – 
technology enterprises on the Internet, orientation with regard to each other through 
knowledge sharing and collaboration is a necessary aspect for achieving viable cultural 
and commercial growth.  
(3) The dual fashion-technology identity of creative organizations in the emerging field of digital 
fashion permits them to engage in two interrelated activities that stimulate the production of 
beneficial innovations:   
(3.1) Internet start-ups in the emerging field of digital fashion create and enable practices 
in e-commerce and e-marketing technology to establish their own brands culturally and 
commercially.  
(3.2) Internet start-ups in the emerging field of digital fashion assist other peers or 
fashion brands in interpreting and applying the repertoire of new practice associated with 
success online. 
The transfer of culture to fashion brands in DigiVog follows a two-step process that starts 
from DigiVog’s New York office, where the marketing and technology teams develop new e-
commerce and digital marketing practice. The practice is shared and adopted by headquarters in 
Milan and transferred to fashion clients. The dual cultural identity of DigiVog is paired with its 
access to diverse resources at the level of the digital community of fashion. The contextual 
access allows the company to create beneficial practice for its fashion clients. 
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Beneficial digital practice is a set of online marketing and e-commerce campaigns and 
actions that are not immediately associated by the creator firm with the ability to generate 
commercial success. The opening of the technological boundary between content and commerce, 
in which the New York City-based team operated, helped the company to complicate the 
measures of success as a mix of commercial and non-commercial key performance indicators. 
Success was interpreted as an exercise in mobilizing diverse resources without immediately 
talking about the bottom line.  
The unfolding of collaboration between players with complementary skills in the space and 
the ability to mobilize established brands is significant because it indicates the growing 
importance of business models with boundary-spanning functions in business and management 
research. Pure play fashion retailers and social-commerce publishers have used the boundary-
spanning nature of their technology models creating a seamless way to help extend each other’s 
audience and capability reach. Technology-fashion companies join forces to bridge their skills 
and open up opportunities as well as to reduce uncertainty inherent in operating under new 
technological regimes.  
One significant conceptual finding emerging from this study is that paradigm-shifting 
cultural change on the Internet materializes by small changes at the level of individual 
organizations comprising the entrepreneurial community in online fashion. For incumbent firms 
the process of coming to terms with new identity was an exercise in selective experimentation. 
At the same time as brands attempted to use the latest advertizing tactics, such as showcasing 
runway shows on YouTube or announcing collections on Facebook, their executives explicitly 
denounced the acceptance of a new commercial culture. Curiosity was a common denominator of 
the deeply intense sensemaking process with which these companies had struggled for so long.  
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Collective sensemaking requires from peers in the emerging community to explore weak 
ties and convert them to multiple strong ties by tapping into insider sources of tacit knowledge 
on the level of the community. The research validates March and collaborators’ (1991) 
proposition that in emerging industries where histories are short and the number of key insiders 
is small, small samples can be of significant import to discovering how aspirations to learn 
change in organizations during key periods in their history. In emerging industries where 
technology change is rapid, the experience of organizations can loosen the link between 
performance and outcomes and the definitions of success or failure depend on the aspiration 
level and on the sensemaking interpretations of community peers.  
This research offers several solutions for executives willing to experiment with online 
practice. It is to learn to manage collaboratively the parts of their value chains that are most 
affected by seemingly persistent shifts in entrepreneurial creativity of new peers. To branch out 
conceptually from the grip of their ubiquitous brick intermediaries, fashion brands can engage in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives with technology-fashion firms. Those actors, executives, and 
companies in the fashion system, which understand that at the core of cultural sensemaking 
online is the pursuit of opportunity for growth achieved by the fostering of beneficial practice, 
would begin to interpret “success” as the willingness to collaborate with others and experiment 
in their cultural and business affairs.  
Chapter 2: Culture and Ritual in Creative Organizations 
2.1 Neither Branding, Nor Commerce: Fashion Shows as “Ritual” Technology 
The fashion system was a cultural enterprise built around the themes of seasonality and trend. 
Trending was frequent and change of trends was initiated twice a year during the industry 
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Fashion Week that still takes place in the four major cultural centers of fashion, New York, 
Paris, London, and Milan. One of the reasons for frequent “trending” was and still continues to 
be the small scale production that luxury fashion firms retain, especially the European, Italian 
and French fashion houses.  
A luxury fashion firm would locate its production in the country of origin, control smaller 
suppliers and perform quality checks of production samples. These activities require rigorous 
quality assurance, because of the growing demands by large buyers for particular garment design 
execution at the time when the purchase order (PO) leaves to the production facility overseas. 
Small-scale production is necessary to control for the ambiguities in the demand of large 
wholesalers, but it makes it difficult for fashion firms to sustain and increase their revenue 
streams. 
The production of high-fashion garments also continues to be very labor-intensive, even after 
the reorganization of the fashion industry from artisanal affair to vertically integrated 
organization (visible specifically in US fashion firms, such as Polo Ralph Lauren). The rule of 
integrating status and craftsmanship has affected how firms in this creative field culturally react 
to the adoption of technical systems along their value chains. “Technically,” the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) at a well-known luxury fashion firm from Italy said, 
 “we have a very limited, very high quality production and we don't want to be too pushy to 
our production facilities because they are not capable to see what really the production needs to 
be. In our example we are talking about 100,000 SKUs a year, so it is not a lot. So, we are able to 
control very, very well the production, [in which] all these processes, from the first idea to the 
first sample, are done most of the time, manually.”  
Through the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, trends in the fashion industry were communicated 
manually. During that period, brands were extremely reliant on original design, and “original 
design” was communicated by their seasonal fashion shows. According to the received culture of 
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the day, original trends could not be done just by anybody. The entire population of fashion peers 
had to wait for the runways to see the future trends. By popular peer construction and critical 
opinion of fashion industry’s two powerful intermediaries, wholesalers and fashion press, only 
one or two designers in the industry were considered to be capable of producing “original” 
trends.  
The “guru” in the 1970s, for example, was the Japanese house of Kenzo, headed by the 
legendary Kenzo Takada. The Creative Director at a global fashion consulting firm in NYC and 
an internationally renowned expert on fashion trending, argued that the standing of the House of 
Kenzo in the 1970s had such a dramatic impact on the subsequent derivative styles produced by 
fashion companies, because Mr. Kenzo had the foresight to produce "a look that was so definitive 
each season that everyone in the industry could copy and did copy".  
Photographers were hardly ever allowed on the shows, and trend experts attending the 
runway shows of Mr. Kenzo learned to scribble quick illustrations of his elaborate. After the 
copies have been produced, "[…] we would then slide the handwritten notes under the doors of 
designers that did not have the opportunity to attend the show. This is how trending then was 
communicated".  
This example elucidates that firms in the fashion industry legitimated themselves by 
adopting, as dubbed by one fashion executive, a “peer pack” approach; or, using the lingo of  the 
institutional perspective, an “isomorphic” approach to their legitimation of practice. To follow 
this approach of peer pack mentality was considered to be a gauge for originality. Of course, as 
the industry progressed in this creative pursuit, as one pundit in trending put it, this led to "a 
lock-in effect that for decades continued to feed the fashion industry only one lesson - the lesson 
of retro trending".  
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Today, seasonal fashion shows remain an artifact of this management myth. They are still the 
forums where retro trending is communicated. "There was actually a time when trends were 
new”, lamented a fashion consultant at a global retail consulting firm in New York. “Fashion 
shows are entertainment today. They are creating brand awareness. From the runways, we don't 
even laugh at these unwearable creations.”  
The problem, according to this executive, is that to copy each other’s designs cannot be used 
for collective legitimation today. The two most stylistic shows of 2010 can accommodate this 
claim. Alexander McQueen's was dwelling on the theme of prehistoric birds. Karl Lagerfeld's 
show in Paris was based on a fantasy Marie Antoinette had - to be a peasant girl. Both of these 
shows went as far as polar opposites could. Originality was now communicated by being as 
different as possible. There was a trend, the executive mused, to “make things as short as they 
can possibly go”. But, even by discerning this trend, the fashion industry did not appear to offer 
“something definitive” – a style that was original and required to be followed by the “pack”.  
The myth of having to follow a leader in trending could no longer serve the purpose of 
legitimating collective behavior. As a result, the actual function of fashion shows has become 
more explicit. Fashion shows are, simply, the occasions for negotiating next season’s 
commercial bottom line with wholesale clients. Seasonal Fashion Weeks always coincide with a 
highpoint in the year when samples of new collections are produced and ready to be shown 
backstage to fashion firms’ largest clients – wholesale buyers, such as Neiman Marcus, Saks, 
Nordstrom, or the Italian Rinascente.  
The Chief Information Officer (CIO) at a luxury Italian fashion label supported the argument. 
To showcase the post-runway samples is the most important commercial event in the season, he 
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said, because the production of merchandise begins right after the client issues a PO (purchase 
orders) backstage.  
“After we present our collection to the customer during fashion shows […], and once they 
select the product, we quickly place customer order in the system. Once we have customer 
orders, it takes some time, from three weeks to three months, depending on the vendor and 
selected design. So, immediately after we have customer orders, we begin to analyze the trends 
of sales, we begin to figure out…, so in this moment, production begins to buy all fabrics, they 
begin to allocate, capacity, what they're able to do. Of course, production needs to start a.s.a.p., 
to begin to purchase.”  
In no other industry is the myth of creativity so ostensibly divorced from the actual reality of 
producing and selling with the desire to attain commercial viability. The product samples that a 
high-fashion label actually offers after the show to its wholesale clients differs substantially from 
what is shown on the runway. The Style Editor at the Wall Street Journal mused at a talk that 
"backstage with McQueen, the merchandise available for purchase and the styles available at 
wholesalers like Saks are not remotely the same thing". "You know how it works", a fashion 
consultant retorted, "there is craziness on the stage, but the retailer
2
 walks into the fashion room 
and there is an entirely different range of sellable clothes."  
A trend consultant voiced his disapproval of this decoupling of the myth of the construction 
of creativity in the fashion system. “One of the things that have changed the paradigm”, he said, 
"[…] is that consumers now have access to these stupid fashion shows. They like what they see 
and they expect to find that. In the past, the consumer didn't see ‘the who’, only the trade side 
saw it, and the trade people understood what to ignore and what to put their faith in. But, now it 
has gotten crazy and the lunatics have taken over the asylum. [...] How confusing is that? We are 
supposed to be the authorities! People need to be told specifically and exactly what is presented 
to them. Designers are realizing that there is a problem with endless fashion shows“.  
                                                          
2
  Here used in the sense of a wholesaler client, such as Saks. 
 23 
 
The point of decoupling is to disambiguate the ritualistic practice of continually sustained 
high marketing costs, required for nourishing the management myths. The main expenditures of 
high-fashion brands – Gucci, Prada, Dolce & Gabbana, Versace, Thom Browne, or Karl 
Lagerfeld- are their communications costs. As indicated by the CIO at one Italian brand, “[T]he 
costs are production costs - materials; marketing costs and distribution. Usually if you can reduce 
this cost as much as possible, is good. This is a major problem for high fashion firms because 
they can't reduce the production costs or the marketing costs (publicity, advertizing follow some 
rules) […]”.  
If fashion runways represent exaggerated performances obscuring behind-the-scenes 
practices that characterize the actual process of sensemaking that goers into creation of culture in 
fashion firms, then what practice do fashion firms explicitly advertise as a commercial practice? 
Executives in the fashion system know that commercial success for their firms is as important as 
sustaining the social and cultural reproduction of their brands. The problem is that everything 
related to experimenting with or creating new kinds of commercial practice in fashion firms has 
been obscured from view and is not considered to be a cultural exercise in originality. Large 
wholesalers are treated as brand-makers by the Communications divisions, while Financial 
Planners inside fashion firms have taken an increasing proportion of the role of Creative Design 
teams. The “lunatics” had, indeed, taken over the “asylum." 
2.2 Institutional Constraints  
The reliance of high-fashion firms and the brick-and-mortar fashion industry on wholesalers 
has its roots in the 1950s, when old couturiers had to become ready-to-wear fashion houses (and 
make money). The fashion industry and its incumbent brands had practiced this ceremonial 
relationship with their clients since the 1960s. USA’s oldest department store Neiman Marcus, 
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having relied on couturiers before to make most of its own sales, had to re-interpret what ready-
to-wear means to their own customers each time they bought new collections from designer 
labels. Wholesalers had the opportunity to partake in the creation of brand identity for fashion 
houses since the 1950s. Neiman Marcus and other large peers began, together with fashion 
publications with whose directors they have collaborated ever since, to navigate the space of 
high-fashion, attaining the cultural clout of assigning exclusivity and originality to fashion 
brands. Fashion firms were sensitive to equating price with originality and innovation, yet did 
not mind participating in this socially legitimated enterprise, because the “more original” they 
were considered to be, the more floor space they could receive.  
The Director General of Altagamma, the Italian Luxury Firms Foundation, mused at the 
memory that  
“When I started working in this area – 1966 – 99.99% of the products were channelized in 
the multi-brand stores.” Hardly any fashion brands at the time actually owned single branded 
stores. Particularly, these were jewelry stores: Bulgari, Cartier, Tiffany, Graaf, Asprey, etc. But, 
not so many. And, the other industry was leather bags:  Louis Vuitton, Salvatore Ferragamo, 
Gucci, Prada, and Coach. But, apart from that, the majority of the goods were channelized 
through the multi-brands.” 
In private talks, a mere two years after the onset of the financial crisis, some fashion 
executives became outspoken on their cultural dependence on wholesalers. One executive shared 
that "the fashion industry has become so consolidated today that analyzing the few department 
stores that are left is not appealing anymore." The Credit and Treasury Director at the NYC 
headquarters of a luxury Italian label, with operating revenue for 2010 of €1.4 billion, was 
similarly unenthusiastic about the cultural role of wholesalers in sustaining the businesses of 
fashion brands.  
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In the worst months of 2008, his brand had to wait up to 90 days to receive pending 
payments on their merchandise from Neiman Marcus, and its largest store – Saks 5th Avenue. 
Both of these clients had accumulated “bad credits” and the brand had difficulty to negotiate 
financing with the factor firm; the financial firm that typically backs credit lines for fashion 
brands necessary for their survival until they receive account payables by their large clients at the 
end of each season.  
Not only did high-fashion brands have liquidity troubles under these circumstances; their 
Head Design teams now had to think out how to produce designs that were increasingly 
divergent from the rest of their peers. Said the Credit and Treasury Director of the Italian brand: 
“During the recession it was tough, because the factor could also go down. For a while, we 
did not have a factor. We had to deal with the accounts receivables in-house. As of April 1 
(2010), we have a new factor. Our factor company was able to reduce our surcharges because the 
risk was lower. In 2009, during the recession the aim was to create products that the customer is 
buying. And, for example, for March 2010, our retail sales were 1.6% higher.”  
The wholesale advantage against fashion brands was clearly commercial. It placed fashion 
brands at imminent disadvantage and financial peril. The reliance of fashion brands on these 
large clients however soon also became related to maintaining the cultural legitimacy of their 
brands. The VP of a large retail consulting firm in New York pointed out in 2010 that this 
systemic direction was inevitable, because Neiman Marcus and Saks had the advantage to be 
"too big to fail and […] Macy's and J.C. Penney are bigger than most of the brands that they 
have”.  
The new social mechanism for cultural legitimation wad embedded in the fashion brand 
wholesale relationship visible in the disproportionately higher ability of wholesalers “to issue a 
purchase order (PO) to a fashion brand, say, Gucci, and the latter has the responsibility to do all 
the rest; specify the product, acquire the materials, get it from source, to a central distribution 
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source, and eventually to Saks's premises”. Wholesalers became regarded as brand-makers and 
arbiters in fashion, giving rise to the myth that separated their commercial ‘obligation’ from their 
newly invented branding role. 
Twice in their history, at the end of 1980s and after 2008, fashion brands tried to have 
commercial clout over their own sales and brand positioning. Toward the end of the 1980s, large 
wholesalers began to adopt new technologies in their relations with fashion brands, such as 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
3
 These new technologies allowed US-based wholesalers to 
optimize their own production streams and begin requiring from fashion clients to frequent 
changes in size, and even in design for the contracted merchandise.  
EDI was a private standard developed to better control the purchase order (PO) transactions 
with fashion firms. Many high-fashion executives considered the practice to be a private 
governance mechanism and disagreed with its application. The CIO at an Italian high-fashion 
company explained that, 
“[T]hey [wholesalers] decided that they need to have single standard format in order to 
receive information from all the different brands, and essentially for each brand to use this 
technology. In reality, and this is true for most of the other fashion brands, EDI is just a service 
to the main clients, Neiman Marcus and Saks, in order to be able to work with them. The fast 
response model works very well when you sell T-shirts, but doesn't work well when you sell 
fashion products. [Our products] have a very short life… Usually, they are born and die in one 
season.”  
Some brands fathomed that their relationships with wholesalers had little to do with a 
legitimating process of “becoming” a brand. Save for shop-floor space negotiations and changes 
in demand, wholesalers had no engagement that offered nurturing branding practices for fashion 
                                                          
3   The transactions involved transmitting a standardized message from one computer to another 
before the Internet (Laudon & Laudon, 2004). EDI now involves using the Internet for transporting EDI 
messages. The using of Internet for mediating electronic transactions allows business partners to get rid of 
the added cost of paying for an EDI mailbox residing on an EDI VAN. 
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companies. Executives in high-fashion brands slowly realized that they needed more control over 
their branding and marketing operations. “A revolution took place in the early 80s,” recounts the 
Director of the Italian fashion association. “Fashion companies pushed a lot – and particularly, 
Italian, for the creation of single-branded stores, and they started opening single-branded stores, 
particularly in the US. And, when the department stores reacted, Versace, Armani, Ermenegildo 
Zegna, and Gucci proposed to the US department stores to open single-branded boutiques within 
their space. Immediately, on the same direction was Polo Ralph Lauren.” 
By then, however, it was too late. Department stores reacted by proposing the “shop-
within-shop” concept in order to avoid competing with the single-branded stores and European 
and US-born fashion brands increased their reliance on wholesalers over the years. The ability 
of fashion companies to run, create and culturally own their brands became increasingly 
limited. In the end of 1990s the average Italian brand would have commercial and brand-
related overexposure in dealing with multiple brick-and-mortar distribution channels, such as 
multi-brand, single-brand, and shop-within-shop establishments, and relying on an increasing 
amount of sales with a decreasing number of large consolidated partners.  
2.3 Routine-dependent Cultural Constraints 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2010, a problem of balance emerged between 
creative teams and commercial planners in fashion firms that were considered to be among the 
most design-driven fashion brands. This trend is best explained as another shift in legitimacy in 
decision-making in the most intangible element in the production of cultural value in fashion 
firms - design.  
Fashion companies are known to be careful when internalizing new technology solutions, 
particularly when the advice of deploying these technologies is driven by commercial results. 
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Retail consulting firms have detected that apparel firms go through “a lifecycle of functions that 
emerge after a company is born.” A typical apparel fashion firm normally organizes around two 
functions – communications and design.  
Fashion firms start off with very limited merchandising capability in inventory management. 
As the company grows, the number of its own stores would grow as well and the managing of 
purchase orders (PO) from production vendors to wholesale clients would increase in 
complexity. Table 1 presents a rough workflow of the cultural negotiations that occur long time 
before production or samples is conceived. These negotiations take place prior to any 
involvement from Communications; the other most important function in fashion firms.  
The sketch confirms that the complexity of forecasting and planning technology has 
permitted financial functions in fashion firms, such as planning and merchandising, to have 
decision-making clout over the most subliminal functions in a fashion firm – the definition and 
delimiting of the seasonal collection. The kinds of questions that planners can influence here are 
absolutely essential to the final collection, because not only the quantities, but styles themselves 
are defined by these financial functions.  
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Table 1 Role Planning and Cultural Negotiations from Creation to Production in Fashion Firms  
A Senior Buyer at one of USA’s largest vertically integrated apparel firm argued that the 
Head Designer (also Chairman of the Board and CEO) was traditionally tackling "every financial 
decision". She noted the change: 
"[...] Design has always been completely free in every decision. It was not merchandise-
oriented at all. Lately, there has been some reshuffling in the company, for the economic 
downturn, and merchandise is more in charge. This is not easy, because we are such a design-
driven company and the design team directly reports to [Head Designer] and [Head Designer] is 
still involved in every decision. It's a little bit like that -- merchandise telling design what they 
can do, how big the line can be, how many new models they can design, in how many colors 
they can do the line, because it is based on how much they can sell.  Lately, it’s still a little bit of 
a bad situation, since when the line designer can't do what he wants, he goes straight to [Head 
Designer], and says, ‘the merchandiser doesn't want me to edit new order, but I think you should 
press them’. And, obviously [Head Designer] says, go for it. It's like endless […] it's a constant 
back and forth meetings, back-to-back."  
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Supply-chain experts corroborated that financial planning, and not design, is taking the head 
position in fashion brands. “What usually happens”, the Senior Application Analyst at a global 
database consulting firm concluded, “is that a new season starts in fashion with financial 
planning.  
“They first start with the merchandising plan, then assortment planning, promotions, that is 
the seasonality of the items. All this is driven by a demand forecast […] driving the allocation 
based on the forecast. At the end of the season, how do I clear that merchandise, which is 
seasonal in nature, and I don't want to carry, and how do I get the highest margin I can? Then 
they make a budget and within that budget they say: ‘now, what assortment do I need to have to 
help me reach that financial goal’? Now they're starting to look at colors, types, fabrics. They use 
historical sales information and forecasting to help them see where the market is moving. They 
maybe have to plan a year or more in advance of what's gonna be hot.” 
The Creative Editor at the Wall Street Journal exclaimed in 2010 that "major merchandising 
decisions now take place at a level that is so far removed from the selling floor…that the tail is 
wagging the dog." The new division of labor gives occasion to executives with no decision-
making power in the area of marketing or branding to offer precipitous advice on what their 
brand is about. For example, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of a publicly traded retail 
company in the US with annual sales of $2B and a market cap of $4.06B in 2011 suggested that 
the prevailing cultural narrative in fashion brands is to have a ”[…] hard commitment to 
quantities and soft commitment to clothing lines.” The CIO was enthusiastic to engage in a 
rhetoric which ascribed to the fashion brand whose information systems he managed, the 
attributes of a “[…] design-driven company, because the nature of our designs is very unique.”  
This new way of ritual legitimation of the most important function in fashion firms is 
unintentionally designed to obscure the crisis of legitimacy suffered by the system as a whole. 
We now understand why fashion shows are a necessary cultural vehicle intended to help fashion 
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firms maintain the façade of myth and ritual pertaining to original design. Fashion shows are an 
important vehicle that supports the cultural rite of creativity.  
2.4 New Institutional demands and the “Break-up” of Incumbent Technology and Practice 
The financial crisis had the equivalent of a paradigm-shifting effect on the luxury segment of 
the fashion industry. In 2010, the CEO of fashion industry’s main client, Saks, reported some 
changes in the cultural practice of buying from fashion firms that his company was willing to 
support:  
“ [..] The four components: the product itself, the selling environment; the selling and 
cost structure. Every one of them needs to be redefined. If you look at product – it's about 
value now. […] consumers want luxury products, but luxury products are differentiated: 
they're exclusive, they have limited distribution; they're not widely available and that's what 
makes luxury special. But people want value. And value doesn't necessarily mean price. It 
could be price, but it's about quality, design, it's feeling that whatever they're buying is worth 
it. Tory's [Burch] brand is a luxury brand; it's not at the same price point as some of the 
younger brands, but this is why it sells so well, because if you buy designers brand, it's 
quality and its value for the consumer.”  
This programmatic statement made it clear that the cultural tale of luxury would shift from 
the traditional association with “craftsmanship, timelessness, and heritage4” to luxury by “value” 
that is not defined by a (high) price. After the crisis, wholesalers had made their rhetorical stance 
as commercial partners and as makers of meaning for fashion brands. Hungered for revenue, 
between 2008 and 2010, Neiman and Saks, restructured their brand portfolios and employed this 
new cultural rhetoric to buy and advance lesser known, cheaper brands. The reinvented brand-
maker rhetoric proposed that (having satiated the consumer with high-price, high-fashion brands) 
the large department stores should now be getting “[…] something that they [consumers] can't 
get anywhere else. I hope that we can focus on differentiation, 25-30% products you can't find 
                                                          
4  These three proxies were suggested by Fabio Leoncini, Managing Director of the luxury goods 
unit and member of the Board of Directors of Loro Piana, SPA - one of the world’s most renowned 
luxury garment firms, specializing is custom-made cashmere production; he called his company a "tiny 
global luxury retailer". 
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anywhere else. Doesn't mean brands necessarily, but products you can't find anywhere else. And 
then, we are going to be marketing it in a totally different manner.” 
Price and subsequent commercial results became further dissociated from the goals of high-
fashion firms. With the crisis, the "best" price point at which a brand was considered to be 
eligible to qualify for a luxury proposition, changed. Steve Sadove, CEO of Saks, reported that 
“in the new world, you've seen changes. You're seeing a bifurcation – a lot of the entry level 
within some of the high-end brands and the very high end price points. We talk about luxury – 
and luxury is at multiple price points.”  
The concept of differentiated luxury, according to which a “luxury” brand could now be 
placed at differentiated price points, was seen as a propeller of innovation. Sadove noted that 
“[…] in the fashion apparel market, when there is differentiation, there is innovation. We have a 
whole platter of brands that didn't exist a year ago, and that's really the future.” Although some 
representatives of high-fashion brands, such as the Managing Director of Loro Piana SpA, were 
certain that “the crisis help to draw a defining line between luxury and fashion,” other fashion 
pundits, as the Managing Partner of Elixir Advisors, suggested that “luxury became overused, 
overdesigned concept” that necessitated a new phase in the development of the fashion industry.  
Other industry pundits soon joined the claim of department stores. Jean-Noel Capferer, an 
industry consultant, asserted that “[P]rice is not the point. People want experiences; people want 
to rise above and have fantastic experiences, which happen to be expensive.”  
Price became a prejudice. The changes in culture were unilaterally imposed by wholesalers, 
because fashion firms had made their cultural routines dependent on the cultural legitimation of 
intermediaries, considered to be “insiders” to the industry.  The final divorce of wholesalers and 
their transition from commercial to branding partners came with these claims.  
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Chapter 3: Theory and Method 
“…the web isn’t like all the other things governments regulate.” Thus, reads the 
epigrammatic retort of Vint Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist at Google, offered 
by him to address the challenge of cultural interpretation of Internet organizations, in an email 
dated April 9th, 2012. “It’s not a system of roads, or a factory, or a farm, or a company”, he 
continues. “It’s an organic collection of diverse communities whose shared conversations are 
making the world a better place.”  
This research studies the nature and impact of organizing for online entrepreneurs on the 
Internet. It uses the case of the fashion system and pairs up two very different kinds of players 
bearing dissimilar cultures, goals, and interpretations of commercial and cultural success. The 
two categories are online technology-fashion organizations that are born online and conduct their 
businesses in the emerging field of digital fashion, and brick-and-mortar fashion brands. The 
dissertation studies how online communities can influence the choice of practice and culture of 
mature firms entering the new domain for value creation by facilitating the development of 
beneficial practice that affects the behavior of incumbents. The research posits in the final that 
due to their exclusive access to contextual knowledge co-created by each community 
collaborator, online communities in the emerging field of digital fashion are uniquely culturally 
positioned to be the transporters of new identity for incumbents.  
There are a number of questions relating to pragmatic inquiry in organizational sociology and 
management by answering which we can establish the nexus of thinking about evolution, 
survival, efficiency, and function of organizations on the Internet. For example, does the study of 
internet-only organizations offer specific results with regard to conceptualizing organizational 
formation and work practice on this channel? What prompts some Internet technology start-ups 
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to organize and collaborate in diverse communities, in which each partner contributes with a 
complementary skill? Why can online organizations in some industries change the culture and 
practice of incumbents that endeavor to position their brands and sell their products on the new 
channel? What part of the cognitive behavior and creative negotiation skillset of newcomers 
persuades incumbents to respond to novelty?  
Vint Cerf’s statement imputes that an Internet mode of organizing in “diverse communities” 
has inherent beneficial qualities that are difficult to define and that make the new domain for 
value creation culturally different and novel from other fields. It follows that to learn to use the 
channel for business and branding, incumbents from industries with modes of distribution and 
marketing that are created in a manufacturing context, should pay heed to contextual advice of 
these communities.  
Firms born on the Internet and Internet communities of diverse organizations collaborating 
for a common goal have not been rigorously investigated in the organizational literature, nor has 
impact of these organizations been related to parallel brick-and-mortar industries. Scholars tend 
to squarely place online businesses as dichotomous conduits of information to larger publics or 
other businesses. In this capacity, online firms can mediate information (“infomediaries”) or 
mediate innovation (“innomediaries”) (Sawney et.al. 2003). Deep investigative accounts of 
organizational change in online organizations are scarce.  
When scholars do study innovations in technology or business process done by online 
companies, the common suggestion has been that innovation online is the product of a 
“continually morphing” menu of capabilities in online firms (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Hagel, 
2002). Online entrepreneurs whose companies become engines for commercial growth are rarely 
investigated for sources of non-commercial value to partners or new entrants and some scholars 
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have recently argued that only quasi-entrepreneurial consumer communities can create 
innovations with “beneficial” effects that encompass learning and dissemination of these 
innovations to community members (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Shah and Tripsas, 2007).  
We know, on the other hand, that incumbents rarely trust newcomers and suffer from various 
ailments related to unhealthy attachment to their routines (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). As a case in point, at the time that the online 
community around digital fashion began developing new practices, such as community branding 
in 2009-2010, brick-and-mortar fashion firms had no intention of accepting any of the tools, 
practice and culture of their Internet peers.  
Fashion brands, in particular, can be a perfect case study for managerial default in the 
explicit terms that Christensen lays out in his analysis of dissociative incumbent behavior in 
1997. These firms lack explicit commitment to commercial results, but have increasingly 
structured their operations to reflect extreme reliance on profit generation. Fashion firms do not 
collaborate with their peers and manage to live in this misconception by recruiting vast amounts 
of advertising dollars to their Communications Divisions and finances to their gatekeeper 
intermediaries, large wholesalers and fashion magazines. Wholesalers, such as Neiman Marcus, 
serve as commercial lifelines for fashion brands, even though brands frequently rely on factor 
companies to repay the vast outstanding debts of their gatekeepers. Fashion magazines, such as 
Vogue, can raise or reduce the awareness about a brand through editorials and advertising. These 
two types of intermediary are perceived in the retail industry to affect the standing of a brand 
much like analysts on Wall Street can cause tumult for firms wishing to diversify their brands to 
new areas of functional expertize (Zuckerman, 1999). 
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The reason for my choice of this emerging organizational field is both theoretical and 
pragmatic. Due to the problems of accessing elites, sociology has historically studied less 
successful and more marginalized market actors (e.g., collective movements).  I, conversely, 
study the online practices and mechanisms for survival of old elites (i.e., luxury fashion houses), 
the cultural toolset of new elites (i.e., online entrepreneurs), and the clashes between the two 
categories.  
If there is learning that takes place between incumbents and new technology-fashion 
organizations, the process would require of new elites to deliberately develop creative apparatus 
for old elites to learn about, interpret and accept the use of digital tools for e-commerce and 
marketing. This type of beneficial collaboration is very difficult to envisage in practice because it 
requires the kind of trust that the obscurantist ritual culture of fashion brands prohibits.  
Meyer and Rowan have been helpful in explaining institutions as complexes of cultural rules 
(1977). They argued that organizations emerge as the rational outcome of cultural rules, which 
provide the basis for their construction (Scott, 2008). The argument from Meyer and Rowan is 
useful in so much as it helps explain the foundation for legitimating ceremoniality and myth in 
mature organizations as a form of legitimacy that reduces uncertainty. Recently, Scott (2008) has 
suggested that the three pillars that support the resilience of institutions – here applied as cultural 
rules that facilitate the emergence of common behaviors in the emerging field – should be 
studied in distinction. From this vantage point, studied could address independently the existence 
and emergence of cultural-cognitive elements of institutional domains, those “the shared 
conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is 
made.” (Scott, 2008: 57). 
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Scott’s proposition for studying culture and cognition in organizations as an independent 
conception that gives rise to meaning fits nicely with Weick and collaborators’ argument for 
studying sensemaking as a practice-oriented phenomenon “that make[s] it more future oriented, 
more action oriented, more macro, more closely tied to organizing, meshed more boldly with 
identity, more visible, more behaviorally defined, less sedentary and backward looking, more 
infused with emotion and with issues of sensegiving and persuasion” (Weick et. al., 2005:409).  
This narrative integrates sensemaking and organizing approaches from Weick et al. (2005) 
and Scott (2008) in examining the momentum for collaboration between incumbent fashion firms 
and online entrepreneurs in the period between 2010 and 2012. The 2-year historical “moment” 
is infused with counteracting meaning for both categories, and yet, collaboration does occur and 
consistent behaviors do follow. The ritualistic beliefs of fashion incumbents described in Chapter 
1 were hard to straddle to an entrepreneurial culture on the new channel. Despite their fear and 
taken for granted rules of conduct, fashion organizations gradually took liking for the 
entrepreneurial method of their new counterparts online.   
3.1 What is New about Online Organizations? 
Entrepreneurship research traditionally approaches the Internet as “a powerful platform for 
collaborating with customers on innovation” (Sawney et. al., 2003: 77). The speed of technology 
changes make the Internet a productive domain in which to study the unfolding of contextual 
practices between businesses. Researchers have recognized that the new channel presents an 
ideal-typical case for studying networked collaboration, as it happens.  
Recent submissions by Sawney et. al. (2005) have also attempted to build taxonomy of 
online organizational forms, based on the capability of online organizations to transmit ever 
more complex information to consumers or other related firms. The authors look at the evolution 
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of online platforms created by established firms in order to facilitate the sharing of information 
with consumers of their products. The result is a taxonomy that includes two main new types of 
organizations on the Internet, info- and innomediaries. Infomediaries are "expert-meets-user" 
communities, such as CNET.com and Angieslist.com. They are perceived to be online-only 
ventures that “gather and organize information on products and services for individuals 
considering a purchase” (2003: 78).  
The second category is the perceivably more robust and novel form of "innomediary". As in 
the infomediary case, this online organization is created by established brick-and-mortar firms, 
such as Eli Lilly’s InnoCentive initiative offering intellectual collaboration to other established 
firms in pharma and biotechnology.  
Taxonomy studies like these may be useful pointers to focusing the discussion on how the 
culture of new online companies created by “analog” firms differs from their parents’ idea of 
success and novelty. However, innovation and entrepreneurship research needs to offer a 
common research agenda and framework for describing and explaining the emergence, capability 
development and the ability of online-only organizations to impact the culture and practice of 
established firms. One way to survey these phenomena inductively is by doing exploratory 
inductive research, and qualitative in-depth studies of a cross-section of a community that testify 
to common cultural characteristics in the community. 
There is little research showing the interplay between variables, such as technology, 
organizational practice and goals for organizations and brands born on the Internet. There is also 
limited evidence about the mechanisms that firms online use to make sense of collaboration and 
how they conceptualize success. Entrepreneurship literature and the literature on the sociology of 
innovation need to offer an explanation of how companies on the Internet achieve success; 
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whether certain types of collaboration are preferred or can lead to “more” success; and, if 
collaboration with each other is, in itself, a metric for success.  
In the absence of this pragmatic research agenda, when organization and innovation research 
attempt to build taxonomies of meta-organizational arrangements found in online organizations, 
the result is an incomplete kaleidoscope of organizational forms and insufficient understanding 
of their methods of becoming and thriving on this creative new channel.  
Beneficial Innovations, Creators and Enablers 
The online channel is a virtual ‘playground’. We need to know the underlying forces that 
ignite creativity in online businesses. E–collectivities on the Internet are both social and 
entrepreneurial formations. Entrepreneurial collectivities are interested in pursuing opportunities. 
Opportunities are pursued by a process of continual experimenting with new digital tools and 
practice. The virtual domain of branding on the Internet also contains new and existing players. 
These players comprise the inner structure of the emerging field, in this case, of digital fashion.  
The two broad categories comprise the ecology in this dissertation: online-only companies 
and established fashion firms. If collaboration is a native feature of Internet-born organizations, 
companies born online will be engaged two interrelated functions. The first is positioning 
themselves as brands and establishing their businesses culturally and commercially. For online 
merchants, for example, this would include recruiting old brands into the digital domain by 
acquiring their merchandise, or selling commercial and digital marketing services to this 
category. The second is to help, facilitate or assist other peers or fashion brands in interpreting, 
using, and understanding digital technology for e-commerce and online marketing. This second 
function of an online community would be “beneficial” and the technologies and practice 
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developed with regard to facilitating the businesses of other peers can be conceptualized as 
beneficial technologies.  
This proposition is put forward with substantial pragmatic reason. Beneficial or non-
commercial determinants of growth have been conceptualized well by many start-up 
entrepreneurs, who have moved on to establish some of the most commercially successful 
organizations. In the “Pirates of Silicon Valley” documentary Steve Wozniak – the computer 
engineer, who co-founded Apple, explained that the risk of failure was worth a creative try 
because “at least, we could say that we owned a company.” In describing his own period of 
leaving Apple, Steve explained what seemed to be a critical component of Apple's problems; the 
lack of passion: "My passion has been to build an enduring company where people were 
motivated to make great products. The products, not the profits, were the motivation. Sculley 
flipped these priorities to where the goal was to make money. It's a subtle difference, but it ends 
up meaning everything." 
While beneficial innovations are understandably more frequently cited in health or 
environmental research (Taylor et. al., 1978; Haider et. al., 2004), management and 
organizational sociology submissions have provided persuasive arguments as to the value of 
seeking and value creation that these approaches, technologies and practices develop and convey 
(Abrahamson, 1991; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Tripsas, 2009). 
This dissertation categorizes online entrepreneurs in the emerging field of digital fashion into 
creators and enablers of beneficial innovations (Figure 1). Creators are online startup 
entrepreneurs creating and advancing business models, technology, and practice for the field and 
other peers to use. For example, Google can be characterized as a digital creator of the beneficial 
technology of search. Google has created a proprietary algorithm that decides which keywords 
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(and websites) are more relevant and highly ranked than others. When a party conducts search on 
a term that relates to, say, branded keyword on fashion merchandise, such as “Burberry Trench”, 
the implication is that the results displayed upon this search query will be highly relevant and 
play in the ability of a firm to be highly searchable online.  
Enablers are companies advancing new cultural practices that expose the businesses of their 
partners to beneficial effects related to the exposure of their businesses to new audiences, 
marketing reach, and cultural pursuits. 
Culture / practice 2.0  Enabling            2.0  Critical  
                              Google Inc. (1998) 
                              DigiVog Group (2000) 
            DigiVog.com (2000) 
            Meet.com (2006) 
            Net-à-Porter (2000) 
            ShopStyle (2006)  
            Gilt Groupe (2007) 
                Digi1 (2009)                
            Polyvore (2009)                                    
            Fashion Stake (est. 2010) 
           SocialCom.com (2010) 
 
Creators. Create and advance business 





Enablers. Advance new bricolage practices 
that help peers out with marketing and branding. 
Figure 1  Ecological characteristics of the online digital fashion community 
In the emerging digital field of fashion, online fashion retailers, for example, are technology-
fashion firms that have designed key parts of their value-chain, such as commerce, marketing, 
and branding, exclusively for the digital channel. They typically own the back and front end 
technology solutions for their businesses and come up with creative ways to display and promote 
branded fashion merchandise from brick-and-mortar fashion brands. These players also create 
beneficial new business models and practices, such as community branding, extending beyond 
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the traditional function of selling into branding, product curation, and creation of editorial 
content.  
These new fashion companies actively collaborate with the other part of the ecology, social-
commerce publishers; a broad category that includes online blogs and bloggers (
5
), online social-
shopping destinations (ShopStyle, Polyvore), social networks (Facebook), and online magazines 
(Refinery 29.com, Nylon Magazine.com, Vogue.com, Elle.com, Style.com). These companies 
are enablers of beneficial innovations and consider themselves culturally to serve as editorial 
platforms for the production and distributing of fashion related content.  
3.2 Why Collaborate?  
Together is better: Organizational Collectivities on the Internet 
The appeal of examining what is now known as resource recombinations in firms originates 
in the work of Schumpeter who emphasized that "entrepreneurship" in the capitalist system can 
generate types of innovations that alter the rules of an industry (Schumpeter, 1942; Schumpeter, 
1947). The concept of the Schumpeterian "creative destruction" comes from the ability of 
entrepreneurs to recognize value and recombine existing resources in a novel fashion. However, 
Schumpeter understood the defining characteristic of an entrepreneurial innovation that has the 
beneficial qualities of a new creative momentum as “simply the doing of new things, or the 
doing of things that are already being done in a new way”. (1947: p., emphasis added.)  
                                                          
5
 A typical Top 10 blog listing of personal blogs includes in the community of digital fashion the 
following players: Jak & Jil (blogger: Tommy Ton), Hanneli (blogger: Hanbeli Mustaparta), Sea of 
Shoes (blogger: Jane Aldridge), The Man Repeller (blogger: Leandra Medine), Gala Darling (blogger: 
Gala Darling), Karla’s Closet (blogger: Karla Deras)  The Selby (blogger: Todd Selby), B.Jones 
Style (blogger: Beth Jones), Trop Rouge (blogger: Christina Caradona, Natalie Off Duty (blogger: Natalie 
Suarez), Bleach Black (bloggers Kristin and Valerie), Fashion Toast (blogger: Rumi Neely).  
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An important precursor of “why collaborate” is the principle of ecological organizing 
between online organizations, based on collectivities. The key assumption in defining online 
start-ups in the emerging field of digital fashion as a collectivity of innovators is that their 
behavior is not bound by institutional rules. The digital community in the emerging field of 
fashion lacks attachment to any particular association or industry and contextual constraints can 
only come from their peers. Since the Internet is unregulated institutionally, the productivity and 
success of the community, such as access to creative digital resources, creates advantages for 
collaborators that allow establishing dominant position in interpreting the meaning for the use of 
new technology.  
Google provides one example illustrating this principle of relative freedom in the pursuit of 
opportunity on the Internet
6
. The search services that Google provides to its clients are regulated 
by its own “Terms of Service.” This set of liability protection policies, including privacy policies 
protecting the company from third-party abuse in its main business area of Internet search, is 
subject to unilateral change at any time. The reason to guard this area of expertise is not to 
protect the proprietary knowledge over the technology, but to set private governance 
mechanisms that discourage other potential parties, directly infringing on Google’s boundaries of 
competence, to developing that knowledge
7
.  
By contrast, organizations in stable domains can be also conceptualized as rules developed 
by institutions that participants internal to the rule-binding process do not understand (Mauris 
                                                          
6 https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ 
7 Curiously enough, a similar rule operates also in the fashion industry proper when it comes to 
protecting the intangible elements of the proprietary knowledge of incumbent brands. The Vice President 
of a retail management consultancy in New York noted in an interview, after being asked where the real 
value added in mass retailers, such as Zara. “Zara's real advantage is not their supply chain (SC). 
Anybody could do what Zara does. Zara's real advantage is their understanding of the consumer and their 
feedback connections that they have form that consumer that gets fed into the SC. Anybody who has the 
appetite for risk and the capital to invest could have a SC that looks exactly like Zara's.” 
 44 
 
and Sorge, 2000). The Internet is a new channel for value creation. Institutional fields here are in 
flux and businesses plot their strategies for survival against the backdrop of evolving 
technologies in e-commerce and digital marketing to ensure their commercial and brand-related 
success. Because technologies develop fast and their interpretations by actors differ in the 
evolving field, Internet businesses tend to guard their hard-earned competence by sharing it only 
with peers they interpret as "insiders".  
Internet entrepreneurs in digital fashion are incentivized to collaborate due to their need to 
better control the ambiguity of their environment. In the absence of institutions that govern 
behavior, orientation with regard to each other does the job (White, 1981; 2002). Online brands 
would have the advantage of receiving feedback through their own community for which the 
technological innovation in digital marketing and branding is developed (see, observations about 
social entrepreneurship cases in Tripsas, 2009). In attempting to position themselves as brands 
and facilitate the access of other peers to contextually available resources, including incumbents, 
players comprising the new field are in a unique position to dictate the dominant uses of 
technology by collaborating to set a standard for their use.  
Users of services and technologies tend to be exposed to asymmetries of information in 
economic exchange (Arrow, 1974). At the same time, insiders in a technological system of 
practice would have unique access to “sticky” information that is co-created at the level of the 
community and is costly to acquire, transfer, and use. (von Hippel, 1994). Access to “sticky” 
information by community members plays significant role in their adoption of beneficial practice 
in the emerging online field of digital fashion.  
Organizational collectivities are profoundly cultural things. The collaborations outlined in 
this dissertation are examples of organic behavior unfolding in them. Organizational 
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collectivities are also powerful heuristic devices for explaining the evolution of culture and 
practice in emerging cultural fields. 
I define entrepreneurial collectivities in the emerging digital field of fashion as a collection of 
independent firms and practitioners who share an organic culture of collaboration for the 
discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. Weak ties play important role for making these 
organizational arrangements strong (Granovetter, 1985). Stronger ties in “analog” industries, as 
in the fashion industry, have ceased to kindle creativity, and means-ends relationships dominate 
the usually “alternative” forms of collaboration based on “simply doing new things” by 
experimenting and sharing new technology and practice. Weakly connected social collectivities 
of practice are better equipped with knowledge, skills, and technology to discern possibilities for 
resource recombinations, than are firms operating independently under conditions of arm’s 
length trading in what during the span of Schumpeter’s own life, could probably be 
conceptualized as the “analog machine”. 
Sensemaking and the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity  
The work on co-constructing the social and cultural boundaries of the new environment as a 
shared collaborative space between organization, technology, innovation, and practice is not an 
easy task for pure online brands. The players in this research are struggling with designing and 
interpreting performance metrics, or key performance indicators (KPIs), for measuring the 
success of building the commercial value of their digital brands, and measuring their social value 
necessary for the development of beneficial innovations.  
Online organizations interpret the cultural meaning of emerging technology by a process 
involving repeated collective sensemaking (see, Weick, 1995). This process includes learning 
about a commercial or social technology, figuring out or interpreting its commercial and cultural 
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uses, and creating practices around its interpretation. Sensemaking is a necessary function for 
online entrepreneurs, because creators and enablers both use technologies in e-commerce, social 
media, and social commerce, in the pursuit of branding and commercial success. Collective 
sensemaking helps participants in the emerging field go about their businesses and share with 
peers in the community their tacit cultural understanding of how to use technology for branding 
and commercial success.  
Sensemaking occurs in all dimensions of online collaboration in the digital collectivity. Pure 
online brands share proprietary data on their tactics of execution of promotions with smaller 
peers, such as bloggers. To communicate promotions on their e-commerce website, pure online 
brands also reach out to a significant peer audience that distributes the message for them. Online 
brands are frequently members of large aggregator communities, such as LinkShare. The 
individual partners that populate the aggregator communities - called “affiliates” - consist of tens 
of thousands of digital businesses, from mini personal blogs to large price-comparison engines. 
They make their bottom line by using their webfronts to promote and distribute digital content 
from large, pure retailers or fashion brands. Every time that information is passed for the 
delivery of an online promotion, there is knowledge shared between online technology firms 
creating the online promotion materials, such as editorials, newsletters, and banners, and 
thousands or dozens of affiliates who perform it. 
Aggregators such as LinkShare help organize the competitive landscape for larger online 
brands and reinforce the standards of private compliance for smaller digital peers. These firms 
monitor if smaller businesses distribute the promotional material properly. This usually means 
that affiliates use the correct proprietary links and digital content, according to the terms of 
contract with the aggregator and the online retailer.  
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Another microsociological example that illustrates how this particular, affiliate, form, of 
marketing happens, is when LinkShare’s account managers share contextual information with 
Marketing teams of technology-fashion brands, such as DigiVog. The sharing of contextual 
knowledge may concern revealing information about up-and-coming affiliates expected to 
contribute to commercial success and branding to DigiVog’s or their fashion clients’ business. 
Account managers scope daily applications from smaller players for interesting propositions for 
campaign promotions. Examples of affiliates, shown later in the dissertation, are social 
communities with a blog function, content curation websites, or even fashion savvy cash-starved 
start-up entrepreneurs in fashion who happen to stumble upon an intellectually stimulating idea 
for a specific promotion. 
Online, indicators for success are typically referred to in the industry as Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI). KPI’s help pure online brands gauge the cultural value of their proposition (i.e., 
how well is the brand known), and to figure out the commercial success of a campaign. KPIs can 
be spelled out as qualitative measures, such as “quality of engagement”. Frequently, quantitative 
proxies, such as sales, number of newly registered customers, traffic, conversions, and average 
order value (AOV) would be used to gauge commercial success. Industry pundits such as 
Forrester Research, and Internet Retailer advocate broadly that explaining success with numbers 
is the least ambiguous way for measuring success. “It is important to let the numbers tell us what 
we should be doing; otherwise, how do you know that what you’re doing is working?” (Hofer-
Shall, 2012). A substantial collaborative sensemaking is required to interpret the results of 
campaigns that have many intangibles, which need qualitative interpreting. 
From another vantage point, quantitative and qualitative measures of success both are in 
themselves numerical expressions of profoundly cultural phenomena. Furthermore, 
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entrepreneurial success for Internet brands is not confined to measures ubiquitous across other 
fields (e.g., sales). DigiVog’s US Marketing Director explained, for instance, that “for brands 
born online the only channel for creativity is online”.  In other words, entrepreneurial ventures 
can measure the success from their birth onward by any measure of creativity that these 
entrepreneurs come up with, on their own or in collaboration. This dissertation interprets both 
quantitative and qualitative measures of success and survival, as they are understood by their 
creators and users in the community. 
Collaboration as a Form of Innovative Intermediation 
Recall that the second function organized by entrepreneurs in an online collectivity is to help, 
facilitate or assist peers or fashion brands in interpreting, using, and understanding digital 
technology for e-commerce and online marketing. Collaboration between firms from the 
emerging social collectivity online is one way in which these entrepreneurs can interpret or get 
hold of the contextual knowledge of what to make of emerging technology in order to use it for 
building a lasting and sustainable brand. This knowledge – whether it pertains to collaborative 
practices or use of social media for certain promotions –is proprietary and contextually specific 
and in the context of the community is only shared with other “insiders” in the collectivity.  
The pursuit of opportunity as it relates to, for instance, developing an alternative use for 
digital technology, such as social media, is a powerful instiller of collaboration. For example, 
some technology-fashion retailers that share mutual interest in using Facebook for branding only 
may decide that the peer understanding of being present on Facebook as a cultural platform is to 
"use Facebook for branding; do not try monetizing on it", as one technology-fashion executive 
put it. Another variation of this new prescription, as expressed by an Executive Marketing 
Director at an online creator firm may be that ”young brands should use Facebook for 
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awareness building, and older brands should use Facebook for monetizing.” Both of these 
interpretations are the result from collaboration scenarios that these entrepreneurs have designed 
in mind with developing beneficial practice for the community. 
The interpretations of technology-fashion firms using Facebook can evolve and shift as new 
practice is introduced by creators in the community. For example, in 2011 Facebook native 
developers created a new practice, called “contextual advertising”. Besides having a “fan page” 
that worked on enhancing brand awareness, brands could now definitively use the platform to 
advertise their businesses and attempt to derive commercial revenue from driving traffic to their 
e-commerce websites.  
The types of collaboration that can be fostered by the pursuit of beneficial practice are varied. 
An online technology-fashion firm, as DigiVog can partner up with a digital enabler, such as the 
online fashion magazine Refinery29 and subsequently develop a new beneficial contextual 
practice called “community branding”. This exercise involves actions from both companies that 
provide complementary strengths and contribute to the advancing of their brands. The practice of 
community branding itself may involve actions, such as, a) setting up an e-commerce page 
(called shoplet) by DigiVog to be hosted on Refinery29's website; b) product curation by 
DigiVog by populating the space with merchandise from fashion brands that both partners agree 
to promote, and c) content development and curation by Refinery29. The collaboration in this 
creative exchange helps both of these partners, other fashion brands whose content and product 
is selected, and myriads of affiliates that promote the partnership.   
Online Collectivities and the transfer of Culture to Established Organizations 
The “peer pack” approach to change in fashion incumbents tells us that only when actively 
guided, would these traditional organizations accept a proposition of cultural novelty in their 
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behavior on a new domain. In the first ten years on the new century, very few high-fashion 
firms had websites and none sold products online. One well-known marketing consultant called 
this behavior “a response out of apprehension and fear”. Another interpreted it as a cultural 
"tantrum" on the part of fashion firms indicating lack of preparedness, awareness and 
knowledge in accepting help. 
Apart from being well documented in the behavior of fashion incumbents, the mentality of 
active opposition to change is anticipated in the organizational literature (see, e.g., Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). In 1999, while studying financial analysts, Ezra Zuckerman proposed that 
some companies are prone to accepting new behavior only after assessing how the value of their 
brands handles new situations and functions. For fashion brands it would be extremely difficult 
to assess the value of the online channel without a partner facilitating the access of incumbents to 
knowledge on beneficial aspects of experimenting with new tools on the Internet.  
On the other hand, the literature has allowed for creators and users of new technologies to 
“nurture” and educate potential adopters of the value of new technology. In certain documented 
cases, this course has been observed in user entrepreneurial communities whose members decide 
to act on educating and facilitating the access of other members of the community as they 
themselves learn about these aspects first (Shah and Tripsas, 2007; Garud and Karnøe, 2003).  
From this vantage point, technology-fashion creators and enablers of beneficial practice can 
influence how established brands approach the online channel. If key insiders to the community 
of digital fashion can successfully engage fashion brands to embrace a new understanding of the 
value of their brands through the use of new practices in digital marketing, their role in the 
community can be theorized close to Vedres and Stark’s observations of “‘almost’ a brokerage 
position” (2010: 215) that is enjoyed by key members in their network analysis.  
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One way to observe this active brokerage position is by studying the cultural practice with 
which online entrepreneurs engage in their dealings and negotiations with fashion brands. 
Because both types of players in this dissertation are conceptualized as cultural entities, the 
technologies and practices that they develop and use can respectively be conceptualized as 
cultural objects (see, Bandelj, 2008).  
The cultural objects that online entrepreneurs use to nurture the acceptance of new 
technology by incumbents are native to an Internet mode of organization and business. These can 
be, for example, content produced by an organization, banner campaigns, the product listed on 
the webpage of a brand, or the creative elements of new practice, such as “community branding”. 
Cultural objects are embedded in social relationships between new and old players (Swidler, 
1986: 277). Cultural objects and behaviors documented over the research period show how 
organizations in the emerging domain of digital fashion have a bearing on each other’s cultures 
(cf. Van Maanen, 2011).  
Implications to Management Practice  
This research will have certain implications to management practice, particularly in 
understanding new practices in creative industries. The study will explain how the use of social-
commercial technologies, such as microblogs (e.g., twitter), social sharing platforms (e.g., 
Facebook), and mashups along the social-commercial spectrum (e.g., Kaboodle.com, 
ShopStyle.com), permits original business models to transform the archetypal ways in which 
content is created and consumed in a commercial context. Another related goal is to explain how 
thriving as a brand on the new channel can translate into sales and brand equity when the final 
result (i.e., assessing the social-digital value of the brand) is intangible.  
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In order to compete and survive organizationally on this new value creation channel, mature 
firms need to know how to apply innovative concepts and follow the technology leaders in order 
to survive. The research will describe the ways in which high-technology firms create a blueprint 
for using social commerce technologies. The research will also have advice for technology 
starters, who want to penetrate the space around branding. As new digital models evolve, they 
will continue to capture rents arising from the digitization of knowledge, but first-mover 
advantages will be very important to newcomers. Practitioners, managers and policymakers will 
be well-versed when taking decisions about the parameters of action planned for this domain.  
3.3 Method and Data 
I utilize both longitudinal ethnography and interviews. My choice of conducting extended 
ethnography and interviews with new online start-up entrepreneurs and established fashion 
brands is an original attempt to deconstruct the complexity of cultural response to the online 
channel. This research design allows me to gain unprecedented entrée to deciphering the cultural 
beliefs of executives in key digital start-ups and making sense of the resulting practices and 
interpretations for success in the emerging new organizational field.  
New cultural practices emerge slowly on the Internet. The creation of tacit knowledge in this 
domain is shaped by learning-by-doing (LBD) practices. These practices are situationally 
embedded. When we study social collectivities on the Internet, the best way to approach them 
methodologically would be to sample the population to a relevant and manageable “population 
of social situations” (1998: 5), as per Burawoy’s instruction, rather than a population of 
predetermined players.  
Each type of player, from online retailers to old fashion brands – however well tooled and 
aware – struggles with the interpretation of how to use technology for beneficial uses. Burawoy 
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gives us a nondeterministic approach to studying social collectivities on the Internet that is apt to 
situations where changes in behavior and changes in technology can co-evolve.  
I sample the population to “a population of social situations” also because collaboration 
between peers on the Internet represents an elaborate social situation, in which both partners give 
up and gain contextual knowledge that serves them to deconstruct the cultural meaning of 
success and form new practices on the basis of this contextual learning-by-doing. In studying 
these phenomena, I was guided by the following empirical questions: 
 What are the new practices in digital branding used by the new entrepreneurial ecologies 
in the emerging digital fashion field? 
 What are the internal organizational processes that lead to the adoption of new 
technology for a particular new goal? 
 What are the cultural beliefs and processes of thought and collaboration that lead to the 
use of a particular new practice in an incumbent fashion brand? 
 Are there ideal-typical examples of changing cultural beliefs in fashion firms in relation 
to the Internet? 
 Is there a collective interpretation of the cultural meaning of technology online? 
This dissertation employs the following qualitative practices to study the population of social 
situations pertaining to the creation of capability and collaboration in the emerging field: 
(1) Extended 2-year ethnography in one of the largest technology-fashion entrepreneurs 
in digital fashion (referred to as DigiVog  Group) 
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(1.1) Interviews with senior executives and mid-management operations 
specialists at DigiVog Group, in charge of online marketing, merchandising, 
operations, creative services, technology, and management. 
(1.2) Internal documents from DigiVog Group, such as press releases, client 
presentations, commercial and customer plans; strategy plans; confidential 
agreements between DigiVog and fashion brands and/or publishers; media 
presentations and proposals by other parties to DigiVog. 
(1.3) In-depth interviews with fashion brands. 
(1.4) In-depth interviews with technology-fashion firms  
(1.5) Historical analysis of primary and secondary data from  
a) Retail consultancies 
b) Digital media firms 
c) Key opinion makers, associations, and foundations, representing the 
fashion industry proper. 
(1.6) Participation and opinion tracking at industry conferences, forums and 
events. 
Ethnography  
The research takes an in-depth look into the cultural practices of branding of a key producer 
of cultural digital knowledge (DigiVog) and related peers in the community of practice around 
digital fashion. DigiVog is a high-technology, e-commerce firm born in 2001. The firm is also 
one of the largest worldwide online fashion retailers. DigiVog has enlarged its business practice 
 55 
 
by signing exclusive online marketing agreements with more than two dozen international high-
fashion brands, whose online cultural brand value it now manages.  
A very useful conceptualization for DigiVog’s role in the ecology can be gleaned from Stark 
and Vedres (2010), who note importantly that if one or more of the members of a network or a 
community of peers takes on multiple affiliations, these actors become “multiple insiders, 
facilitating familiar access to diverse resources”. This conceptualization of DigiVog attests to the 
multiple capabilities of the firm as a “multiple insider” to a community with a sensemaking 
power that can influence the adoption of culture in the community and the outcomes from 
experimenting with a practice. DigiVog has adopted a culture of continual experimentation with 
testing new practice. This strategy helps the firm to gain validity among its peers and use this 
leverage, both socially and commercially, build best practices in digital marketing, and boost the 
position of its own brand and the brands of its collaborators.  
My ethnography at DigiVog Group’s offices in NYC started in November 2010 and was 
completed in March 2012. A total of 45 weeks of observational data were collected, for a total of 
450 pages of observational transcript. Each week included 1 to 2 days of 8 hour observation, 
comprising a total of 360 hours. In addition to observation, I completed a total of 20 interviews 
with the Country Manager and the Marketing Manager of DigiVog in the US, for a total of 250 
pages of interview transcript. In June 2010, I spent 3 weeks interviewing key functions (CEO, 
COO, CFO, Global Commercial Director and Global Marketing Director) at the headquarters of 
DigiVog Group in Milan, Italy for a total of 10 in-depth interviews. Thirty-one (31) additional 
interviews were carried out with executives from high-fashion companies (working with and 
unrelated to DigiVog), media agencies, social media firms, and peer collaborators to DigiVog for 
an additional 230 pages transcript.  
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The primary ethnography location in NYC is appropriate, because the US office at DigiVog 
has been invested by headquarters to be an incubator for experimentation with new marketing 
technologies and the building of practices around them. My primary change agents in the firm 
that supplied me with their evolving narratives regarding the role of digital technology in 
branding have been are the US Country Manager and the now former US Marketing Manager
8
. 
In-depth interviews were also carried out with key functions in both offices, spanning those 
responsible for technology and marketing, such as CEO, Chief Marketing Officer, Mono-Brand 
Director, CTO, Senior Buyer, Web Editor, Merchandiser, etc. Careful longitudinal observations 
in the two contexts permit to also assess the internal brand identity that DigiVog holds with 
regard to its own practices and understand what external visions of identity this dominant player 
holds vis-à-vis other related high-technology firms, subject to this analysis.  
The ethnography is carried out at a time that is especially crucial in the history of the digital 
fashion field. By the start of the research in May 2010, the competence of digital players under 
scrutiny in this dissertation was becoming more easily documented. the ecology of social 
situations that I studied were born out of the sense, expressed by media and industry talk at 
conferences, that some online players were explicitly associated with driving the narrative in the 
emerging field.  
In-depth interviews with fashion brands  
                                                          
8
 The US marketing manager left the company in September 2011. He was then succeeded by a new 
Marketing Manager, hired in July 2011. The new role is also responsible for organizing offline events and 
for the overall direction of the US marketing.  
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In-depth interviews were carried out over two periods, in 2010 and 2011 and followed a 
longitudinal method of observation of the situations pertaining to change of culture or adoption 
of technology in these organizations. During the year that I have given these executives a brief 
hiatus, their own appreciation of, interpretation and understanding of activities on the Internet 
had advanced with regard to the conceptual apparatus that they thought they should use with 
regard to the Internet. During the interviews, an in-depth orientation questionnaire was used that 
included chapters devoted to questions regarding: 
 The history and evolution of organizational capability, as it relates to new organizational 
practices for using digital tools for social-digital branding and marketing. 
 The internal team projections of the cultural relation of the firm to the emerging 
organizational field.   
In-depth interviews with specific fashion firms are carried out. These players are established 
high-fashion brands. They are treated as incumbents with established cultural values moving 
from a traditional (e.g., “analog”, “brick-and-mortar”) to a new (e.g., “non-physical”, “online”) 
system for value creation. The goal for the move is to explicitly use emerging technologies for 
marketing and branding. For representatives of this population, establishing presence on the 
Internet is defined as an ownership of a corporate website, e-commerce website and the use of 
social commerce technologies for branding by way of establishing and maintaining direct 
relationships with dominant fashion-technology players.  
The functions interviewed were selected to ideally reflect the existence of dual interpretation 
in the use of new technology. Where possible, with each of these firms, I have interviewed 
functions that represent the “old” offline worlds of Communications and Retail Commerce and 
contrasted it with Digital Commerce, Digital Media, Web Marketing, or a Social media team. 
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This has been a very useful approach indicating gaps in culture across the studied firms and their 
interpretation of the meaning of technologies for branding and commerce. For example, 
alongside the Internet Woolhunterer position at one of the firms, I interviewed also its Global 
Communications Director, who had pursued a more expectedly traditional line of cultural 
inquiry, but also surprised me with openness to some of the new players. At another, older Italian 
firm, the traditional story was provided by the firm’s global CIO, whereas the e-commerce 
manager and the Creative Web Editor delivered a softer and Internet-friendly social media focus 
that they believed should be the centerpiece of their digital strategy.  
At one of the oldest UK high-fashion brands, despite their very own, original approach to 
integrating both online and offline marketing in the same division, the traditional organizational 
culture surprisingly made the Global Vice President of Marketing unwilling to think of 
collaborating with publisher networks or of thinking of the placement of their merchandise into 
online channels as a marketing tactic.  
This dual focus, when it was possible to obtain it, allows taking a look into the different 
cultural priorities and prerogatives regarding new technology that exist in traditional players. The 
approach also solidifies Burawoy’s advice to sample curious and stimulating social situations, 
rather than populations, to elucidate data that are extremely difficult to capture otherwise.  
In-depth Interviews with online technology-fashion firms  
Conducting ethnography and interviews with the most active emerging players in a domain 
where managerial practice is contextually evolving and life histories are very short (in some 
cases, 2 years), is aptly done by documenting their current thought-provoking situational 
analysis of the emerging field. This approach is suitable exactly for cases when the new 
population is emergent and small in numbers. When a new organizational field appears, 
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technology change is rapid. The narratives that organizational actors create to explain the use of 
a technology for supporting a certain vital function (i.e., the brand) can differ during the period 
in which they must learn to practice the technology.  
The few actors that are first-movers in the space also need to agree on a dominant 
interpretation of how to use technology for the support of new/improved organizational 
functions. Consequently, the knowledge that the researcher is attempting to discover about the 
organizational practices in the field can be highly situational and tacit. The ethnography and 
interviews allow aggregating knowledge into a social process and circumscribe the boundaries 
of the field as it evolves. A qualitative microsociological approach here explains and describes 
the formation of a brand as a collection of higher-level processes unfolding over time in 
organizations and mediated by technology, as competition happens.  
The ethnography and in-depth interviews at DigiVog Group are complemented with 
interviews with other players in the new field. The semi-structured interview format combines 
sections on:  
 History and evolution of organizational capability, as it relates to new organizational 
practices for using digital tools for social-digital branding and marketing. 
 Internal projections of the cultural relation of the firm to the emerging organizational 
field.   
Enabling-Critical Technology-Fashion Firms 
For the purposes of this research, I look at enabling-critical players as 'users' (von Hippel, 
1986). These players are digital firms whose impact on incumbents’ capability to adapt to 
digital technology moves from enabling to critical, as they are able to focus on practices that 
 60 
 
position them as strong players in the space. Consequently, more fashion brands would directly 
use their platform and more users would participate in the customer community that they serve. 
Directly means that the enabling players directly collaborate with fashion brands and use social 
community tools for talking about these brands to their community base. These players have 
emergent identities. The place of these stakeholders in the organizational field is analyzed from 
the vantage point of DigiVog as a dominant co-constructor of the digital space.   
The concept of critical-enabling player is also an attempt of this research to bridge the gap 
between critical audiences (or, organizations) and the development of new industries. Enabling 
players would surface in digital/new technology spaces in which critical audiences are scarce or 
do not exist, as in digital fashion branding. Enabling-critical players are conceptualized as 
organizations that co-construct the new organizational field; build best practices around it and in 
doing so facilitate the transition of incumbents to using/adopting new cultural tools (digital 
practice) in figuring out the cultural competence on the channel (Figure 1).  
Organizations in the new field can also play only a critical role to the industry. The critical 
capacity depends on the managerial intentionality in transferring competitive practice that is 
crucial to the survival of the organization to the incumbent population. By collaborating with 
other players and by continually developing proprietary knowledge, firms like DigiVog would 
actively co-construct the space around themselves. Consequently, the ability of players as 
DigiVog to discover and validate a practice that is going to be required of all future participants 
in the space, including incumbents, becomes critical.  For example, DigiVog has developed over 
time a competence about how to do digital marketing that is proprietary and tacit in nature. This 
knowledge has been accumulated by learning-by-doing practices with the stakeholders in the 
vicinity of the firm.  
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When DigiVog signs a contract with a brand and develops its e-commerce website and 
digital marketing mix, the firm essentially transfers this “hard-learned” contextual competence to 
the incumbent. Initially, the kinds of competence that DigiVog developed for brands were basic 
help with search engine optimization (SEO). This service was shared with brands on a fixed fee 
basis. As DigiVog’s efforts to co-construct the digital space around fashion evolved, the 
company was able to first, adapt to its own brand the evolving digital technology and second, 
transfer learned practices to its fashion brands. DigiVog shares with its partner brands the tactics 
it uses for successfully positioning the social value of its own brand, and becomes a player of 
critical importance to incumbents. This is how the role of a critical player differs from the more 
positioning, marketing platform role of an enabling player.  
When enabling players collaborate directly with fashion brands, they position the brand name 
and merchandise via the proprietary platform they have created (e.g., FashionStake, Moda 
Operandi), but do not intend to build the knowledge base of the fashion firms regarding how to 
use the digital channel.  Some platforms/players such as Facebook are enabling-critical (although 
strategic brand executives told me that they see Facebook’s role in digital branding and 
marketing as purely critical). This high-technology firm has established a 'native' set of 
applications available to any brand that wishes to use the platform. At the same time, Facebook’s 
own social brand value is increasingly connected with practices that mix and match marketing 
and branding, such as ‘fan pages’ and contextual social advertising. The firm’s digital strategy 
team also helps actual organizations position their brands using the native applications of 
Facebook. The extent of help in some cases (offered to some of the largest corporate clients) 
include free of charge brainstorming on how to build the most innovative 'fan' page. Thus, the 
free use of the platform as a way of experimenting with brand message (enabling role) can be 
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supplemented with explicit transfer of e-branding capability from this player for select clients 
(critical role).  
The way enabling-critical players are sampled is based on the fact that: a) DigiVog either 
collaborates with them actively or has explicitly singled them out as important partners/peers in 
the construction of the field; and b) the firms represent some new model that may not be 
necessarily of critical importance to DigiVog’s stake in the fashion digital space, but is 
interesting to DigiVog as an “outlier” competence. In terms of firm history, the oldest among the 
new entrants are founded in 2000 and the youngest in 2010. These players are technology start-
ups – i.e., they own the proprietary digital e-commerce / social media / social community 
technology. All firms are currently in business. 
Players like Polyvore, ShopStyle, Facebook, Google, (via SocialCom.com) were suggested 
by DigiVog to play an active role in the firm’s digital marketing strategy. DigiVog also 
collaborates with these firms. Polyvore, ShopStyle, and Boutiques are what the digital industry 
calls “publishers”; Facebook is a distributed social media platform. These players combine 
search technologies with social content from users in the form of community blogs around styles; 
user building of fashion sets, and fashion editorial content provided by consumers themselves or 
publisher’s editorial team. These are the social commerce players that provide the backbone of 
DigiVog’s digital branding partnerships.  
Cases of interesting outlier models that DigiVog found particularly stimulating with regard to 
extending the boundary around the digital capabilities in the field, were, for example, Gilt 
Groupe (founded 2009), FashionStake (founded 2010), Moda Operandi (founded 2011). These 
players are the latest thought-provoking models that have organized around the idea of a 
marketing platform that helps young designers position themselves in the digital space. 
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Secondary data were also used in order to establish the evolution of these firms and their location 
in the organizational field.  
Historical analysis of primary and secondary data  
The digital marketing industry is an organizational field in the making. Knowledge is 
produced contextually on the Internet and the opinions of organizations, consultancies and digital 
media companies born on this channel are useful to monitor as they can advance contextual 
knowledge in narrative form. Online media companies typically specialize in developing 
narrative around new digital technologies and address the conversation around the intended goals 
of using web marketing technologies.  
Media publishers whose discussion are followed in this dissertation are adage.com; 
adweek.com; brandweek.com; hubspot.com; progressivemediaconcepts.com; 
socialmediaexaminer.com; tedtalks.com; wired.com; zeitgeist.com, and AMA.com. I have also 
tried, where available, to check the opinions received during interviews with information from 
two specific sources: the American Marketing Association’s (AMA) webcasts, and the webcasts 
provided by HubSpot.com. The reason to focus on these two channels was to contrast the self-
reflective thought leadership of AMA with the cultural beliefs of smaller marketing opinion-
makers. Media publications about organizations in the digital fashion space provide an important 
third-party check into the contextual events and competitive practices of different players as they 
relate to their cultural beliefs. 
AMA, one of the largest marketing associations in the world, explains its role in three major 
components: “a) Connecting, as a conduit to foster knowledge sharing. B) Informing, or 
providing resources, education, career and professional development opportunities. c) 
Advancing, or promoting/supporting marketing practice and thought leadership.” AMA defines 
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marketing as “[…] the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, communicating, 
delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society 
at large.
9”  
In contrast, HubSpot directs its conversational tools, such as webcasts, presentations and 
white papers to the needs of smaller online entrepreneurs. The main cultural belief of this media 
channel is the idea that smaller is better in online forms of organization and that “the internet 
disproportionately favors small businesses since it enables them to position their niche goods to 
people shopping for that particular niche good regardless of the numbers of degrees of separation 
from their rolodex.
10”  
In addition to these outlets, I have followed the formal opinions of opinion-makers in the 
luxury industry proper. Paying attention to the beliefs advanced by these organizations permits to 
track how they perceive the evolution in the behavior of fashion brands. Interviews have been 
carried out with independent industry experts (Burke & Associates, Doneger Group, e-Luxe 
Inc.), digital consulting firms (BitMama), luxury consultancies (Kurt Salmon & Associates, the 
Luxury Institute), and flagship luxury group associations (Fondazione Altagamma, Walpole, 
USDA).  
Participation at industry events was also necessary in order to observe if during these events 
industry leaders, fashion incumbents and online technology-fashion firms that attended them can 
arrive at a mutual cultural interpretation of digital technology that redresses their original 
business goals.  
                                                          
9
 Available at: http://www.marketingpower.com/Pages/default.aspx[Retrieved on 07/30/2013.] 
10
Available at: http://www.hubspot.com/internet-marketing-company/ [Retrieved on 07/30/2013.] 
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One event that includes key online “activists” and incumbent firms is the Luxury Interactive 
held each year in London and New York. Two other venues attended consistently include local 
conversational outlets, as Fashion 2.0 organized by the Style Coalition in New York’s Silicon 
Alley, and the annual meetings of the Luxury Club at Columbia Business School, NYU Stern 
School of Business, and Harvard Business School.  
An important reason for attending these latter events held academic institutions was to 
observe the interpenetration of academic opinion regarding firm-level effects of digital 
marketing. Some of these events, in particular events related to conveying the interpretation of 
pundits regarding their understanding of new technology, were also attended by some of the 
peers from the online community studied in the dissertation.  
Original involvement in triangulating the ethnographic data was also attempted. One example 
is the Fashion 2.0 meeting that took place on March 28, 2011 in New York titled “The future of 
online retail”. This was going to be a key conversation for the online community provoking 
questions from attending fashion brands. I noted the event to the former Marketing Manager at 
DigiVog US, who after some resolution on the disclosure of information regarding DigiVog’s 
new digital practices, decided to register and was promptly offered to speak by the organizers. 
Despite his general unwillingness to present for fear of disclosing information to outsiders, the 
executive agreed to be part of the panel and the information gathered during the event was vital 
to this research.  
Some practical examples of the utility of the method  









Figure 3 New practices as enablers of commercial and branding success.  
Figure 2 and Figure 3 describe some digital marketing practices in DigiVog Group and 
partners with which these are associated. These depictions of behavior were produced in multiple 
discussions between me and DigiVog’s Marketing Director in the US. The goal of these ongoing 
conversations was to understand how the share of each of these new practices has evolved in the 
marketing budget during the last 5 years and how has the company’s position evolved in relating 




















collaborations between DigiVog and multiple partners, for example, appear to be conceptualized 
as “grey” area that is still to be interpreted in iterations of collaborations with other partners.  
Longitudinal Visual Ethnography 
To better describe some of the elements of digital marketing I have collected and used, where 
appropriate, visual data. For example, one new tactic for digital branding developed during 
collaboration between DigiVog and peers is the so-called community branding practice. Based 
on the breakdown of technological boundaries between curation of content and curation of 
fashion merchandise, this practice is a powerful indicator of the seamlessness of cultural 
collaboration online.  
In this practice, a technology-fashion firm partners up with an editorial publication or an 
online magazine. The magazine curates a theme and the retailer curates product from its own 
portfolio of brands. The curatorial selection is approved in conversation with the magazine and is 
posted online at a shoppable link that developed and powered by the retailer’s team.  
Visual research is the only acceptable way in which this collaboration can be illustrated, 
documented and its evolution can be observed. Below is one example of a recent collaboration in 
2010 between Vogue USA and an online retailer. 
The choice of this set of qualitative data sources follows Glaser and Strauss (1967) advice to 
use different data sources in order to fully describe– in this case – the empirical phenomenon of 
interest. For example, selected press releases that DigiVog’s PR team has compiled since the 
inception of the firm show important events in the company’s history that mark the 
development of certain practice.   
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PART II: ONLINE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS FASHION DISCONTENTS  
Chapter 4: The Fight for a New Cultural Identity in Fashion Firms  
4.1 The Internet Challenge: New Partners, New Boundaries, New Culture 
Luxury fashion executives had difficult time understanding technical tools, such as search 
engine optimization (SEO) or natural Google rankings or the input of entrepreneurs from digital 
agencies, who engaged in acculturating executives in their intended commercial consequences. 
For fashion firms these tools were invested with cultural meaning beyond their immediate 
business impact, such as providing a brand with visibility upon a search. At luxury fashion 
conferences during late 2010 and 2011, fashion executives listened little to the advice of digital 
entrepreneurs, and a lot to their digitally distressed peers. This practice was in keeping with the 
“insider”, “peer pack” culture, which required that for an existing cultural belief to dissipate, the 
peer group needs to show collaborative signs of validating new partners to the industry.  
At a heated discussion on luxury and e-commerce in May 2010 in London, a well-known 
fashion communications consultant argued that before the Internet, “[T]he brands survived, 
because they were different… [Now], it's a jungle11!  When you search for Rolex, it's a Jungle! 
No, we have our own rules as luxury.” Few fashion consultants for the brick-and-mortar industry 
                                                          
11
 By “jungle”, the consultant was referring to the ostensible lack of organizing logic in Google-
generated search results, which appear after a search phrase has been generated by the user. The 
discussion below shows how fundamentally necessary to an entrepreneurial culture (yet, simple to put 
together) the concept of Search Engine Optimization is. Simply put, SEO online is somewhat culturally 
similar to a collaboration between a fashion firm and a search engine; the latter being “enabling tools”. 
SEO makes it possible for fashion firms to be “found” in the “jungle” by optimizing their content to be 




agreed that there may be a new paradigm emerging out of the digital channel and that there was 
potential for deriving new sources of brand value that could be harnessed through trial and error 
together with new peers who were born online and already had them figured out.  
The former Digital Director and current VP Business Development for China at one of UK’s 
most renowned fashion brands explained the merits of experimenting with new Internet culture 
for fashion brands:  
“Regardless of the general knowledge the consumer has for the brand offline, online it’s a 
different game.  It’s fast paced and you have to garner dynamic new capabilities as a brand – 
capabilities that are tailored exclusively to the digital domain in order to appear first in search 
engine rankings. It’s the search engine that ranks you to the audiences who search, not your 
offline store, or your offline advertisement, etc. So, instead of working with Elle or Vogue for 
making your audience aware of you, bidding with other brands for ad space. Google provides 
you with the platform and the rules for using the platform that are democratic – e.g., you use 
the platform yourself, you bid against other brands but you know this and everyone has a 
chance to win on bidding; you also collaborate with search engine players on testing new 
technologies to better position the outcomes from a search with regard to the brand. Anytime 
you see a sponsored link on Google, and it says “sponsored link”, each one of these companies 
has paid to appear there and they have paid money against that word that you’ve tapped into 
Google.” 
For fashion brands and multi-brand luxury conglomerates who owned them, such as 
Richemont or PPR (previously known as Pinault-Printemps-Redoute and since April 2013 as 
Kering), it was difficult to understand why their boards of directors should invest in digital 
practice, like search. A Senior Project Manager for e-Commerce at a large fashion conglomerate, 
now Director of Global Digital Projects, kept asking executive management to invest in digital 
marketing and to attempt to “internalize this capability at a Group level from [our] digital 
agency.” The governing board was concerned as to how relevant new digital tools and practice 
were to the needs of 250 year-old brands. There was no clear answer or recipe for transition. In 
the meantime, many digital experts emerged, claiming that their experience with internet culture 
and practice should hold sway.  
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One of the executives in charge of such a discussion was the Director of Partner Division for 
DigiVog, the company in this research, who was responsible for managing relations with 24 
high-fashion brands from Italy, France, Germany, the UK, and the US. He explained the cultural 
apparatus of online entrepreneurs by disconfirming the need for “insider”-type legitimation for 
incumbent fashion brands. His advice was practical, stating that fashion brands could, in fact, 
engage in Internet activities on their own, provided that they follow the contextual knowledge of 
the new channel imparted by other online-born “insiders” to the business of fashion online. 
These entrepreneurs were born online, engaged in selling fashion merchandise online and built 
their brands as fashion and technology brands. The implication was that to succeed online, 
fashion brands had to work hard and collaborate with qualitatively new types of legitimating 
partners. 
“Do you have metrics behind your business?” asked the Partner Division Director. “When 
you look at sales, you can't really say, I spent 1% and 1% came back, but when you see the trend 
in sales, it should be at least the starting point for you to ask for more money”. “How do you run 
SEO campaigns?” asked one fashion executive. “Can I ask you, what do you mean by SEO?”, 
DigiVog’s executive countered. Unsure, the brick expert responded, “Search engine 
optimization...” DigiVog’s executive was persistent: “No, no... I mean, do you pay an agency to 
do what exactly?” The manager readily offered, “We pay an agency to do our web marketing and 
social media for us. They are testing…, moving keywords.”  
It took a lot of persistence for DigiVog’s executive to negotiate a simple and clear picture for 
the fashion community at the table. 
“We’re talking about a search engine, Google. Google needs content and this content has to 
be relevant. The SEO expert- she or he does what? Changes the content? This doesn't make a lot 
of sense. About SEO. Once you've done it; you've done it. You have to optimize your system so 
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that it produces intelligent URLs. Period. Names, Category, Product. Period. Then, you need 
text on your site, and the text needs to be seen by search engines. When this is done, you don't 
need an SEO expert at all.” 
Fashion firms were culturally “insolvent” to accept straightforward propositions on the 
meaning of practices related to the new medium. Established fashion firms typically separated 
their operations in siloes, where the organization of e-commerce operations is functionally 
different from the unit that deals with the internet; commonly called the “digital team”. When 
fashion firms started opening up their boundaries to the Internet, executives initially placed the 
fledgling new units, social media and e-commerce, under commercial or communications 
operations. One Sicilian "haute hippy dom" brand, established by its two eponymous founders in 
1987, had a team of 15 people in charge of digital media already in 2010. An executive at a peer 
brand called these arrangements “[…] very strange for the market, because it is very peculiar...“. 
The “peculiarity” was that there was a high degree of control from the top even on such simple 
tasks as interpreting media reports produced by digital agencies on the results from banner 
advertizing online. The Head Designers, who were also CEOs, had to be immediately informed 
of the weekly results. As many others, this brand suffered from an Internet identity crisis. The 
digital team was placed inside Offline Communications. The e-commerce division was similarly 
attached to brick Retail, and was viewed as “just another store”.  
Traditional players in the industry, such as the Italian Altagamma Foundation, presumed that 
this siloed arrangement was the best fashion teams could do to nominally “waive off” the 
Internet as a new communications and commerce domain. The Director General of Altagamma 
saw the new organizational concept of “digital team” as an organizational irritation necessitated 
by new technology, but not new culture.  
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“No, for e-commerce, it has to be under the Retail Division. It is a single brand store. Gucci 
online store is part of single-branded retail; the technology is different. But, anyway, it’s just 
retail. I believe that the effect of having digital – just the technology – you don’t need to have 
corporate Communications dealing with all the traditional media and the digital team with all the 
new media. The Communications department has to be in a position of managing all 
communication by having the ability of using each of the technologies; the media.” 
Communications divisions in fashion firms hold sway over the cultural meaning of branding. 
They are the focal points where the “reinventing of the brand” takes place during the two 
seasonal fashion shows. The former Director of Client Marketing for one of the oldest French 
maisons explained in 2010 that the flipside to attaching the Communication divisions to the 
Internet channel was likely to produce risks because ”Communications activities on the Internet 
…misinterprets the meaning of this channel, which has grown out of the communications stage 
and into the collaborative stage.” In his own brands of tenure, this executive had come to a new 
cultural understanding of the most crucial function in fashion firms. He had ventured to “bend” 
Communications to respond to the principles of the new cultural domain.  
One example of the fight for a new identity is a major French fashion label, founded in 1946. 
The former Director of Client Marketing reported in late 2010 that he perceived the separation 
between e-commerce and the digital channel as a “cultural prohibition” by executive 
management.  E-commerce was under the retail division and “Internet” was under marketing. 
The executive was frustrated with the situation and lobbied to experiment with the cultural logic 
of thinking about novelty in the firm. He pledged to the CEO of the fashion conglomerate that 
owns the brand to unite the two teams just as online pure play brands in the field of digital 
fashion would.  
As a result of his consistent efforts, both functions were placed under a newly 
founded ”Client Marketing” department. The Client Marketing department included customer 
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service and customer relationship management (CRM). The department was responsible to 
Communications.  
Both the “Internet” team and the e-commerce team were placed under Client Marketing 
(Figure 4). The chain of functional command, however, indicated that the two new functions 
were conceptualized as auxiliary to customer care and not as new units that would engage with 
an entrepreneurially-driven domain. The two teams were also responsible for different things. 
The former Director of Client Marketing noted that “the Internet team creates content and the e-
commerce team manages sales.” The challenges were clear, but the company had been successful 
to position e-commerce away from brick-and-mortar stores. 
Figure 4 Organizational Chart at a High-Fashion Brand (France) 
This example shows that established fashion brands with long histories of cultural 
predilection for brick-and-mortar dependence can pull through an organizational change related 
to reshuffling functions for the Internet. Brick-and-mortar executives were aware that this new 
domain for value creation calls for the adoption of entrepreneurial units with larger competencies 
than their predecessors in the brick and mortar world. The separation of the two units and their 
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brand considered this move to be an act of experimentation. The change is slow but sure. In 
2010, some executives growing comfortable with the idea of integrating novelty in fashion 
rejected opportunities with other brands in which the two functions were separated. 
4.2 The Plight of Digital Agencies for Intermediary Status in the Internet Transition 
In late 2010, an executive in charge of Marketing at a high-fashion French maison was 
offered a newly created position related to e-commerce at LVMH. He refused the job for what he 
termed "ideological" reasons. The point of frustration was his lack of conviction that LVMH was 
going to change the existing culture in which both e-commerce and online marketing were 
separated. 
“One person for Internet and one guy for Communications on the Internet, and it is not 
possible. In fact, in fashion companies, they don't know where to put us - the people of the 
Internet. Because, it's e-commerce, but, it's also bloggers - it's public relations. It's also 
technology. In US, it's more advanced; in France, Europe, it's really not advanced. They always 
put us either in Retail or in Communications and it never works. In fact, what is happening in the 
US, if you look at big website, big organization, you have the e- communications, marketing, 
store retail, and at the same level you have the Internet.”  
Executives in the few fashion firms who knew the organizations of new entrepreneurs in 
digital fashion believed in mimicking their internet organization and practice and felt compelled 
to prescribe this cultural behavior to their bosses. As the example that follows indicates, 
executives at fashion firms that were willing to follow the cultural sensemaking of online 
entrepreneurs understood “success” to involve the willingness to adopt a new, entrepreneurial 
culture.  
At a Swiss brand owner, financial conglomerate that owns Chloe, Azzedine Alaia, and 
Piaget, e-commerce and digital communications were also separated. The conglomerate ran each 
of its brands as independent entities, and the executive management explained that this approach 
“ensures that each maison remains unique”. The executive managed to persuade in a number of 
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conversations the president of the company to invest in search engine optimization and social 
media. The problem was that the investment did not go into integrated marketing and e-
commerce initiatives, because the two teams were separated. In addition, outside digital agencies 
handled the planning and operation of social media and SEO campaigns. The executive noted 
that having to wait for the results from these campaigns to be presented by digital account 
executives felt like waiting for traditional paper advertizing agencies to report on the results from 
paper adverting campaigns.  
“[W]e started to spend some money on the Internet. We spend money on communication, 
pay-per-click advertising, but the e-business team is not aware of it.  We don't know the 
conversion rates, we spend money, but we don't know… We get a communication from the 
digital agency with whom we work 3 months after the campaign, just like a traditional paper ad. 
What I am trying to do is…, we have 15 brands and, separately, we do not have enough power to 
produce the type of work that a digital agency can handle.” 
Digital agencies gathered momentum after 2009 by starting to propose to brands to engage in 
a set of easy to follow prescriptions in social media, and less typically, SEO. Specialist digital 
agencies appealed to fashion executives because they offered specialist advice in areas, such as 
SEO, digital advertising, and social media that seemed to be the key to operating online, but 
unknown to brands. The operating procedures of digital agencies were friendly to brands and 
they were less costly than paper advertizing agencies. Furthermore, account executives 
demonstrated to clients a straightforward connection between performing a practice and getting a 
favorable result.  
Digital account executives offered methodologies that differed across populations and 
geographical location of the brand, but typically their plan proposed to the brand to carry out a 
package of social media initiatives online. The goal would be to reach certain levels of 
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performance for a set of indicators called key performance indicators (KPIs) and commercial 
return on investment.  
The Vice President for one of the largest digital agencies in the EU outlined the methodology 
that his firm used with fashion brands in four steps. The brands want a recipe for understanding 
how to engage with their audience using social media channels, such as Facebook, twitter, 
YouTube, or paying for keywords in search engine optimization. The first step for the agency is 
to understand where the brand wants to communicate in terms of social media channel. “A very 
important element is to evaluate what is available out there that people see about your product”, 
said the Vice President. “Here, you have to study the perceptions that users deliver on the web 
and maybe the company doesn’t know. Many firms don't know what media, websites consumers 
use to talk about their brand.” 
The agency then evaluates the gap between what the brand wants to achieve and the actual 
sentiments of “fans” on desired social media channels. In a third step, the account executives 
draw a proposal for the tools and investments they want to use to address “the gap”. Finally, the 
agency delivers on these gaps and communicates the results to the brand with a focus on 
“improving communications about the brand”.  
The cultural impact of working with digital agencies for fashion brands is to simplify the 
stress on cultural cognition associated with understanding various new KPI metrics. However, 
digital agencies do not do the kind of business fashion firms do in the brick-and-mortar domain 
and their scope of competence does not include owning digital properties in fashion or e-
commerce. One consequence to proposing prescriptive plans to cultures digital agencies to not 
understand is the introduction of confusion in fashion executives who are hard pressed, but 
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unable to explain the cultural meaning of the prescribed metrics of success. The VP of Marketing 
in the entrepreneurial case study “C” is a good example.  
“There are 3 classic metrics. Traffic, conversions, average transaction value. The three 
create the revenue (ROI). … I mean, the traffic one, cannot only be driven by marketing expense, 
but it is really a reflection on … if your brand is doing well; you're going to get an increased 
traffic. We get around 200,000 unique visitors a week in the US, the same for Europe and 80,000 
in the rest of the world.  The e-commerce traffic has increased by 100% in Europe in the past few 
years. 200% over two years.... As we shifted money into more digital media spend, obviously the 
opportunities for driving a digital traffic also increased. The conversion rate... the database 
actually demonstrates a lower rate than is actually achieved. The reality is that loyalty among 
customers of fashion brands is around 2-5%. What we're seeing is much more incremental 
growth stage level. What you're actually getting is much more occasional browsing, but that's 
fine, I mean, again…, that's what drives our business, so it's not much of a problem…” 
The VP of Marketing was unsure of the cultural meaning of “traffic”, “conversion”, or 
“browsing”. He was certain that these were the appropriate KPI’s with which to measure the 
success from e-commerce on the Internet. The VP gauged this success in a commercial form; as 
the ROI, or revenue brought by increased traffic that leads to conversion and sales. However, he 
then noted that the lower average ticket on the e-commerce website of the brand was around 
$200, at least 3 times less the cost of the brand’s most popular apparel product. This, meant, in 
turn that customers behave as “fans” and that e-commerce is a branding tool. 
Some brands have tried to motivate their own teams to adapt recipes from their digital 
agencies in-house. The problem of going-it-alone is compounded when the brand has separated 
e-commerce and online marketing from each other. An e-commerce director at a UK luxury 
fashion brand indicated in mid-2010 that when she insisted not to use the services of digital 
agencies, senior brand executives hired a limited number of staff to deal with SEO and social 
media. The new hires were trained in SEO and in some aspects of digital advertizing, such as 
negotiating banner space. She reported that the separation of her team from the “Head of Digital” 
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tripled the time it took the new hires to respond to a problem. This undermined the effort of the 
brand to learn from the digital channel and react quickly.  
“If the question is not specific enough, you have to brainstorm it with yourself.  Once you 
have the information you want, it's too late. We all know that digital is too fast, and you cannot 
miss a step. When you think of building a team that works around digital... You really have to 
have someone to work on the specific brand, even if from Group Level. We probably need 15 - 
16 in the team. Yes, you can touch the brand; yes, you can educate about the brand. […] I think 
we need someone who is really like an editor, and gives a different voice […] someone needs to 
be hired to bring the level of the conversation on a whole other level.” 
As ritualistic organizations, fashion firms go to great lengths to obviate the necessity to adapt 
to this new culture of doing business. The former VP of Marketing at one of the largest UK high-
fashion houses noted that as long as the culture of exclusivity continues in high-fashion brands, it 
would be difficult for change agents in them to attain internal support for accepting and working 
with the Internet by the “local” rules of the game. 
 “Traditional luxury behavior is outside democratic behavior. Digital language is an 
inclusive language. We needed to include digital in our DNA. Chanel or Dior – they are not 
inclusive brands. They are exclusive brands and that is how they have built themselves. It's very, 
very challenging to deliver inclusive experience online and that is a difficult position to be in and 
as a result they will probably find it more difficult to have a relevant brand online. I can think off 
the top of my head about activities they should engage in, but for them to respond to the digital 
would be difficult.”  
4.3 Attitudes of Cultural Change: Three Case-Studies 
Brand “A”: Indifference and Change 
One typical example of indifference to the new channel is the response to the Internet from 
one of the largest international high-fashion brands whose revenue for 2011 reached €1.8 billion. 
The former supervisor of Retail and Promotions at the brand, currently Manager of Marketing 
and Events reported that his intent to "push digital" was not well taken by senior executives at 
the brand headquarters in Europe. His rationale for expanding the presence to the online channel 
was that even though “80% of the business is driven by 20% of the customers, it's important to 
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get the other 80% of customer base shopping. I guess the internet gives them this broad reach 
opportunity”.  The brand’s PR Department which reported to Communications opened up a 
Facebook page in 2010 and considered that until further notice this was the absolute push for 
Internet outreach.  
The manager of Marketing and Events was responsible in 2010 for maintaining relationships 
with two divisions – retail (own stores) and wholesale (the wholesale business of the brand with 
Neiman Marcus and Saks).  
Practice  Content Domain 
(online; offline) 





Product specific collaterals 
Local Projects 
Market-specific events 







product-specific promotions (e.g., they send a link 
and client can watch runway shows streaming) 
Joint projects (with DigiVog - direct emails for the 
runway). 
Online. 
3. CRM  database analytics and segmentation 
RFM (ideal client shops twice a year, or maybe once) 
behavioral tracking (offline) 
marketing activity tracking (after receiving the e-mail, 
have you shopped –online/ offline) 
customer retention (offline mainly) 
List generation (online/offline). 
Offline/online
. 
4. Events  
 





special new and limited editions promotions 
sale 
GWP 





perceived value of offer 
% of sales 
sweepstakes, raffles, etc. 
5. Partnerships business partners 
licensees (A/X, L’Oreal, Fossil, Safilo) 
partnerships with non-competitive luxe brands 
hotels, jets, etc. 
Magazines 
NPO (non-profits) 
BI services with AmEx 
Offline. 
Table 2 The appeal of offline marketing: high-fashion brand (Italy), 2010-2011.  
 
(Source: Internal reports, 2010.) 
As Table 2 indicates, brand “A” used events and partnerships with magazines as the primary 
building blocks for branding. For example, “event management, one of the most important 
generators of business”, according to the executive, was a ceremonial practice maintained by 
strong personal relations between executives and wealthy individual buyers. Events were also 
brand status generators, because the largest area of competition between the brand and its luxury 
peers was to compete in planning and carrying out events.  
Direct mail, CRM, and partnerships were also brick-and-mortar practices. Their goal was to 
acquire or retain existing customers. Customer relationship management was explained by this 
brand as the “most important practice in the lifetime of a fashion firm” aside from brick-and-
mortar magazine ads. CRM in this brand, as was typical for fashion labels, was done in 
consultation with the Retail Division and new leads were generated via partnerships with 
magazines and licensees, in-store promotions, and “datamining” of contacts.  
Despite the importance of CRM, executives at this brand could not outline in steps the 
process of designing and maintaining customer relations. This fact indicated that CRM is 
important as a ceremonial practice with clients. The Chief Commercial Officer (CCO) at 
DigiVog explained his perspective on ceremoniality and CRM in brand A.  
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“CRM is an absolutely unknown topic. I had a very close friend; a CRM Director in [brand 
A]. And, I mean, she was paid $150,000, she had the best job ever, and she had nothing to do. 
You have store managers with a handwritten card with the name and the perceived age of the 
customer and maybe the address, which you’ve jotted down with a few typos and then 
transcribing onto another database with more typos, which doesn’t fit because it’s different from 
US to Italy. I am talking of Italian fashion firms and to an extent of French fashion firms. When 
they are interviewing for a store manager, do you know how you define the value of a store 
manager? All you’re asking for is the customer carnet with a handwritten name of all the 
customers this manager has. The more VIP names, the better! You observe how much in total the 
best customers spend, you cut that in half and based on that, you define store manager's 
compensation. That is CRM in fashion companies.” 
In 2009, brand “A” launched corporate informational website with information on the 
history and the whereabouts of its stores. People visiting the website were “corralled” into 
registering for e-mail updates and this online practice became the company’s digital CRM. The 
Director of Events explained that the goal of e-mail was to “balance[e] the frequency of reach, 
database growth, and the message that is contained in the email.” E-mail officially became the 
ceremonial extension of direct mail to the online channel.   
Brand “B”: Distress and Change 
Brand “B” is a high-fashion Italian label established in 1978 with € 340.2 million revenue in 
2011. The brand suffered tremendous operating losses in 2009 and 2008. The supply-chain 
distribution of the company was heavily restructured for cost-saving and in 2010 the firm 
announced one of the worst years in its history, posting €22.3 million loss. In 2011, the brand 
still struggled with financial shortages, but reported no loss.  
Brand “B” opened its first retail boutique of on Via della Spiga in Milan, in 1978. For 
comparison, “B” is similar organizationally to two other Italian brands – the privately owned 
Prada and the public Gucci, owned by the French PPR. The brand’s Internet saga started out with 
two challenges. The first was related to the lack of in-house knowledge on how to build an e-
commerce website. The second was the fear of finding a partner- the company was looking at 
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DigiVog as a possibility- that would turn out to be much stronger in culture and competence than 
the brand. The implication was that a stronger partner that could help the brand transition online 
may force brand “B” into accepting a new cultural identity on the new channel.  
Wither Collaboration Prospects 
One of the significant problems of handling a transition online for the CIO and the Creative 
Director was the challenge to retain control of marketing and communications.  In 2009, brand 
“B” started negotiations with DigiVog executives to have assistance with building an e-
commerce website. In early 2010, the CIO was cautiously optimistic about the tenets of this 
possible partnership if DigiVog were to keep away from managing the brand’s marketing online.  
“What I'm saying is, is that we are not going to do this project internally, because the cost 
and the complexity of making a distributional e-commerce site is not convenient. But we will 
outsource all the logistics function to somebody else, and keep all marketing in-house. In this 
way, we can keep the image and the size but do not make any big investments.” 
In mid-2010, the CIO of brand “B” was in preliminary negotiations with the CCO and other 
executives at DigiVog on assessing the options for developing e-commerce. DigiVog was asking 
the brand to sign their contract for managing the e-commerce system, which also stipulated that 
DigiVog would plan some digital marketing campaigns for e-commerce, such as SEO. The brand 
executives wanted to retain the decision-making related to communications in the new space. 
This cultural approach made it necessary to keep any future partnership with DigiVog at the 
most basic level of technology provider. Said the CIO: 
“Once we have control of marketing, and have control of the look and feel, we don’t have a 
problem to allow our distribution service to somebody else. The reality is that until 3 years ago, 
nobody had this capability in-house, so that's why nobody was doing this. [DigiVog] just in two 
years developed this capability and is able to offer it to the brands. And most of the brands don’t 




As a co-creator of the new identity, DigiVog required as part of the standard contract to have 
decision-making and revenue stake in the online marketing campaigns of fashion brands whose 
e-commerce businesses the firm serviced. In 2006, DigiVog required as part of the standard 
contract to manage the brand’s search engine optimization (SEO) program. This meant to 
optimize the e-commerce property for search to help bring in traffic and revenue.  
The CIO was at a cultural crossroads. He understood that a partnership with DigiVog would 
require the brand to accept someone else’s take on how to do marketing on the new channel. He 
reasoned as to why DigiVog could be the “right” partner for a fashion brand. It seemed that on 
the Internet, the brand would be giving up substantial part of its cultural identity. 
“They are very good. They do everything.  They design the website; they are in charge of the 
fulfillment and customer service.  In some cases also they own the inventory and in others, we 
own it. Very good marketing ideas, but... we don't want to give our brand image in the hands of 
someone else. Even if they are doing the website like we want it, even if we have complete 
control over the way the website is executed, at this stage we are not feeling confident to give 
our image to someone else. At the end they are in charge to speak to the customer, they are in 
charge to propose the product, to collect the money and at the end we get some partial 
commission... Depends which level of integration you want to have; depends which 
completeness of the process they want to own.” 
There were two possible business models between DigiVog and brand “B” at the signing of 
the e-commerce partnership. Brand “B” could sell its seasonal product in bulk to DigiVog or bill 
DigiVog at the end of each month (also called consignment) depending on how much fashion 
product was sold on brand “B”’s website each month. The brand did not want to carry the 
inventory risk with the latter option. The company was accustomed to selling apparel in bulk to 
its wholesale accounts and wanted to continue doing so on the new channel.  
However, if the brand would succeed in negotiations and dispose of the risk to carry the 
merchandise by selling it in bulk to DigiVog, this came with the price tag of losing creative 
control over the displayed selection online. “If inventory risk is in our hands”, the CIO said, “We 
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can have leverage. If inventory risk is in their hands, they get to decide. If we do sell them the 
product, they get to decide which product they want to put on the site. In the end, they 
compromise the image.” 
The CIO was a cautious change agent. He assumed that the established culture of the firm in 
the brick-and-mortar domain was the only valid identity for the brand. He did not think that an 
Internet company would be capable of campaigning for the brand by curating fashion content 
with the highest sales potential for the brand’s website. The CIO summed up his conflicting 
prerogatives:  
“If we sell it to you, you are in charge of what you want to buy. So, you say: red dresses we 
do not want to buy, because red dresses do not sell well, but black dresses we will. So, in some 
way they do compromise the image of the brand. […] The idea is – to shift the attention from the 
product to the brand. You think about “B” first, and then, you approach the product. This of 
course, in some way, reduces the number of potential customers, but we want to go back to be an 
efficient company.” 
In late 2010, the CIO became less committed to partnering with a pure play brand on tackling 
the e-commerce challenge. “What I'm saying is”, the change agent stated, “Is that we are not 
going to do this project internally, because the cost and the complexity of making an e-commerce 
site is not convenient. But we will outsource all the logistics function to somebody else and keep 
in-house all marketing. In this way, we can keep the image and the size but do not make any big 
investments.” The executive launched internal plans for limited experimenting with e-commerce 
as an internal project. 
Ritual Experiment and e-Commerce  
The brand’s initiation to the Internet as a commercial channel started with the decision to 
redevelop the corporate website by issuing a global tender to five web design companies. An 
experienced local media firm, DigiMedia, won the tender to redesign the corporate property 
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online. The reason for reshuffling content on the corporate website was the desire of 
management to introduce interactive content. This was a staple theme in the strategies of all 
brands in 2010. The corporate website was redesigned to offer a quick view of upcoming, past 
season, and this season’s collections, which could be streamed as a runway video.  
In 2009, executives at the brand announced the implementation stage of an internal initiative 
to test the Internet as a suitable e-commerce channel. The perception of the team was that the less 
risky product for introducing the brand to online commerce was the luxury “Home collection”. 
The Home collection presented limited risk from competition with other online pure plays 
because the distribution of the line was confined to very limited number of brick-and-mortar 
locations.  
The team hoped to proceed to a more “aggressive online distribution” after March 2010, 
following the testing of this first “prototype” for an e-commerce website. The redesigned 
corporate website was going to drive users to the Home Collection e-commerce property. The 
corporate website was optimized for search and the “Home Design” website was placed as a link 
on the front page of the updated corporate website.  
The problem of this “doing-it-alone” experiment was that Home Collection’s e-commerce 
website did not offer to customers the ability to order and purchase online any of the products 
displayed. This was an informational website masked as a test of a new entrepreneurial practice. 
The CIO argued that this ritualistic experience was essential to figuring out how many people 
would visit the website and then go to physical stores to buy items from the Home collection 
there instead. The experiment ran the other way around; it had nothing to do with understanding 
the meaning of internet distribution and marketing. 
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“We are collecting customers’ data in order to drive them to our own stores. We use data to 
drive to stores; we do not fulfill customer requests online. But, of course, the next step, once we 
understand very clearly who our customers are online, definitely online is one of the solutions. 
That's for sure. But all these things have to make our customer to access our own little stores 
first immediately after other channels.” 
The acceptance of the Internet was designed to be ceremonial. As corroborated by the CIO: 
“… It is something that was unsuccessful from the start, meaning that the website was not 
advertised.  There was no online/direct marketing that announced the website to the world; 
positioning on the search engine, not much of it. We wanted to use the available tools in-house 
and see how the market out there reacts to the product. Home is a very special product. There 
wasn't much success because the customer did not know anything about it.” 
There was no awareness campaign to induce people to visit the website, such as buying 
popular Google search keywords or placing banners on content-heavy online magazine fronts. 
On the Home Design e-commerce, there was no registration necessary for the browsing few who 
ended up finding this Internet realty. No email marketing campaigns were ever developed, before 
2009 and well into 2010, as part of an internal structure of an emerging online marketing 
department. The marketing team consistently avowed their confidence that "new" customers 
would somehow, without the website indexed on search engines, know exactly how to get to 
Home Collection online. The “experiment” ran its course with executives aware at the extremely 
low odds for potential customers to discover the Home Design website. 
Why did brand executives “bother” investing in an e-commerce website at all, if the new 
practice was not advertised and had no built-in ability to allow users to purchase the product? 
The architect of the redesign experience, the CIO, argued that the main idea introduced by this 
experiment was to have full control of the experience. “To visit Home Design”, he said, “You 
need to run through the corporate website. There is no other entry point.” The CIO explained that 
the main goal of the experiment is to control the digital distribution of the idea of e-commerce. 
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“When we open the store, our own store or via wholesalers”, “we sign a contract that we do 
not allow anyone to open a similar store in a similar area in order to have full control of the 
distribution. At the moment that you allow an e-commerce site to distribute all over the country, 
because you cannot control if the product is in NYC or LA… We are extremely careful to move 
this way. The only possibility could be to sell a very different product. In this way you do not 
create distribution problems […], in this way you don’t risk to have a sales price that is not 
comparable and you preserve your own identity to the customer.” 
After the corporate website was redeveloped and more relevant searchable keyword content 
was introduced for easier pick-up by search engines, the brand’s corporate website began to be 
visited by more people. The CIO reported that “we began to see some results not really in terms 
of sales value, but on traffic; how many people that are passing the website. We have about 
500,000 unique visitors per month to access the main site. Visiting the Home Design are 45,000 
people out of these uniques.”  
The CIO dismissed the conception that increased traffic to the corporate website would lead 
eventually to sales on the Home Design website, had it been designed with the appropriate tools 
for buying. He did not consider the concept of traffic as culturally meaningful to the brand. The 
term “traffic” was relevant only to the assigned meaning it already had in the brick-and-mortar 
world: the entry and exit of people into a store. “Our product is very peculiar, either you like it or 
not”, was the verdict. “You cannot just browse it like IKEA. [We have a] more specific type of 
customer with a specific taste.”  
In 2011, after the formal conclusion of the Home Collection experiment, brand executives 
started thinking about a qualitatively new approach to executing the design of future Home 
Collection e-commerce website. The team working on the execution would be composed of 
people from a media agency and the brand. The CIO saw this as an “idea to do it internally or 
with a small media agency that will take charge of the production, the shooting, etc. but based 
totally on our directions.” The minimum engagement on the part of the brand was to have a 
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Creative Director talking to another Creative Director from the media agency.  Upon the 
negotiation of the look and feel for a future website, further roles would eventually be hired to 
execute the project, such as copyrighters, web editors, etc.  
“If we are lucky to get enough money for this”, said the CIO, “there is somebody else besides 
the Creative Director, let’s call them a copyrighter… this is a person who has full access to our 
content books and they pick the right information to put on the website, at the right moment, 
with the right content on the website.” Even though this rhetoric suggested there was a 
transformation of the brand’s culture toward accepting entrepreneurial opportunities, the 
persistence of fear as an unwelcome solicitor of entrepreneurial default was evident in the 
multiple hedges against risk which introduced a slow step-by-step procedure for the design of the 
e-commerce website.  
The CIO continued to argue that to make a future e-commerce website highly searchable 
online is not part of the “core” cultural apparatus of the company.  
“It is not that important to be searchable. No, not that important. If somebody wants our 
product, they can go to the brand page immediately; they don't have to think of anything else. 
Until now we do not present products but we present image. You find the image, runway show, 
but you don't see anywhere the cost of the dress, etc. because we wanted to capitalize on the 
image not on the product.”  
In mid-2011, the corporate webpage ceased to link to Home Collection. The Home 
Collection was however remodeled and the Communications division agreed to free funds for 
investing in search engine optimization (SEO) to make it “searchable” to customers who did not 
hear of the brand or the line. The investment was small, and the fear of opportunity was still 
present. The CIO in charge argued that despite the continuing lack of e-commerce capability for 
the Home Collection website, it was sufficient to ”communicate” the products via social media 
to the consumer.  
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There were clear noncommercial opportunities from integrating marketing activities and e-
commerce on the Internet. Executives at brand “B” had figured out that e-commerce websites 
can be associated with new sources for brand value. They did not know how to derive this 
positive noncommercial, “welfare” effect. They were also in distress of losing any perceived 
control over the brand stemming from any promising collaboration with a new player online. The 
result was that executives at “B” associated the implementing of an e-commerce solution with a 
very high risk from revenue loss, resulting from not knowing how to manage noncommercial 
exigencies. This fact led executives to revert to old culture and place the future unit indefinitely 
under the retail division. Said the CIO: 
“For the Italian shop, online retail is just another store. We never moved to the next level 
to think that the online store is something completely different. … It is something broader; 
needs more…. more activities… different activities, than a regular store. If you keep it under 
retail, there is very clear ROI. If you put it here, because Communications, really, it is very 
difficult to measure... Even if you are the best in the world, the results from the 
communications campaign would come in a few months. If you put the store under retail, the 
departments under retail have to present results every month; they are more immediate; they 
are measured on what they are doing now.”  
The CIO and the Creative Director were aware that Communications would only support a 
structure where e-commerce as a function is placed under the Retail division. “At the moment, 
the online is inside the retail division”, said one executive. “Even if in reality they can exchange 
ideas on product, customer, etc. they can meet together…, there is no link between 
Communications and retail.”  
Ritual Experiment and Social Media 
The biggest blow to the cultural confidence of brand “B” was the downsizing of its 
Communications division in 2009. There was at the time, only one person in Communications 
looking for opportunities in social media, who had left in 2010. Only three people were now in 
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charge of online content. The “Marketing group” – as the CIO referred to Communications 
pertaining to online activities – had three people and dealt with planning and executing digital 
tasks that were approved by the Communications division. The three people in the marketing 
team working on very basic editorial content were responsible to Communications division 
officer. The Communications division itself relied on press officers who would maintain contact 
with the general public, or in the words of one executive, “control the communications outside of 
our company”.  
Communications hosted the PR office, the marketing team and was responsible for all 
content produced for the company. Marketing was not conceived as a function that had to shift to 
creating action plans for the new channel. Therefore, there was no team in place with a 
“marketing” intention in managing social media. The PR office, similarly, did not create content 
for “branding”. The CIO argued that the lack of a “formal unit that deals with these two channels 
[is] because we lack an e-commerce shop for the collection do drive the public inside”.  
Most of the digital planning and execution for these “very, very limited” digital activities was 
outsourced to digital agencies. “We outsource most of these services”, pointed out the CIO. The 
decision was taken despite the concern of executives with surrendering the control to somebody 
else. Digital agencies were engaged in areas that were related to managing and producing 
content online. One agency planned and executed press releases; another helped with the content 
and frequency of content on social media channels (chiefly, Facebook and twitter); and the 
largest, DigiMedia, was in charge of “most of the content on the [corporate] website”. At the 
same time as this multitude of outside voices was managing the “soft” social media content for 
the brand, the importance of social media to executive management was placed by one senior 
executive at 1, the minimum on a scale between 1 and 5.  
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This pronounced democratic position for hiring a swarm of agencies was difficult to 
reconcile with the unwavering opinion of executives to control at all costs “all” brand-related 
content that was to be published anywhere online. The CIO could not even recall the name of the 
agency that published content on Facebook and twitter. “Yes”, he pointed out. “It is a firm in 
NYC, but I forgot the name. They are in charge for us to publish the content. They propose what 
to publish. We have a partnership with them. They are not completely independent.”    
This limited understanding of opportunity and change was evident in how brand executives 
perceived the value of new modes of communication and brand culture online, such as social 
media. Executive at the brand said that the history of the engagement with Facebook began by 
the incidental knowledge of an employee that, “The Facebook page... there was somebody else 
that opened a webpage with our name. At that moment, we decided to take control of things. 
Facebook removed that page and gave it back to us. And, we took full control of the page.”  
The social media strategy of the firm was considered to be a “softer” and easier to adopt and 
implement part of the new culture of the brand. Facebook and twitter were considered to be “a 
little bit more independent than any other marketing initiatives”. Executives did not think that 
allowing digital agencies to manage social media content was problematic “because, again, we 
just communicate with this medium, we don't do any branding, we don't do any marketing.” Said 
one executive:  
 “Facebook, twitter […] we use them to control our audience. We do it with DigiMedia. 
It is important. We do not buy keywords on Google […] just preserve the name of the 
company and buy all the possible words that are connected with the brand. Not for 
marketing, but to be sure that nobody else takes the name of our brand. There is web agency 
in the US that is in charge of buying for us all the possible keywords in all the markets 
worldwide. There is another firm called [X] in Japan. This brand office also makes sure than 
nobody else owns official web domains that carry the name.” 
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After the crisis in 2009, the brand’s executive team decided to shift gear and change the main 
products with which brand “B” was associated in hopes of raising sales revenue. “Until a year 
ago”, emphasized a senior executive, ”we tried to emphasize accessories, now we want to go 
back to fashion.  To do this, we need to remove from the customer the product association to the 
name, and then, to associate a specific product to the brand.”  
This problem could be solved faster and easier on the Internet than in the brick-and-mortar 
domain. The strategy would be to use search engine marketing and optimize keywords associated 
with product search. Instead of promoting the search combination “brand B and accessory type”, 
the emphasis would be to pay for higher placement of combinations associated with “brand B 
and product type”. These activities can be augmented with other online marketing activities to 
promote the new product identity of the brand, such as collaboration with affiliates, magazines, 
and co-branding.  
The CIO knew that the communications division was epistemologically not ready to carry 
out or interpret online ad campaigns in this new manner. The CIO wanted to achieve a 
compromise and envisioned that in the future there would be a “dotted line between the 
department of marketing [under Communications] and the retail division. If we grow more, I can 
imagine that in the future marketing will be added at the retail division level to take care of e-
commerce. It is more cost-effective to keep it under Communications.”   
Brand “C”: Pro Amateur in Entrepreneurship and Change 
One of the oldest high-fashion firms, established in 1856 in UK, represents one of the few 
cases of accidental entrepreneurial success on the Internet. This case-study runs contrary to the 
hypothesis that the age of an organization correlates with its exposure to a new culture. The Vice 
President of Marketing was an Internet enthusiast who came up with a new interpretation of the 
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meaning of cultural success online for fashion brands in the late 2000s. Since the beginning of 
2009, the brand was also headed up by an enthusiastic CEO, who had been in a similar position 
for a very different US-born brand until that date. 
The openness of this brand to new cultural practice was facilitated by the openness of its 
executives, such as the CEO, marketing and supply-chain, to discern broad patterns of change 
surrounding the organization on the Internet. The Vice President of Global Marketing narrated 
the shifts in communal practice on the Internet that prompted him to suggest to his superiors 
and peers in the firm the need to experiment with new interactive and collaborative tools for 
brand positioning. 
“By this I mean the broadened maturing of the function of the internet moving into web 2.0 
about four years ago. … Before 2.0 in my opinion, the Internet was a communications and 
commerce platform. And then, with the advent of web 2.0 the desire to connect people much 
more, to develop a community behavior, what you moved towards was the development of an 
entertainment, interaction, collaboration base. […] Not all our peers were engaging in this 
behavior, so the opportunity was there for us to grab. I have the extraordinary opportunity to 
advance thinking in a new way. So, the way you need to engage with that is what story you 
drive. As a result, when I started I hired a lot of new people and replaced old people.”  
The VP of Global Marketing came from a consulting background and responded swiftly to 
what he perceived as the need to adapt to the new digital channel to reap new advantages for 
positioning of the brand. The shift in acknowledging the Internet as a collaborative channel 
implied for executives in brand “C” that its organizational structure and reporting arrangements 
have to change. The Internet became a challenge that ran parallel to large-scale structural shifts 
necessitated by increasing competition and pressures for improving performance in the brand. 
Core departments such as Marketing, IT, and Supply Chain were all centrally driven.  From a 
regional federation, the executive management began the process of transitioning the brand to 
“a sectoral system, corporately run and driven with essentially, a state”.  
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The success of the project depended on hiring specialists with diverse backgrounds that had 
already served businesses known for their creativity in approaching problems. Said the VP of 
Marketing: 
“I hired a guy from Xbox – on the marketing side; a guy from Nokia, a guy from an 
advertizing agency. In the Media Department I created a Digital Media side and hired a specialist 
in search media, SEO. And, I spent time working with the PR team, make sure that they were 
engaging with the digital. In conjunction to that, the rest of the system was changing, so I found 
great partners in the IT team. As I joined [the brand], there were also people across [the firm] 
who were at that time trying to stimulate change.” 
Prior to this reorganization, brand “C” was one of the first fashion industry movers that 
adopted e-commerce in 2006. The surprising approach of executives in this brand was that they 
had commercial expectations from e-commerce and saw it as a risky project with exploratory 
dimension. A senior executive argued that 
“There was recognition within the firm that e-commerce was part of the commercial future 
of the company. The idea was to establish a presence, learn from the behavior, and not wait until 
you have the other brands collectively establish that e-commerce is something you should 
engage in. ‘Cause there is quite a movement towards collective collaboration in all sectors. Kind 
of follow the herd mentality. Brands gain confidence from other brands behavior. But, this 
doesn’t mean that the opportunity has been positively explored. It was seen as strategic 
commercial opportunity.” 
Executives conceptualized that the risk of failure budgeted for e-commerce in the regional 
structure “[…] was similar to the risk you encounter at a normal retail level” and e-commerce 
was initially introduced as a supply-chain project, driven by the IT division. As the firm garnered 
experience with e-commerce as a commercial pursuit, they understood that new pure play peers 
on the Internet associate e-commerce with new sources of brand value that extend to their 




In 2006, there were no known providers that offered integrated competence in building an e-
commerce website and running it like a new brand opportunity. DigiVog was just starting out its 
client expansion model. The brand executives decided to hire an e-commerce platform provider 
and look at the service at a “business level, [and] not on a brand level”, said the VP of 
Marketing.  
Between 2007 and 2009, brand “C” was going through regional reconfiguration and the e-
commerce project became interesting to regional management. E-commerce became perceived in 
the brand as a regional revenue opportunity. After 2009, the e-commerce opportunity finally 
became driven by marketing. Marketing executives observed that new capabilities, such as social 
media and social commerce were introduced online and emerging pure play retail fashion brands 
and social commerce firms were starting to integrate these capabilities on their e-commerce 
fronts.  
The fact that helped discover opportunity where other brands saw hurdle, was the attention of 
the VP of Marketing, the Director of Media Planning and the Director of Social Media 
Marketing to contextual changes in the emerging digital field of fashion. Said the VP of 
Marketing: 
 “The reason we did it is, we wanted to play in the top-tier of brands [online]. You've got 
LVMH, Chanel, Gucci, Dior, Prada, and Polo Ralph Lauren. The reality is that we were the least 
well run and supported of all of those. We considered ourselves a top-tier brand, although at a 
smaller revenue level. We wanted to create awareness. And since no brands were engaging 
digitally, we were in a position to engage with the consumer in a competent way. It was that 
simple.”  
Executives at “C” did not understand the utility of these new practices. However, the brand 
was moving away from the cultural identity of fashion brands associated with ceremonial 
practice by attempting to “think” like an online entrepreneur and discover the cultural 
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empiricism and relevance of new Internet tools for brand positioning by practicing them. The 
decision was made to enhance the value of e-commerce as a brand opportunity and experiment 
with new opportunities in technology and culture. “We are a luxury brand”, said the VP of 
Marketing, ”and it is not about embracing all technologies at all times but use the right medium 
in the right way.  Digital is not a spooky thing; it should never be used in a spooky way.”  
Prior to the structural reorganization in 2008 advertizing and marketing were siloed-away in 
the brand, similar to the existing cultural organization in other fashion brands. In 2010, the 
Global Marketing team discovered that most high-fashion European brands would have the 
digital side and the communications side of the firm handled separately, sometimes by different 
teams on different continents. The Communications team could be advertizing in Elle Magazine 
and the digital team could be advertizing on Elle.com. The Director of Marketing, Media 
Planning and Buying thought that it did not make sense to add on a team in an old organizational 
structure in which both the new team and the old division would be “spending another heap of 
cash and these two teams aren’t even talking to each other”.  
After the marketing team shared these observations, in 2008 senior executives in the firm 
proposed to establish a digital advertizing structure that would be separated from offline and 
print advertizing. The retail department would still manage the e-commerce team and e-
commerce would have a limited budget, consisting of search, content optimization and some 
advertizing campaigns. There was also a separate Marketing department whose goal was to work 
on branding by buying media space online. The brand executives considered that a viable way to 
coordinate offline and online practices of advertizing and communications was to establish 
boundaries between a new Marketing team and the existing Communications division.  
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Between 2009 and 2011, the Director of Media in the brand reported how observing pure 
play fashion retail brands made it possible to envision organizational changes that would 
integrate e-commerce “into more marketing”. The Marketing division of the brand became 
responsible for holding one single advertizing budget fluid across digital and paper advertizing 
mediums.  
The brand was had its own in-house Creative Media, which helped create its own digital 
content, such as ads, digital videos, or behind-the-scenes videos. “Everything that we produce 
digitally is done here”, explained the Director of Media. “And that is a really big deal because 
not many houses have in-house creative teams. We can make content as soon as we need it, 
basically.”  
While digital content was produced in-house, brand executives faced the challenge of 
working with multiple digital agencies on online campaigns. Partnerships with media agencies 
were short-term and did not involve complex activities for which tacit knowledge had to be 
accumulated or exchanged. Typical example is the brand’s ongoing contract with MediaCom. 
Exchange here involved developing media briefs for content buying. MediaCom prepared a 
proposal; the brand refined it and returned it to the agency. The agency executed a purchase for 
media space.  
The VP of Marketing spearheaded a campaign to find a long-term partnership opportunity 
with a single agency that would have exclusive involvement in all digital campaigns, from 
banners on Vogue.com to SEO. Before the middle of 2010, when DigiVog established Pure 
Partner division, there were no specialist agencies of this kind. The Head of Media Buying 
summed up the risk the brand faced by involving multiple agencies to run campaigns on “face 
value” for which the brand did not have expert knowledge: 
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”increasingly, you cannot find that degree of specialism in one agency.  If you have the 
quality in-house, […] you can challenge and be productive with multiple agencies on a specialist 
level. We've got internal marketing expertise. But we work with agencies. We work with search 
engine marketing agencies. We work with our website partners on SEO. We segment our 
databases. We … work with our digital agency on developing the advertising campaign.” 
This conceptual discussion is important because independently of other high-fashion brands, 
executives at “C” were open to think of coming up with a new cultural understanding of the 
value of engaging with the Internet. This understanding read that if a fashion brand did not have 
in-house expertise in managing multiple campaigns online, the use of multiple specialist 
agencies was doomed to be an Internet misadventure. In the absence of in-house knowledge on 
what channels to experiment with and how, fashion brands needed a single specialist – a 
DigiVog - a consultant who does it all. Best as they could, executives at “C” invested time and 
resources in discovering how they could become their own agency. 
Understanding Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
Marketing department executives were hard-pressed by the Board of Directors to show that 
the participation of the brand on the Internet was successful in terms of return on investment in 
e-commerce and social media. Having done substantial work on optimizing their website for 
search with contract agencies, marketing executives at “C” knew that some factors leading to a 
commercial purchase could be quantified. For example, the “searchability” of an e-commerce 
website on major search engines correlated with online sales. The Head of Media Buying knew 
that search alone was responsible for “two-thirds [80%] of all traffic and revenue, so it’s the 
single most important factor in terms of driving revenue success”. Twenty percent of the revenue 
was driven by online advertizing.  
On the other hand, the brand’s average purchase value online was stagnating at $200 and the 
share of online sales in total sales totaled 1.5%. Other high-fashion brands faced similar puzzling 
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results. The former senior marketing executive at Dior, for example, noted that “one percent is 
the typical conversion rate. If people say they do 10%, they are liars. They never do more than 
2%.” It seemed that customers were essentially purchasing to experience the brand, rather than 
make a necessary purchase.  
The Vice President of Marketing noticed that even when brands thought out far-reaching 
campaigns with the goal of gaining potential customers, such as by funding a YouTube video 
with a captivating brand story, screen played by popular personal style bloggers, the traffic 
achieved by viewing the video did not result in high conversion rates. He came to think that the 
quality, not the level of traffic was important for understanding the success of e-commerce. In 
this case, the quality of traffic on the e-commerce website of brand “C” was related to 
“occasional browsing” and not a purchase.  
The development of social media and social commerce further validated the idea of non-
commercial performance as a possible indicator of success. Marketing executives could not 
predict with certainty if investment in advertizing on Facebook resulted in traffic to e-commerce 
and conversion to sales. Experts from Internet research agencies, as Forrester Research, found it 
difficult to measure how commercial performance of a brand’s e-commerce website can be 
affected, if the fashion product featured is linked to content generated on social platforms, such 
as Facebook, blogs, or magazines.  
The Director of Media at brand “C” indicated that investment on the new channel can be 
looked at as a commercial goal, related to sales, and a non-commercial goal, related to deriving 
new sources of brand value.  
“All marketing activity is creating something with a commercial opportunity for a brand, 
but it's not necessarily about direct purchase. There are very, very few examples of Social 
Media behavior that leads to purchase, I mean, I can't think of any off the top of my head. I 
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mean, the Internet is less about telling consumer things and more about brand behaving in a 
way which is relevant to consumers and the consumer making the decision on how to engage 
with the brand. And that's what drives all thought behind Social Media”. 
The result from this internal collaboration in thought leadership was to foster a 
noncommercial performance culture, especially when it came to conceptualizing the value of 
social media. Said the VP of Marketing: 
“You want me to quantify Social Media? That is a pretty impossible question to answer! 
Now, quantifying Social Media is difficult, because although the consumer engages in 
community behavior all the time, community behavior hasn't led to commercial behavior 
historically. Whether you're talking of MySpace, Facebook, twitter or YouTube, they're not 
really revenue generator. They're not really commercially viable behavioral types, what they 
do is that they are great brand engagement tools. So, what we realized was, SM was not 
going to disappear, it was only going to increase in importance. And, it wasn't about 
connecting “if I invest X in SM, I will get Y in revenue”; there was no way to throw that 
kind of relationship. But,…SM can have a very positive effect on our brand, and that would 
drive our brand momentum and value and that would result in traffic, whether that is online 
or offline.” 
Fashion brands typically thought of Facebook as an additional social tool for brand-related 
communications. In 2010, this brand made no exception and the Global Director of Social Media 
presented it as a “broadcast vehicle”. The difference from other brands was that the Global 
Marketing team showed an understanding for the collaborative work that had started it. Unlike 
the “seizure” method of their fan-created Facebook page that brand “B” followed, executives at 
“C” took advantage of an already existing fan page on Facebook.  In 2009, the marketing 
executives in London noticed that there was a brand-dedicated community on Facebook, 
operated by fans of the brand for the past few years. There were few followers and the 
community posted haphazard content around the brand. “And, we got in touch with the 
consumers who started the group and we worked with them”, explained the current Director of 
Social Media Marketing. In 2010, the brand’s Facebook community had 900,000 fans. In 2012 
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(July), the brand pumped up to 13,034,608 followers. The Global Director of Social Media 
reflected that the social membership in the Facebook page of the brand 
“got to this number – a big enough audience with which we could behave in a mass way. 
Like, in a broadcast type of behavior. We thought about communications stories, brand stories 
you want to tell. We're quite simple-minded in the way we roll out our stories and our thinking. 
We use it as a broadcast vehicle and as you join in, you get to distribute the brand's content 
because the media channel [Facebook] allows this”.  
This cultural acceptance of the beneficial innovative pursuit of the initial authors of the page 
is one example showing how learning from others is an expression of showing appreciation for 
noncommercial brand value in the emerging new institutional field of Internet fashion culture. 
Entrepreneurial Inroads in integrating community and commerce 
The VP of Marketing and his creative team learned from observing that in order for an 
entrepreneurial entity to be successful online, it needs to be good at adapting to the behaviors of 
other online peers and user firms. Apart from their Facebook page, the brand developed what the 
Global Director of Social Media dubbed “our own Facebook”. The VP of Marketing and the 
online media team were actively discussing the meaning of some emerging social practices, such 
as social or community blogs. The brand was continuing to show behavior in which executives 
would follow developments in the use of new Internet tools, and attempt to replicate the use on 
their own. The VP of Marketing confirmed the process: 
“We were talking about the fact that Social Media wasn't going to go away. The type of 
experience that we wanted to create was a luxury experience which cannot be done on other 
people's platforms [Facebook]. Nor could we offer a social media experience on [our own 
website]. So, we created a stand-alone platform. [The website presents our] iconic product which 
most customers directly associate with the brand, and it became the obvious focus of the 
conversation. But, the important thing to do was not to make it about the [product], but about the 
consumer who wears [it]. We succeeded in providing the environment which leads to consumer 
engagement. We provided an opportunity to demonstrate that this is possible”.  
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This stand-alone website was the first instance in the corporate haute couture world when an 
incumbent of this caliber had demonstrated willingness to establish and support their own social 
community webpage whose goal was to foster engagement with the most well-known product of 
the brand. The photographer– blogger Scott Schulman took the first photographs of street fashion 
of people wearing the product. The brand’s Facebook fans were encouraged to share photographs 
of their favorite still shots of others or themselves wearing the brand on the website. The idea 
with introducing the community is to incite users to engage in publishing their own content. The 
global Director of Social Media interpreted the success of their social media engagement by non-
commercial criteria of engagement per minute. 
“One of the insights is to inspire people to publish – more about inspirational experience. 
100,000 likes, we've had [Data at conception, May, 2010]. We have about 20,000 unique 
visitors, unique visitors a week. This is pretty significant for what it is! This is more than what a 
fashion website gets a week. The average engagement time is 6 minutes, which again, is 
amazing. Since the launch, there have been 6,000,000 unique visitors’ photos that have been 
viewed. This also resulted, although not directly, in double-digit growth in our sales.”  
The VP of Marketing supported the non-commercial culture of assessing the success from 
the new community website. In his opinion, as a variable social engagement rendered a brand 
“more powerful because the consumer has decided to engage with [the website]. But, we have 
very quickly earned that. Because, all we've done is become more famous for what we do. We 
want to give the consumer the opportunity to engage and manipulate the brand much more, 
‘cause the brand itself does not change.” 
The story of the social engagement project evolved in 2010 when the CEO of the brand saw 
her children ordering Nike shoes on the Internet and tailoring the product to their own creative 
ambitions. A closed meeting with senior executives in the company was held in which the VP of 
Marketing was made responsible for the project. The new idea was to engage webpage users to 
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participate in social engagement by posting photos of themselves or others wearing the product 
and to elicit a buying a response from these users.  
In a heated discussion on the future of the fashion industry and Internet entrepreneurship, the 
CEO asked the executives to analyze the options for mass-customization of the high-fashion 
product, for which the brand is known, to the public. Whereas Nike used its e-commerce website 
at Nike.com to offer customers to customize shoes, the CEO of “C” discussed a different type of 
creative approach in which content and commerce were to be looked at as an integrated 
experience. The integration would be achieved by linking the social community webpage of the 
brand with the mini e-commerce website that would tailor the product to customer specifications.  
The most difficult aspect of negotiations in this discussion with senior executives was to 
justify that creating the options with overseas factories for tailoring the design and coloring of 
the product would not be too costly and would, in fact, produce demand. This concern was 
voiced by executives in production and supply chain operations, who themselves were pressured 
to deliver on commercial goals.  
The initial discussion with executives from commercial departments ended with the 
agreement to introduce tailored production of the apparel product in small batches to experiment 
with the commercial aspect of this idea. It was decided to continue with the existing engagement 
message on the user generated website, but limit the custom tailored combinations of the product 
to five only, so as to not pressure production.  
Executives in charge of production and supply chain continued to struggle to transform the 
content website from a space that deals with engagement to a space that primarily encourages 
and drives revenue. The CEO continued to show support for the hybrid goals of the enterprise, in 
which both commercial and noncommercial goals would be supported. The CEO reminded 
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executives that social community engagement was important in stressing the “heritage” of the 
company in creating the product and customer engagement was an important vehicle of 
commanding continual learning about the iconic status of that product. 
In 2012, the idea of linking the community website with an e-commerce website dedicated to 
the ordering of a tailor-made product came to an end due to constraints at the executive level 
related to their still emerging understanding of integrating commerce with branding. When the 
mini – store was introduced in 2011, it was only accessible to users who would visit the e-
commerce webpage of the brand. There was no direct link on the community page that pointed 
out to the commerce page. The creative idea of uniting content-heavy social community with 
tailor-made commercial proposition was lost. 
The current configuration is that there is no link announcing on the community website 
celebrating the product that there is an option of creating your own product. This option is 
announced on the e-commerce website of the brand. The tailor-made initiative also has a new 
name. Despite its successful inroad to cultural adaptation and entrepreneurial experimentation on 
the Internet, brand “C” was lacking in confidence and preparation to follow through with this 
experimentation of integrating content and commerce in the way that was initially envisaged on 
the example of online companies in digital fashion. 
Entrepreneurial Inroads in digital marketing  
The all-under-one-roof organization of the structure of marketing in the firm made transition 
to the new institutional domain easier for this brand. The brand engaged in two types of online 
marketing activity: search engine marketing (SEM) and online advertizing. It is important to 
distinguish between the two types. The goal of search is to deliver sales revenue. Banner 
advertizing is used for branding and awareness.  
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SEM has two sides. The first type is to optimize the e-commerce website of a brand for 
search. This practice is also called natural search optimization. The process of optimizing e-
commerce for search is necessary to improve the searchability of a commercial website in search 
engine results and boost traffic to the brand’s e-commerce property. This activity is basic, but 
important and could be outsourced to an agency or performed in-house, provided that there is 
internal expertise on performing this function.  Paid keyword search is a more advanced version 
of natural search. This practice is more labor-intensive and involves monitoring the performance 
of keywords associated with the brand’s products and name on Google AdWords and bid against 
other firms for principal placement in Google search results. A fashion company would also 
outsource this activity to an outside agency. Brand “C” sourced out both natural and paid search 
to external agencies. 
The second type of marketing activity for brand “C” was to advertise with fashion 
publications online. Online advertizing inherited its importance as a practice to this brand from 
the overwhelming reliance on brick-and-mortar advertizing in general. Even though search 
(natural and paid) generated two-thirds of sales revenue, the total investment in search, which for 
2010 was 2.5 million pounds, was “a lot less”, according to the Director of Media, than the 
annual spend on banner advertizing.  
The brand used another media agency that helped pair advertising content with publications 
online. As this activity was outsourced, the Director of Media and Buying was able to put 
together a team to think of additional online marketing activities that may be used by the brand. 
In searching for these opportunities, the team was looking at the practices of online entrepreneurs 
in fashion. The discovery of an entrepreneurial opportunity came accidentally.  
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The Director of Media and Buying was serving as an informal business development 
manager for the online division. Part of his job in recent years had shifted from maintaining 
relationships with magazines to building relationships with online content creators, most 
importantly, with search engines, like Google. The reason was to enhance the support of search 
activities. In the past two years, between 2010 and 2012, fashion firms had generally undermined 
the importance of investing in search. Brand “C” was more adventurous. Executives in the 
marketing team knew that search was the primary revenue driver for the firm’s online operations. 
They understood the importance of this fact with regard to pursuing relevant relationships with 
the content creators that were instrumental to bringing revenue to the company. 
Google had developed a new collaborative practice to test the usability of new search 
initiatives. Google offered to test Beta products to selected brands. Brand “C” wanted to take 
advantage of this relationship before other fashion peers in the industry. During the latest Beta 
test with Google, the Director of Media noticed that the brand could shift the use of search to be 
associated with a new cultural meaning gleaned from observations of pure play fashion firms. 
Search was widely used for generating sales revenue, but could also be used for attempting to 
gain non-commercial welfare effects, such as brand engagement. The Director of Media 
explained the shift: 
“Traditionally, “we wanted to have relationships with publishers to make sure that when 
the animated advertizing side came up in a magazine, they would call us first before they called 
somebody else. We are now able to start thinking about how we can use search to – of course it 
will still be mainly about driving revenue – buying keywords to make us money— but also, to 
start using search more intelligently, to starting to use search more as a branding tool. In a funny 
way, we already do that. In certain markets, we don’t make any money from the [brand name]. 
And, this word is obviously at the heart of who we are as a brand. So, we always make sure that 
whenever someone types it into a search engine that we will appear at the top. And, we will do 
that even if we lose money doing that. So, you could argue in a really funny kind of way that that 
is actually branding. I mean, it’s a long way from booking an ad in Vogue. But, it helps us to be 
able to display out product better.”  
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The insight about shifting the cultural meaning of search changed how brand executives 
conceived of banner advertizing. The Director of Media realized that display advertizing online 
is driven by assumptions identical to those that executives have when buying print space in 
Vogue, – “we’re guessing that people are going to be right for the brand”. In print media, this 
“guessing game” epitomizes the culture of doing something for ceremonial gains. “Imagine 
when you’re buying pages in a magazine”, said the executive. “You get information obviously 
on what type of readers they have, but generally you’re guessing, really, that those people are 
the right target for the campaign.” The only departure from this guessing logic online was 
quantitative; the advertiser had access to data on how many unique visitors had looked at a single 
banner.  
 
Figure 5 Moving along the scale of meaning in digital marketing practice 
The Director of Media recognized that the brand did not make original use of Internet culture 
and proposed to shift the use of banner advertizing toward commercial goals (Figure 5).  
“This is how we advertise traditionally on the Internet. We buy hundreds of thousands of 
banners and you hope that one or two of these people will click thru and blah-blah-blah. I think 
this is one of the reasons why click-thru is so low – the click-thru is 0.3 % for the industry. I 
think it’s because it’s hard to really know you are targeting the right person. However, if we 
want to think more about making money from banner ads, we can look at a completely different 
way of choosing how we advertise. In the same way that I’ve talked about using SEO to do more 
branding stuff, we are now looking at ways in which we can use our display assets to actually 
drive ROI for every $ we make for this type of advertizing, we make 7$ back.”  
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The goal of display advertizing is typically to have as many impressions (clicks) from unique 
visitors, as possible. A digital team buys a certain amount of impressions on a web site. The 
website that hosts the banner then gets paid on a CPM basis (cost per million impressions), PPC 
basis (pay-per-click), or a combination thereof. The assumption in brand “C” was initially that 
because the brand produced creative media content in-house, the quality of banners was likely to 
lead to “a higher click-thru than a normal banner ad”. The banner displays were produced in a 
way that allowed “the ads escape the limitation” of “normal” technology. This meant to have 
adverts where the video would start playing in the banner with the added technology of, for 
instance, rain drops falling on the page.  
Because of these assumptions, the brand continued to invest heavily in banner production and 
–placement. What prompted brand executives to shift the cultural goal of banner ads to 
accommodate commercial goals was the decision in early 2009 to work with Vogue, GQ, and 
Elle on a more commercial basis online. The idea was very similar to the decision and practice 
DigiVog would pursue with large fashion publications between 2010 and 2012. In looking at the 
production of original culture in pure play peers online, brand “C” was close to shifting the 
production of its own culture.  
It proved difficult to negotiate with these large publications on the proposed changes. The 
Director of Media surmised that executives in these fashion publications were unwilling to work 
with the brand on a more revenue-based collaboration because online ads were “[...] still not 
going to drive a click-thru which is going to make you money. That’s for branding. It’s about 
association.” DigiVog Group would later document that the difficulty to work on a revenue-basis 
with print publications gone online was their lack of enthusiasm for changing their culture.  
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The Media Buying team did not abandon the attempt to work with “more creative assets”. 
They decided to use “retargeting”- a new practice widely used by other, non-fashion businesses 
online. Luxury fashion brands do not use this practice because their executives perceive that its 
cultural appeal is “cheap”.  To retarget means to track the path of a consumer who visits a 
website or clicks on a banner for up to 20 websites prior to and after the click had been made. A 
display ad from the brand’s e-commerce website would then appear as the customer clock-
though pre-selected partner websites, looking for things other than a fashion product. 
The Director of Media announced that retargeting is a prominent way to get revenue from 
previously non-revenue associated channels. Said he: 
“Rather than buying 50,000 impressions on Vogue.com, we could actually buy the cookies of 
people who look very, very similar to the people who've been on [the brand’s website]. This is 
what we call “look-alike” adverting. As they get on the internet, we can effectively retarget them 
with advertizing. This person is much more likely to respond to our adverts than a normal banner 
ad. This ad would have originally been designed as a branding piece for us; now we can use it to 
generate revenue as well.” 
By using this logic, the brand was paving the way for other brick-and-mortar fashion peers to 
transform their online activities into branding opportunities with a commercial appeal, or what 




PART III: FROM CEREMONIAL TO COLLABORATIVE ORGANIZATION: 
CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN AN EMERGING ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD  
Chapter 5: The Genesis of Cultural Technology: Start-up Entrepreneurs in Digital 
Fashion 
5.1 Early experiment, programmatic failures, and entrepreneurial default  
Executives in companies born after the dotcom crisis tend to explain early experiments by 
digital fashion pioneers founded in the late 1990s as “failures in culture”. Leaders in some of the 
key fashion-technology firms today emphasize that the founders of early ventures in fashion 
approached the online channel with the “brusque” sensitivity of brick-and-mortar fashion 
companies and their intermediaries and that their cultural appreciation of the online channel was 
limited to how they thought fashion firms would behave in the brick world.  
The early models did not have access to other “born online” counterparts that would 
eventually coagulate into the nurturing community of practice in digital fashion that emerged 
after 2008. On the other hand, early fashion start-ups were inspired and designed after 
technology pioneers, such as Amazon and eBay. The Director of  the Partner Division at 
DigiGroup, charged with e-commerce and online marketing relations with high-fashion brands, 
in fact asserted that from a “cultural technology perspective, these [companies] are technology 
spillovers" forked in between an identity mindful of appreciating their online “roots” and  





Bluefly.com was founded as one of the first multi-brand retail websites online and its 
founding firm, Bluefly Inc. went public immediately after the launch of the venture in 2000. 
Bluefly’s founders wanted to build a retail brand online that would be similar to a luxury 
department store, but with the caveat that it would “selectively acquire end-of-season and excess 
inventory of high-end designer fashion products and create a hybrid retail environment, that 
combines the best of the 3 traditional channels: full-price department stores, catalogs and 
traditional off-price stores.
12”  
Bluefly’s e-commerce platform was built by Blue Martini, a small and at the time 
independent software firm, with which the start-up signed a Software License Agreement in 
March 2002. Bluefly’s e-retail team accorded substantial importance to the optimization of the 
commercial website. The company’s 10-K in 2001 asserted that “with the assistance of 
consultants from Blue Martini, we plan to develop an improved version of our website based on 
Blue Martini software. Once launched, we expect that the upgraded website will provide us with 
better tools to create and manage on-site marketing promotions, more robust analytical tools to 
measure the performance of onsite promotions, greater site stability and a more efficient platform 
[...]”  
Bluefly’s team wanted to offer customers the advantages of technology, such as 
“personalized shopping environment”. The website was designed in mind with offering the 
customer to "come to Bluefly.com first for all of your fashion needs”, and announced the 
                                                          
12
 BFLY, 10-K, 2001. 
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acquisition of “top designer merchandise at a discount and outstanding customer service in a 
friendly, convenient, upscale environment”.  
Bluefly was the first online born company that devised new slogans that helped to navigate 
the meaning of cultural success on the Internet. After the hard launch of www.bluefly.com, the 
company’s C-level management spelled out in its first SEC filing in 1998 what became known as 
the "eight future principal elements of success" for online fashion-technology firms. Four of 
these were linked to traditional practices maximized by brick-and-mortar fashion wholesalers. 
These elements were price, convenience, customer service, order delivery performance, and 
merchandise selection.  
The other three elements, “brand recognition,” “website performance," and "content,” were 
qualitatively new for a retail business. Bluefly gauged that the success of “content” depended on 
the popularity of the fashion brands present on its online commercial website. As one online 
executive noted, Bluefly derived this online measure of “success” from a culture “rooted in the 
brands that they own." “Website performance,” and “brand recognition” were not explicitly 
defined as proxies. But, in spelling out these “factors of success”, the firm’s founders indicated 
that it was possible to navigate and create practices that would serve as a roadmap for future 
businesses in digital fashion.  
In the years between 1997 and 2000, Bluefly’s online commercial strategy went through a 
cultural disconnect between its stated goals and actual practice. In the absence of advanced 
digital marketing, social media, and social commerce technologies and players who used them 
during that period, the emerging ecology of digital fashion entrepreneurs was a perfunctory 
channel for brands that had ambiguous meaning to both insider companies and outside users and 
served an unidentified consumer. The company noted these problems of interpretation of its 
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domain in two consecutive 10-K reports in 2001 and 2002 stating that “The Internet is a rapidly 
changing and highly competitive market and we may not have adequate resources to compete 
successfully. […] It is characterized by a) rapid technological change; b) evolving user 
requirements; c) frequent new product, service and technology introductions; d) the emergence 
of new industry practices.” 
The fledgling company had to interpret its own position with regard to the emerging new 
channel and spend resources on understanding its difference with regard to the embryonic 
ecology of digital fashion. In 2001 and 2002, Bluefly’s management included a wide array of 
players in its purview of cultural competition facing the company. One category consisted of 
established firms with existing land-based retailers, such as Neiman Marcus, Saks, The Gap, 
Nordstrom, and Macy's. In the other group were traditional direct marketers such as J. Crew, 
television marketers, and land-based off-price retail stores. These brick fashion partners signified 
the ambiguity that Bluefly’s management felt with regard to its structural position in the digital 
space. The brick competitors were known partners with unknown future intentions. Bluefly’ 
management consistently grappled with the question if these firms “[…] may or may not use the 
Internet in the future to grow their customer base.”  
Bluefly’s executive team likewise charted out another emerging category in the new space of 
“less established companies such as Ashford [in 10-K, 2002] and eLuxury [10-K, 2001]”. The 
firm’s management conceptualized the two categories as different. Brick-and-mortars deciding to 
step onto the Internet with e-commerce operations were conceptualized as brands that “us[e] the 
Internet to expand their channels of distribution”. Newborn technology-fashion brands such as 
Ashford and eLuxury were considered start-up companies “which are building their brands 
online”. Bluefly’s team expected many “additional competitors to emerge in the future.”  
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The management team at Bluefly’s was resolute that the company sees the Internet as a 
quintessential commercial platform for the business. Bluefly’s 2010 annual SEC report specified 
that the company, in fact, could not become the "Store of First Resort for Fashion” without using 
Internet as a platform. Bluefly interpreted its own identity as a radical game-changer online. 
Merchandisers in the online firm identified two additional elements re-inventing the premium 
distribution channel for fashion brands on the Internet. The first was to provide “consistency” in 
the brand proposition by selecting a premium matrix of brands. The other element was to offer 
brands with “scarce” distribution.  
Executives from brick-and-mortar fashion firms remained traditionalist and chose not to 
collaborate with Bluefly. They also showed aversion to the eight cultural factors for competing 
successfully online that were developed initially by Bluefly’s executive team. The CIO of Brand 
“B”, for example, countered impatiently: “No, no. It's an online outlet; opposite mentality! Price 
and order delivery is important […].” Another fashion brand consultant said that “Bluefly was an 
experiment; online outlet. Buying leftovers from fashion firms, very well done but very simple.” 
The former CEO of one of the world's largest woman’s apparel companies in the 1980s 
reinforced the failure argument— "They never made a dime", he said.  
In retrospect, this had been the correct assessment. In December 2011, after fourteen years in 
training and experimenting with new e-commerce and marketing practice, Bluefly reported 
accumulated financial deficit of over $147,468,000. The management team attributed the 
negative growth to “costs associated with developing and marketing our Web site and building 
our infrastructure” (10-K, 2011, my emphasis). Insufficient understanding of marketing and 
technology online were the two factors that flunked Bluefly as a successful online company.  
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Bluefly’s executive team started out with good intentions. In the company’s two first annual 
SEC statements, in 2001 and 2002, Bluefly reported that the merchandising strategy of the firm 
is to enter into direct purchasing agreements with fashion designers. The executive team asserted 
that their buyers have substantial merchandising knowledge gained from their former tenures 
with merchandisers, such as Saks, Bergdorf, and Henri Bendel. Despite this claim, Bluefly’s 
management team conceded as early as 2001 to purchasing “merchandise both directly from 
brand owners and indirectly from retailers and third party distributors”.  
The ambiguity of the executive team on this question rendered suspect just how far fashion 
brands would go to endorse Bluefly with their merchandise. The firm was forced to disclose the 
intent to expand relationships with “suppliers of end-of-season and excess name brand apparel 
and fashion accessories. We may acquire certain goods on consignment, or leasing or partnering 
with strategic partners and distributors.” (10-K 2002, p. 25). Bluefly’s executives acknowledged 
that merchandise from third parties “increases the risk that we will mistakenly purchase and sell 
non-authentic or damaged goods” (10-K, 2002). 
The other area of concern was the lack of in-house technology for building and maintaining 
the intended creative marketing and commercial appeal of Bluefly’s online retail website. 
Internal development of the e-commerce solution would have allowed the firm to have its own 
contextual footprint in digital marketing and web design, instead of the heavy dependence on 
third parties in this area. The first two K-10 annual reports of the firm revealed how critical the 
impact of technology was to building the desired “brand recognition” online. Any failure to 
obtain the services of a third-party in web design, fulfillment or digital marketing – functions 
basic to the internal structure of current onliners in digital fashion - was a “material adverse 
impact on our business, prospects, financial condition and results of operations” (10-K, 2002). 
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The two 10-K reports in 2001 and 2002 also advised shareholders that “There is no assurance 
that our technology systems will be able to handle increased traffic. Transaction processing 
systems, network infrastructure, need to be expanded and upgraded; otherwise [this] could 
‘adversely affect consumers’ perceptions of our brand name’”. 
After Bluefly’s unfortunate venture in the new space of digital fashion, ensuring the 
solicitation of established brands along with ownership of e-commerce and marketing 
technology became most critical measure for securing the intangibles of future success for 
fashion-technology start-ups. The knowledge of doing was attained by insiders in the ecology by 
sharing contextual information in the digital community.  
eLuxury.com 
ELuxury.com has a distinct experimental flavor among the pioneers in fashion commerce. 
The online e-commerce company was launched in 2000 by the luxury fashion conglomerate 
LVMH Moët Hennessy/Louis Vuitton S.A. This test of the channel was, because the main 
holding company of LVMH is Christian Dior, a high-fashion French maison dé mode that owns 
42.36% of LVMH’s shares and 59.01% of its voting rights. The goal of eLuxury was to become 
“the premier online destination for buying luxury handbags” (ref) The company represented one 
of the rare instances of ideal-typical emerging company in an emerging institutional field, 
because it wielded the direct support of high fashion designer houses in Europe to distribute their 
product.  
Despite the vantage point, on Friday, June 26, 2009 eLuxury.com shut down its e-retail 
doors. Its mass email to the list of subscribers stated that “it is now moving to the next step of its 
evolution repositioning itself as a premier source of editorial content, information, and 
inspiration for luxury customers around the world.” The open community email stated that the 
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online retailer remained a “[…] pioneer in luxury e-commerce and served as the launching pad 
for many of the world's most famous luxury brands” (closure email, June 26, 2009). The result 
represented a paradox. During its relatively long-term tenure online, between 2000 and 2009, 
eLuxury was unable to total more than $80 million per year in sales and trailed more than 50% 
behind the annual sales of Neiman Marcus' online arm, www.neimanmarcus.com.  
Fashion consultants argued that the end of eLuxury pointed to a lack of differentiation on 
product in the fashion industry. The CEO of the New York-based Luxury Institute reflected in 
May 2010 that "there are dozens of luxury handbags and yes, there is hierarchy, but when we see 
the results of our surveys, few stand out, like Hermes and Chanel, and then there are 40 that are 
ranked almost identically by wealthy consumers." Other luxury industry experts agreed with the 
assessment consenting that when brick-and-mortar firms enter the online channel and attempt to 
do multi-brand retail, the traditional assumption is that they can establish the value of their 
brands on the Internet by using cultural logic identical to their ways of doing business offline. 
DigiVog Group’s Chief Commercial Officer (CCO), for example, argued that the closure of 
eLuxury was precipitated by the lack by the parent company of “the ability to notice the 
opportunities” that existed at the time in carving a niche for its own brand online. ELuxury.com 
was run by its executives just as Bluefly was; as an online equivalent of powerful wholesalers of 
the Neiman Marcus’ caliber. Even Neiman Marcus’ own chief executive appeared aware of the 
need to learn from other Internet-born firms on how to build a multi-brand business that is 
independent of brick-and-mortar logic of chasing after the same clients. Karen Katz, the CEO of 
Neiman Marcus Group shared in an interview in October 2011 that  
“One of the important things we have to think about is… what's happening to our brand with 
all these changes? Where are the customers going; what is next in terms of change; and finally, 
where are we going to place our bets? We are a fashion merchandiser, and we buy merchandise, 
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and year by year and season by season, we have to think about where we will be placing our bets 
on merchandise, and where we would be placing our merchandise, once the season is over.” 
After running deeply discounted prices on premier merchandise during its last few weeks 
online, eLuxury’s former executive team decided to segue the cultural idea of e-commerce into 
an online magazine that specialized in editorial content curation. On Tuesday, Dec 15, 2009, 
Nowness.com became the successor of eLuxury. The transformation of eLuxury.com to 
Nowness.com stripped the site of its original e-commerce orientation. Nowness is an 
editorialized content platform focusing on films, design shots, and content production from a 
variety of contributors, such as documentary filmmakers (Zoe Cassavetes), travel bloggers 
(Nicole Stich and Oliver Seidel at www.thedelicious.com), or fashion bloggers (Imran Amed of 
the www.BoF.com). The content is organized by “Daily Exclusives for You to Love”—a 
collection of fashion shoots, short films on architecture, design, and music that give the viewer 
the option to “vote” to either “love” or “don’t love” the content.  
Nowness is built as a content production platform with a method of cultural execution similar 
to the intended goals of Brand C’s content delivery platform that features photos of the 
company’s most renowned product. The difference in the experiments is that while the UK “C” 
has created a community website for experimenting with content and commerce, Nowness.com 
seeks to preserve the cultural identity of the founding LVMH by sustaining a culture of no 
advertizing, no SEO investment, and no collaborations with other players online.  
5.2 Demography of Culture in an emerging institutional field 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, the digital space in online fashion retail began to be populated 
with new start-ups. Journalistic accounts at the time suggested that these entrepreneurial ventures 
were veritable “gods-of-the-gaps” that emerged to “fill the void left by the big brands” 
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(Walmsley, 2008). The players in Table 3 represent the most active firms in the entrepreneurial 
space of online fashion. These firms construct their advantage on a cultural identity with a dual 
focus: both in fashion and technology. Few of the models also enable new sources of cultural 
brand value for brick-and-mortar fashion brands.  
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Table 3 Moving along the Evolution of Practice in online fashion, technology-fashion firms, 2000-2012. 
 
In the e-commerce literature fashion retailers born online are sometimes called “pure play” 
brands. Pure play describes a company choosing to focus its business process and culture into a 
single channel; in this case, the Internet. This type of business is distinguished from the online 
divisions of established brick-and-mortar companies. In its December 2006 issue, the popular 
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Internet Retailer magazine first offered the term as a point of comparison. “Visits to pure-play 
web retailers in Nielsen/NetRatings Inc. Holiday eShopping index were 54% greater”, editors 
projected, “than visits to multi-channel retailers in the index.”13  
The founders of pure play fashion retailers frequently report to have been culturally 
influenced by the early digital pioneers Amazon and eBay. Starting in 2006 with Amazon’s 
purchase of ShopBop, both Amazon and eBay launched an acquisition campaign of 
incorporation of pure play fashion retailers into their structure. The foray into acquiring other 
fledgling online retailers specializing in apparel and footwear was completed for diversification 
of the cultural heritage associated with the two online pioneers. Amazon and eBay left the 
partners they acquired to continue their businesses as non-branded properties.  
Net-a-Porter is one of internet’s successful pure play fashion retailers. Established in the UK 
in 2000 and acquired by Richemont in 2010 at the peak of $203 million in revenue, Net’s office 
is built on 44,000 square meters open space. The founder recounted that her inspiration for the 
setup was eBay's open communications space. The office is broken down into teams, starting 
with the Creative Team that edits the eponymous online weekly; the distribution center, where 
fresh fashion product arrives; the photography room, where samples are sent right away, and get 
styled into outfits the way that the consumer might wear it.  
The founder of one of the pioneers of sample sales for high-fashion brands online likewise 
reported that she learned about the importance of the word-of-mouth as a marketing technique 






from her former tenure with eBay. The company arrived in the space in late 2009, and Net-a-
Porter was also investigated as an example of successful interior organization of work. 
“I was part of the original team. I watched it scale from 40 to nearly 5000 when I left. The 
way this tenure influenced me when I moved to [the firm] was in the use and empowerment of 
viral marketing, helping develop and grow a brand; a consumer base quickly and cost-
effectively. People look at their closet as a collection when shopping on [the site] in the same 
way I recognize this happened in terms of emotional connection on eBay. eBay was a good 
experience in being part of hyper growth and scale organization effectively. We didn’t look 
much to DigiVog although I’m very familiar with them. We did look at Net-a-Porter, because 
they were probably other than us, the other very successful businesses to create fashion business 
online but we didn’t want to create this idea of a magazine. We took from them [eBay] the 
immediacy of purchase.” 
The sample sales model also borrowed from Amazon’s business practice by collecting cash 
for sales events before merchandise brand owners were paid. The transactional delay benefited 
the few firms in this segment to become cash-positive before they were able to generate income, 
just as Amazon did in its early history.  
In distinction from the cultural business logic of eBay and Amazon, which are multi-product 
retailers, the founders of pure play fashion brands saw themselves as creators of fashion brands 
that happened to be operating with the aid of electronic commerce and e-marketing technology. 
“As we started to move to a more established marketing channel to effectively kind of 
communicate the brand and what it stood for, and translate it for a new online audience”, said the 
co-founder of one of the largest sample sales brands in US, “we recognized that people are 
starting to look at us as a lifestyle expert, a curator, not like Amazon – everything for everyone - 
but only the certain best selection of a collection”.  
This insight deliberately contrasted with the undifferentiated propositions of Internet 
pioneers. The cultural logic on which new players in digital fashion built their businesses had to 
impress upon a selective and differentiated number of potential fashion clients that their 
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businesses were more selection oriented than fashion brands themselves. ”We wanted to almost 
be anti-selection”, noted the CEO of a US-born sample sales fashion retailer. 
The new fashion entrepreneurs introduced two major departures from the business culture of 
earlier startups discussed here, Bluefly and eLuxury. First, pure play retailers focused on 
developing direct sourcing relationships with brand owners and on the subsequent merchandising 
of a consistent ecology of fashion brands. Second, the new fashion-technology players owned the 
technology of their e-commerce and marketing operations.  
The stories of pure play founders are interspersed with candid depictions of the ambiguity of 
their cultural identity; one part technology start-up and one part, fashion company. For example, 
Net-a-Porter sees itself as “the world's premier online luxury fashion retailer”14. The company 
defines its cultural identity as “a luxury brand, with impeccable packaging and unrivalled 
customer care.” At the same time, the CEO of Net-a-Porter has referred to the “technical” team 
in the company as the “brain hub of the business”, noting that the strength of the technology 
team was not so much in propelling the latest “affiliate, SEO, and traditional PR” practice, but in 
materializing the idea of making Net-a-Porter editorially distinct in the new space.  
Similarly, the executive team of a US sample sale retailer construed their firm as an enabling 
cultural space for experimenting with new technology and new practice in which “technology 
has been the underpinning. We’ve created more than 17 sales a day and turning inventory more 
than 70 times a week. We couldn’t service 3 million members without technology. That is a sign 
of a very interesting business that can never exist offline. But, from the beginning, we evolved 
from being a fashion branded shopping site to a marketing channel.” The marketing channel 
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 Available at http://www.net-a-porter.com/About-Us/Our-Company [Retrieved on 07/30/2013.] 
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identity relied on technology that facilitated a friendly approach offering customers immediacy 
and lower price for an editorially selected sample of fashion brands.  
Since most pure play founders started out as technology entrepreneurs, the proposition of 
their teams to high-fashion owners to carry their merchandise had no legitimacy for brick fashion 
businesses. The new players had to use a different cultural rhetoric to develop their early cultural 
legitimacy than the one delivered by fashion brands’ most important commercial partners, the 
wholesalers. To be sure, even Neiman Marcus’ CEO recounted various difficulties in attracting 
high-fashion brands to their online business in 1999 when its digital arm, Neiman Marcus Direct, 
was launched: 
“We were going around to our vendors with whom we do business offline and we were 
begging them to come to the online channel. I spent my first 12 months crawling and I have 
bruises on my knees to prove it! There is one story that characterizes the difficulty of getting 
brands on board. I walked into the president's office of a French fashion company. I showed him 
a little PowerPoint presentation and then he wanted to go to the Neiman Marcus website and see 
for himself. He goes into the search and types YSL (Yves Saint Laurent). And, of course, 
nothing was supposed to pop up! To my dismay, an YSL handbag pops up on the site. But we 
were not allowed to sell YSL handbags! As you can imagine, I turned bright red, I packed up my 
bags and left very quickly. A week later I received a fax, because in 2000, we were actually still 
receiving fax, and YSL signed on to be a partner with us on Neiman Marcus.com. They were the 
first true European luxury brand to come on the store online. As we say, the rest is history.”  
Despite the mishap, mainstream brick wholesalers alluded to the longevity of their 
relationship with fashion firms as the reason why their clients followed them in the new channel. 
Their understanding of fashion merchandising that was supposed to be valuable on any channel. 
Neiman Marcus’ CEO reported in 2011 that even though the team “[…] didn’t fully understand 
the power of what we had in our hands […] this has really become our core competency”.  
The emergent cultural field of digital fashion represented a threat to the status-quo and was 
harshly criticized by global retail consultancy executives. Industry pundits, who consulted for 
wholesale conglomerates and vertically integrated fashion retailers, argued that regardless of the 
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distribution channel brick wholesalers are the legitimate partners of fashion brands. The Vice 
President of a NYC-based global retail management firm noted that many new entrepreneurial 
models, such as sample sales, were couched on the eve of the financial meltdown in 2008, and 
were supported by the excess inventory fashion houses encountered. Sample sales start-ups were 
particularly censured as a model that could not be tolerated by the industry: 
“Those supply-chains only exist because brands and retailers made a mistake, ok? As a 
whole, they're not really viable, but more important, they're not solid. They can only exist at a 
certain time. You can never have [name of the firm] operating a 25 billion dollar company, ok? It 
has to be small. But, more importantly, I do not even look at those as supply-chains, even though 
they technically are.  But, what they really are doing is that via a wholesaler they are buying 
goods directly that is delivered directly to them…”   
Similar thoughts were provided by another senior retail management executive, who argued 
that sample sale Internet start-ups were “opportunistic” and, 
“There’s no consistency in what to study. They would be doing whatever's available to them. 
So, one day they could be dealing with a closeout specialist; another day they could be dealing 
with the brand directly; another day they could be dealing with a retailer; another day with 
supplier. Most retailers are going to look at that as an outlet for closure. I think that a smaller 
company aggregating luxury goods has popped up a lot during many a years, but the real players 
that are able to survive are the likes of Saks and Neiman Marcus.” 
Companies that started out the cultural model of sample sales between 2008 and 2009 did 
benefit from the outstanding inventory that plagued the fashion industry in that period. Only one 
year after the “hot” launch of its commercial website, the co-founder at a US sample sale startup 
reported that “in a recent week, the equivalent of 14 cargo containers loads filled with luxury 
goods arrived directly from designers.  I have so many brands banging down our door that I have 
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to say no.”15 Early data for this company from Forbes and WSJ corroborated that the firm buys 
“directly from the fashion houses instead of buying from wholesalers, as most discounters do”16.  
The success of the sample sale model can be gauged by the longevity of the businesses 
surviving the aftermath of the financial crisis. Only three sample sale firms that emerged 
between 2008 and 2009 in the US have survived to date. One is Ruelala, an independent sample 
sale retailer bought by GSI Commerce Inc. in 2008, and subsequently spun into eBay for $500 
million in debt and equity financing in 2009 (Table ).  The second is HauteLook. This firm was 
acquired by Amazon on May 3, 2011 as a non-branded Amazon property. This acquisition move 
from the two diversified online retail pioneers indicates that their business development teams 
were looking to validate the cultural model of online sample sales. 
The co-founders of the first sample sale start-up in the US, the largest and most prominent in 
the sample sale segment of online fashion, referred to HauteLook and Ruelala as imitators. 
“Imitation is definitely flattery”, one co-founder said. “There are a lot of people outside trying to 
do the same thing, but we have a value proposition.”  
Creating Signature Elements: The Value Proposition 
New players in the digital space of fashion started out by attempting to achieve recognition 
from brick-and-mortar brands by buying merchandise directly from them. The success in the 
matter of merchandise acquisition depended on the cultural thought of their founders. The 
seemingly incongruous detail was that these ventures were founded by entrepreneurs with little 
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 “Buyers Market: Will seasoned shoppers ever pay full price again?” Wall Street Journal Online, 
April 30, 2009, Vanessa O'Connell. [available at: Http://magazine.wsj.com/features/shopping-
revolution/buyers-market].  
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or no formal relationships in the fashion industry and superficial, if any, knowledge of fashion 
design, pricing, distribution, and operations.  
DigiVog Group was founded by a financial consultant who happened to be consulting for a 
well-known Italian fashion house immediately before founding DigiVog. The US-based sample 
sales pioneer was started by an executive merchandiser for luxury brands together with one of 
the original team members that launched eBay. Net-a-Porter was started by a brick and mortar 
turned digital “intuitive luxury investor”, who was a self-employed brand buyer and retailer in 
her native Venezuela. She later served as an early venture capital investor and founded the online 
retailer in the UK together with the current CEO, Natalie Massenet.  
The founders of online ventures compensated for the deficiencies in their knowledge of 
fashion firms by keeping an eye on early entrepreneurial opportunities in e-commerce, and in 
digital marketing technology that could be applied to fashion merchandising and branding. One 
of the collective advantages for online entrepreneurs in digital fashion became their early shared 
understanding that they have to recombine their own new practices in marketing and selling of 
fashion brands with the rigid, old culture of their potential clients. The challenge of 
recombination of culture and technology was well noted by the co-founder of the US sample sale 
start-up, who said “this is an industry that is very driven by relationships and trust and not 
necessarily beta products, which you find in technology, so we had to effectively bridge these 
two ways”.  
The first and, for a while, the only job of new entrepreneurs became to “chase” fashion 
brands to acquire their exclusive merchandise online. One of the co-founders of the US sample 
sale start-up had previously worked as a merchandiser for luxury brands and spent 90% of her 
job finding the brands and talking to them. The first brands positioned for sample sale, according 
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to her, were based on “networks of friends that we had relationships with. These first brands 
were considered by the fashion public to be “highly coveted [and]… Those set the bar high and 
reflected on the kind of brand that we were developing”.  
The primary job of Net-a-Porter’s founder was to ensure financial backing of the venture, 
and “back up the clientele service”, which meant getting high-fashion firms to accept that their 
merchandise will be sold on the Internet. The founder saw that fashion brands were more 
concerned with the commercial side of their presence, rather than with their positioning on these 
new cultural forums online. Financial merchandisers at fashion brands found it problematic to 
sell products against payment in six months. At the time, contract terms with delayed payment 
were only discussed with fashion brands’ long-term partners, such as Neiman Marcus.   
In these early stages it was vital to use cultural narratives that established fashion brands saw 
fitting in exchange for agreeing to sell their merchandise. Peers in the ecology of digital fashion 
started to construct signature elements in their digital practice that they thought would help them 
achieve cultural acceptance by fashion brands. Their signature propositions differed, depending 
on the type of cultural involvement of fashion brands that their founders envisioned for the 
collaboration.  
Net-a-Porter’s signature proposition was a “shoppable Vogue” space where content was 
integrated with commerce. The start-up developed shoppable style-books that run in 52 issues 
during the year. This signature element emerged organically, from an experiment ran by the 
founder who designed her house in Venezuela as a multi-brand space for top designers in 1990. 
She noticed that without the Internet, in the early 1990s wholesalers and small boutique retailers 
ordered merchandise by flipping through pages of content that merchandising teams in fashion 
firms had put into look-books before the start of the season. The time lag to order was significant 
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problem for boutiques buying merchandise directly from fashion brands. In this case, clients in 
Venezuela had limited options of viewing this or next year’s trends in advance.  
In order to be able to show clients look-books for the current season, she started to take 
pictures of clothes that came in from European fashion houses and send them to her clients in 
advance. She noted that “this was like 1993-1994. And, in 1997, the Internet was possible and I 
started as the co-founder of companies [in e-commerce]. The valuations were crazy. In 1999, the 
UK connection came to me as a contact via my then-boyfriend.  It was my Christmas gift for 
1999”.  
The US-based sample sales retailer created a private space reminiscent of the runway show 
exclusively shared between insider public, which was initially by invitation only, the fashion 
brand, and the creative team. The idea emerged as the two co-founders browsed brick-and-
mortar sample sales in New York and talked about the possibility to offer high-fashion 
merchandise seamlessly for less. 
The firm invented an ingenious cultural infrastructure to create demand. Only registered 
users can access the retailer’s website. Regular search on search engines and price-comparison 
websites would not produce results related to the daily sales. The co-founders understood the 
opportunity once they had realized the cultural message that their practice could have for fashion 
brands.  
The business model of this entrepreneur firm was simple. Each day at 12 pm the company 
starts an online sale of limited volume of merchandise with only a few brands. “We buy and we 
do consignment”, says a member of the executive team. “We just take delivery about a month 
later. We know the amount of available inventory; we shop samples; we host the sale and then, 
once we know how much we sell, we say to our partner: okay, send us 1320 items of the product, 
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for example. We take the merchandise risk.” Using this method of acquisition and sales, in 2010 
the firm hosted 17 sales daily, for 36 hours, and had a total of 750 brands serviced. This was a 
100 brand increase from 2007.   
On any given day, the sample sales business achieves 50 to 75% of daily margins in only one 
hour. In 2010, the e-commerce website was visited by more than 100,000 customers during sales. 
During the first two years of the firm, 92% of merchandise was sold out consistently and the user 
membership increased from zero in 2007 to 2,500,000 members in 2010. Over 50,000 brand 
items were moving out of distribution centers weekly. This represented a tremendous amount of 
throughput given the short time window during which sales were hosted.  
The early message of sample sales was to focus on fashion firms that did not have liquidation 
strategies for their excess merchandise. However, the founders discovered relatively quickly that 
their cultural model apparently tapped into new sources of brand value for fashion brands. 
Despite the fact that this was a deeply discounted channel, established fashion brands began to 
warm up to the possibility of feature. According to the executive team, their positive response 
came with the understanding that fashion firms lacked young customer base for their future. “We 
are reinterpreting these brands for a younger generation,” one co-founder argued. The other co-
founder, in charge of merchandising, explained how the start-up negotiated cultural acceptance 
with fashion brands: 
“What we realized in 3-4 months in, is that most companies work with us not necessarily or 
exclusively by any stretch of imagination because they had inventory they had to clear; because 
they didn’t have outlets; because they did not have appropriate outlets, but they started working 
with us because they realized almost before we did, that this is an effective marketing channel to 
reach new customers”. 
Zac Posen, the brand started by the eponymous US designer, was one of the first clients. Zac 
Posen’s brand was young and flexible and these characteristics helped make the sale proposition 
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work.  The exposure was successful to the brand and in the 6-months period between Dec 1, 








2009. Another brand featured early in the history of the sample sales entrepreneur is Michael 
Kors, whose eponymous KORS Ltd., launched in 2004, is known for its flexibility to channel 
collaboration.  
Of the more than 100 brands featured in the first 6 months of the existence of the firm, only 
one-third were headquartered overseas. Merchandisers at the NYC-based retailer continued to 
pursue European high-fashion houses and present the advantages of using the platform as a 
marketing channel. Table 4 shows that in the few weeks remaining weeks of December 2009, 
from December 15 to December 22, US-born brands featured in daily sales became interspersed 
with European high-fashion brands that had finally responded to the narrative. CNC Costume 
National, Moschino, Ferre, Burberry (the lower priced Prorsum line), and Alberta Ferretti have 






Table 4 Brands and sample sales, US sample sale retailer, December 2010, personal data. 
In those companies where founders had already secured the trust of fashion brands, an added 
signature element was to presents oneself as an established cultural arbiter to the industry. Net-a-
Porter’s CEO put it this way— “young brands are very keen on getting on Net-a-Porter. We get 
hundreds of emails from new brands. Use a catchy subject phrase and attach a great picture 
presentation of your product”. Net-a-Porter doesn’t have set rules on what brands are going to be 
part of its content and product portfolio. “The young brand has to tell us how it is different than 
the other brands”, an executive said, ”because we are always interested in telling the story of the 
brand. In a way, think about how you would pitch to a magazine.”  
The US sample sale brand was a newcomer to the digital space of fashion and since the 
company was a discounted marketing channel, the team was willing to pay a cultural difference 
premium to fashion brands to solicit their participation in the experiment. “Organically, from the 
beginning, our culture emerged,” said one of the co-founders. “we firmly believed in brand 
building with them. I felt kind of like together building brand equity”. The founder explained 
that they were able to get fashion brands interested to sell their product when they decided to 
offer “full creative control” over the sale to them. This meant that the design, photography, 
models, make-up, and editorials would be made with the explicit agreement of the brand, and the 
start-up would pick up the check.  
This was the “cultural difference premium” the firm paid in its pursuit to guide fashion 
brands in adopting a new culture. This proposition was also a signature element that emerged 
organically in the capability of the firm. Fashion brands appreciated the advertizing gesture, in so 
much as, as per one of the co-founders, “ad costs are a big issue; we spend a lot on real model 
photography”. Another signature element the firm was willing to pay for is, per one co-founder, 
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“aggressive PR. We had a little blurb in InStyle.com that brought 5,000 clients; and, this is all we 
really need.” A final signature proposition for brands was the intimacy and exclusivity of the 
presentation. According to one executive,  
“Our brand partners work with us because … They love the way we are featuring their brand; 
investing in photography; keeping true to their image and they don’t want this to be necessarily 
all over the place or showing up in all search results. They love the fact that it is a private area 
for a members-only audience. We just had our first sale with Alexander Wang, and when it's 
over, nobody can know what merchandise was on the site, how much of it was sold, etc. The site 
doesn't say – and that is by design, exactly how many [pieces] are currently available for 
purchase or what season it was designed for
17”.  
Creative infrastructure in pure play retailers relies heavily on merchandisers who go after 
brand owners and present the strengths of the cultural model. Merchandisers formed significant 
part of the 450 employees that the US pure play retailer hired in just 30 months after its launch. 
The buying team at Net-a-Porter is also the largest in that firm, growing from two people in 
2000. The team currently buys 400 brands across all categories 6 times a year.  
At both of these firms, the merchandising teams can now cut in at the beginning of a product 
cycle and request to buy seasonal merchandise from brands. Net-a-Porter sells it at the beginning 
of the season, and the US sample sale entrepreneur does at the end of the season. Only 3 years 
after its launch, the sample sale start-up was capable to place orders alongside department stores 
and other distribution channels. For both firms, this is an important cultural step in continuing to 
garner validity as a partner and a cultural arbiter online. 
Limits to the Evolution of Cultural Competence 
The evolution of the cultural competence of pure play retailers has been to extend their 
businesses laterally by specializing in more product lines, similarly to how fashion firms build 
more brand lines. The founders of pure play firms considered lateral expansion to be an 
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 Ibid, Wall Street Journal Online, April 30, 2009, Vanessa O'Connell. 
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“organic” form of evolution in their cultural competence. As pure play retailers formed new and 
longer term relationships with fashion brands, their merchandise portfolios grew, creating an 
impetus to finance new commercial lines. Net-a-Porter Ltd., for instance, extended its business 
by opening a discounted online retail website, TheOutnet.com in 2010 and an exclusive web 
store for men, MrPorter.com in 2011.  
Online retailers that specialize in the multi-brand model of selling fashion brands of other 
company owners find it demanding to expand their business vertically. The barriers to transition 
into other cultural models, say, from sample sales to a full retail website, are high. Most pure 
play firms legitimate their culture by specializing in a particular practice. For example, Net-a-
Porter.com was thought out as a digital shoppable editorial and the bulk of early cultural resource 
was directed at uniting content and commerce and creating, says the CEO of Net, a highly 
curated “shoppable magazine”.  “I definitely think of myself as an editor”, she continued, 
offering a recipe for success for others. ”A successful retailer should think as an editor. Content 
and commerce are now fused together. It would take you a good afternoon to go and check out a 
department store. So, editing is perhaps the most important thing you can do. Execution is the 
key and this is our competitive advantage.”  
In the sample sale space, growth comes from the high volume of demand that is cleared in 
hours during each sale. In 2010, the US sample sale pioneer had cleared $500,000 in only 6 
hours of sale. The challenge for this cultural model is the increased need for inventory and more 
sales to finance organic growth. One way of expansion is to expand laterally and develop product 
lines based on the same cultural practice of sample sales.  
Most of the cultural capital at the US sample sale retailer was invested in mastering the 
original idea of sample sales. Through this work the firm gained long-term support from a 
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growing list of high-fashion brands. The team eventually decided to extend sample sales to 
“curating” products across lines, related to customer lifestyles, such as “city”, “travel”, and 
others. In 2011 the firm also attempted to diversify vertically and founded a full-priced fashion 
retail website for men. The co-founder of the US sample sale firm shared the difficulties in a 
conversation about the transition in mid-2010:  
“We have discovered that email marketing and viral marketing are vital. Less effective for us 
are SEO, because we are a closed site and we cannot be found through the usual SEO tools. And, 
SEM, keyword marketing, is incredibly expensive and is best suited to the person who is in 
search mode and knows they are looking specifically for Dsquared jeans at a particular site. We 
cannot offer this degree of information about the product because we are impulse-driven and our 
sales last for no more than 1 day. We want a repeat customer who wants to get in the mode of 
shopping that we offer and become loyal to us”.   
The expansion into a full-price retailer was difficult and the sample sale firm announced in 
December 2012 the full-price men’s retailer it had started a year ago, would be shut down. A full 
retail business required specialization in all above mentioned marketing practice, including 
online advertizing and the mastery of new emerging techniques co-developed after 2010 by 
partners in the space. For the executive team it proved challenging to multitask in the full-priced 
domain and the model remains centered on improving the sample sale experience for brands and 
customers. 
5.3 Creating New Culture for New Elites 
During 2011 and well into 2012, brick-and-mortar brands were still ambiguous about the 
place of pure play fashion companies in the business of fashion. Some brands moved on to 
consider the new fashion entrepreneurs as competitors. The VP of e-Commerce and Online 
Marketing at a label, whose CEO is a Vice President at CFDA, noted that “as global as the brand 
is, I have many competitors that I deal with – Saks, Neiman, Net-a-Porter.”  
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Other brands look at pure plays as they would look at traditional wholesalers. The former VP 
of Marketing (now, VP Business Development for the Chinese market) at brand “C” asserted 
that "we leave the wholesale team at our brand to deal with where our merchandise is placed – 
online or offline. For us, Net-a-Porter is just another wholesaler that operates online.” One C-
level executive, who worked for Hermes, Lancôme and Christian Dior, noted that because 
fashion brands harbor ambivalent feelings about their long-term wholesale partners, they may 
associate the culture created by pure play firms with the culture of their old partners: 
“Dior is also in Harrods, Saks, etc. but Dior prefers to be direct with the client. Each time you 
have someone in the distribution, [there is] a step between the client and the brand. So, Net-a-
Porter … It's good for little brands, but after... when you are big…  Harrods – for example, you 
need to sell in Harrods; they don't need to have you. The brands – luxury ones – who do not have 
currently a website and after they get one, have to compete with all the multibrand retailers 
online, how much are they missing out?  How much brand identity are they out to lose by not 
exploring the internet as a branding channel and could they regain it once they are in? I think 
they move a lot.” 
Pure play startups continued to build rapport with fashion brands and soon their founders 
began making formal statements in the media and during industry meetings on the importance of 
their contribution to the world of fashion.  The co-founder in charge of merchandising at the US 
sample sale retailer noted: “if you go to a department store, you will see their selection for the 
fall. It is now July and nobody wants to buy a cashmere sweater. They want to buy something 
out of a box and they throw on immediately. So, we are selling Spring-Summer merchandise, 
which to a shopper is current; Department store is one season old.” The CEO of Net-a-Porter 
offered an identical value statement, “you go at a department store right now and what is 
available is mohair sweater. You go in September and there is huge consumer frenzy on the 
Internet but none of the product is available for the next 6 months.”  
It is culturally significant that for less than a decade founders in some of the most active pure 
play fashion-technology retailers have interpreted the value of their firms to be culturally 
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equivalent or even superior to the contributions of traditional fashion partners, such as Vogue 
and Neiman Marcus. Ten years after the founding of Net-a-Porter, in 2010, the CEO Massenet 
stated that fashion brands had “lost exclusivity” that can be reenacted by skipping one fashion 
season. This new cultural statement recognizes the fashion show as a live commercial lookbook 
announcing the arrival of future collections.  
“We skip a season. It will give all designers a break and next September, instead of spring 
shows, the designers show the fall shows and get the products to stores few years later. And, 
then, the buyers and the editors, we just do our jobs and go behind and procure the stuff. We are 
all very capable to say what is new and important without the wait. We don't need to see the 
show.”  
The Internet narrative communicates to the industry that the objective of new entrepreneurs 
is to create new elites on the new channel. Narratives in this direction compete to “give brands 
visibility and credibility”, and the job of fashion brands is to “keep their brand really hot.” 
Personal stories become important in promoting the clout of the new fashion industry partners. 
The mother of the CEO of Net-a-Porter had at one point, for example, suggested contracting 
Balmain, one of France’s oldest luxury fashion brands. The merchandising team, however, 
decided that they “did not think that the brand was actually right for Net-a-Porter.” Balmain 
merchandise was actually acquired a few months later, indicating the rhetorical value of these 
legitimacy statements. 
Narratives are important in establishing the new elite culture for the fashion industry online. 
The new players are unencumbered by historic cultural rites of conduct laid out by older 
“critical” brand-making audiences of the recent past. They attempt to understand and interpret 
the role of novelty in digital technology from scratch. “I am not sure that any of the rules have 
been written yet,” says the CEO of Net-a-Porter. “We are unpredictable and change our minds all 
the time. It would have been very dangerous for us when we started back the UK online retailer 
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in the online world then, which was Yahoo! And Amazon and said: OK, that is the way we need 
to build a fashion business.” 
The Global Communications Director at an Italian fashion brand sums up her 
conceptualization for the importance of emerging players as new cultural spaces for “branding” 
elites.  
“The old audiences were OK because you only gave them the clothes that you produced. 
These guys want and require something special. I certainly would love to engage with all of 
these but I think we can only go to these channels, if we have something special to offer them 
and their clients. I don't think we can go to them with the regular collection which you can find 
in any other store or a multi-brand store, such as Neiman Marcus”.  
The importance of the new entrepreneur is further validated by recent moves from multi-
brand conglomerates, such as the acquisition of Net-a-Porter by Richemont Group in 2010. 
Richemont owns 18 luxury brands, the oldest of which, Vacheron Constantin, was established in 
1755. The holding is not exclusively composed of fashion brands; in fact, the only other two 
fashion brands Chloe (1952) and Azzedine Alaia (1983). In Richemont’s portfolio, Net-a-Porter 
is presented as the youngest brand.  
The acquisition has raised questions about the likely control by the Group of Net-a-Porter 
independent editorial voice and merchandise selection. The CEO of Net was aware of these 
assumptions and reinforced the firm’s independent brand acquisition culture. “It’s nice that 
Richemont are there as a very prestigious group. But, we will live and die on our selection”, she 
said. “I made clear that we have to be independent. The buying team buys what they like, and we 
are working very closely with Gucci, Prada, LVMH, Aeffe Group and we are entirely 
independent. […] Nothing's really changed; we're going on.”  
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The Director General of Altagamma, normally very critical about the online pure play 
industry, thought that the acquisition was interesting in so much as Net-a-Porter was a suitable 
distribution channel for the luxury portfolio of brands at Richemont: 
“The fact that Richemont invested in them is an explanation that this online retailer is not 
harmful at all. It is just a matter of cherry-picking. A luxury company has to be in a position to 
choose the best retail channel in the both – bricks-and-mortar and the click space. If they have 
developed the ability to say if in NYC it is good to sell on 5
th
 Av and to sell to Neiman but not 
Bloomingdale’s, they would have the ability to choose between UK online retailer and Gilt. 
Companies will be in the position of having; if they want to, they could tell Harrods to put a 
number of styles also in the online store. A brand owner has to be open in applying their own 
criteria for selective distribution.” 
Richemont’s Global Brand Director was ambivalent about the impact the buy-out would have 
for the digital operations of Richemont’s other fashion brands, Chloe and Alaia, which had 
steered clear of internet presence prior to the acquisition of Net-a-Porter (Figure 6). Since the 
buy-out, Richemont’s brand portfolio website carries the notice that “for safely shopping 
authentic Chloe products on the Internet, we recommend these fine online retailers”.  
 
Figure 6  Chloe – indirectly online. 
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The marketing distribution of the brand is available only at Net-a-Porter and another pure 
play brand, MyTheresa.com. This fact lends validity to the argument that Richemont is culturally 
accommodating to the idea of online marketing for its brands as long as it owns the new 
marketing platform of choice, Net-a-Porter. The cultural approach used here is to make use of 
Net-a-Porter both as an e-commerce and a marketing platform for fashion brands that are less 
open to a culture of accepting digital experimentation.  
Figure 7 is an example of editorial and product collaboration between Net-a-Porter and 
Chloe. The page,”101 Trends,” consists of pages of video content and curated looks that are 
“edited” together by Net’s merchandising team and Chloe’s creative team. 
 
Figure 7 Editorial Collaboration– Net-a-Porter and Chloe, 6-09-2011. 
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For Chloe, this approach is also cheaper in relation to the high costs associated with opening 
a brand-specific e-commerce presence. The other advantage is to rely on the clout of the host 
platform, net-a-Porter, as a prominent actor in the digital ecology space of fashion.  The CEO of 
Net puts it succinctly: "I say to the team all the time: the website is to e-tailing what the store 
was to retailing 10 years ago. Your own website is the most powerful communication tool you 
can have to the global consumer”.  
5.4 Quick Learners: Pure Play Apparel Fashion Brands  
After 2008, the fashion industry also saw the emergence of pure play apparel fashion 
companies. These start-ups used physical facilities to produce fashion product but their only 
marketing and branding channel was the Internet. Firms, such as Company of We, an Internet 
apparel fashion firm born in 2010, and Bonobos, born in 2007 in Palo Alto, were among the 
pioneers of technology-fashion apparel firms.  
The start-ups understandably did not have marketing revenue for media advertising with 
traditional publications, such as Vogue. They did not have any relationships with brick-and-
mortar distribution intermediaries. The newborn brands had to rely on their own website, e-
commerce page, blog, or Facebook page to drive initial awareness. Costs were a major reason for 
the decision of their founders to use pure online advertising and marketing approach. 
Online apparel brands recognized that it is crucial to attain cultural validity on the channel of 
their birth and their founders learned that making a story around the product they sell is 
important. The founders of Bonobos, for example, created the company “to solve a simple 
problem: men’s pants just don’t fit well. They’re either too tight to be comfortable or too baggy 
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to look good. But by innovating in a few key areas, we’ve developed a fit that actually looks and 
feels great for a wide variety of men.”18 
Online apparel brands were also more likely to collaborate with peers in the digital field of 
fashion. They were culturally closer to peers online than to offline intermediaries. The new 
entrepreneurs quickly learned the tools-of-the-trade for advertising their Internet identity. They 
became aware that if their digital media team could produce rich content, this would boost up 
their ranking on Google-generated search results. The CEO at a beauty brand born in 2010, for 
example, emphasized the importance of using social community in constructing the identity of 
the brand as an editorial story. “When we were thinking of building a beauty company brand 
online, we knew that the community would be part of building the brand,” she said. ”We very 
quickly built a content team around social and around blogging and around editorial. We did this, 
so that the company could navigate customers but also that the customers could navigate us”. 
She explained that the source of brand value depends on the quality and density of content 
provided to an online audience.   
“Social is huge for us”, noted another CEO at a growing online-born apparel brand. ”Around 
20% of our traffic comes from social. [We] do not do any paid advertizing at this point. It’s 
about asking the community and giving via content the community the chance to talk. Traffic 
comes from products that we're finding and stories that we're writing. The growth in social is 
even higher in terms of increase on our site than search.”  
Age plays a role in the exposure of fashion labels to Internet mode of marketing and 
distribution, in general. Younger and stylistically more contemporary brick-and-mortar brands 
                                                          
18
 Available at http://www.bonobos.com/about. [Retrieved 01/09/13].  
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are more interested to be featured on, say, Net-a-Porter. The Head of Communications for one of 
Italy's privately held hip lifestyle brands opined that “I definitely think that some of these 
retailers have become key point of reference for decision-makers. I definitely think it's a problem 
if you are not there”. She agreed with founders of pure apparel firms that fashion brands should 
use new channels to achieve not only sales but brand awareness.  
“We still look at this as a business opportunity. It is a very old way of looking at it. But, let's 
look at Colette [pure play fashion retailer]. Technically, it is a store, so it should be handled by 
the wholesale department, but in reality it is a window and it should somehow be looked at in a 
coordinated way with marketing. Technically, I will not make money in that channel, but for the 
purpose of the image of the brand, I am willing to be there; I am even willing to pay to be there.” 
Executives at apparel fashion brands born online are sometimes not aware of the potential of 
their digital peers to help them co-create their identity online. They are however curious and 
open to learning more. The CEO of the first Internet-born apparel fashion brand, which sold out 
its first collection online in the spring of 2010, corroborated to the argument:  
“No, we haven't spoken to Net-a-Porter. I wish we could speak to everybody that was 
sending an invitation to us. We were looking into doing these relationships as far as the 
nurturing of the brand. Online, our presence is limited to our own e-commerce website and 
Saks.com. And we have Gilt Groupe. And at this point we have also been contacted by- what 
was that thing? www.RevolveClothing.com?”  
The openness to developing a relationship with an online peer to “nurture the brand” shows 
that pure apparel brands first think about developing favorable relationship with online 




PART IV: DIGIVOG: FASHION 2.0  
Chapter 6: Historical Narrative on the Emergence and Evolution of Cultural Identity at DigiVog 
“DigiVog developed skills that are quite unique, because traditionally, the world 
of fashion has not been investing in the digital channel; they have a different 
marketing approach. The fashion brands are moving from an offline to an online 
property situation as a strategy. Now they understand the Internet more because 
Internet is big. Some of them are thinking even investing all online; some of them 
never thought they'd go online and now they are heading that way. So, that is their 
story. Our story is that we have always been online.” 
CEO, DigiVog USA 
"DigiVog was conceived to be global from a geographical standpoint and from a service 
standpoint. To be global; to supply its clients with the ability to sell the product anywhere— we 
wanted to set up a company that is able to evolve in a way that, at a certain stage in time, no 
matter what, it was able to succeed."  
CCO, DigiGroup 
The discussion has so far focused on cultural models that have transformed the traditional 
idea of brick-and-mortar fashion by accommodating the ability to sell for the online channel. 
DigiVog Group was launched as a pure play fashion retailer, but the cultural goal of the 
enterprise was much larger. DigiVog’s founders of conceived of their enterprise originally as an 
“incubator of ideas for the transitioning of the culture of fashion brands online”. The company 
founded its business as a creative pure play platform for developing competence that captured 
the intent of brick-and-mortar fashion firms to not only sell their merchandise online, but also 
restructure their marketing and commerce operations for the Internet.  
The cultural history of DigiVog, as narrated by the firm’s second in command Chief 
Commercial Officer (COO), was initiated by "20 people in a basement with very limited 
connection to the fashion system and with an idea." The line is intensely similar to the stories of 
Internet pioneers, whose founders started in "garages" (Amazon, Google), "dorm rooms" 
(Facebook), and "living rooms" (eBay) before eventually becoming household brand names. A 
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top executive at DigiVog who had been with the firm since its inception in 2000 explained that at 
the outset, DigiVog was conceived as "a global internet provider [...] and a type of retail firm 
that is different than mainstream retail". Achieving distinction from other online and brick-and-
mortar models was emphasized in the early discussions of the three founders as an important 
future cultural competence.  
The deeply transformative cultural investment of the founders motivated the development of 
the business competence of the firm in the emerging digital fashion space as a non-mainstream 
entrepreneurial company. DigiVog was conceived both as a fashion company and a pure e-
commerce firm, but did not have Net-a-Porter’s reach and knowledge of the brick fashion 
industry. The CEO was neither a fashion, nor a technical expert. Having graduated in finance, he 
was a consultant for Bain and Company before calling it quits in 2000. “He dealt with a lot of 
fashion projects and is very fond of technology”, the CCO noted, “but is fond of technology as a 
user. He was outside of the fashion world."  
DigiVog's founding team embraced their outsider status. The key idea the founder imparted 
was that "we need to be aware of the fact that the Internet might be a game changer. [...] We 
were not exactly generating the change, because the change was generated by market effects and 
technology. But, maybe the possibility was there to helping the change to become real. So, we 
set out to help fashion companies understand that change is occurring and how to face it. So, the 
point is not so much how to replicate on the web what you already have. The point is to being the 
global internet partner for these firms."  
The cultural identity of DigiVog as an entrepreneur was focused on many areas instead of the 
usual few typical to other online peers. The CEO of the US office explained the reasons why the 
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team decided to develop only in-house functions that the company deemed important to its 
cultural identity: 
“Net-a-Porter [for example] only sells women's clothes, apart from the launch of Mr. Porter, 
or theOutnet.com, which is only an outlet. So, in this particular situation we could actually refer 
to Net-a-Porter as a digital or virtual wholesaler/magazine? They are also launching some white 
label stuff, like Jimmy Choo, but it's really small. And we are vast and complicated. And then 
TC.com is this other brand, DigiVog.com is another brand... They are both organized and served 
by different principles. And then we have 27 partner brands, etc.” 
The functions across company teams were associated with entrepreneurial experiment and 
many of the accomplishments of the firm with various ventures in fashion are not the result of 
deliberately designed success story, but the product of intense internal evolution in competence 
and culture. The Director of Global Marketing explained that “in 2000, when we started talking 
about digital marketing, we were talking about digital marketing. We never had an agency; we 
always created our main functions ourselves.” This realization of the contextual meaning and 
importance of technology for commercial and branding success spurred the company into 
assembling a strong digital marketing team and its primary role was to figure out how to use 
technology for both commercial and marketing success.   
As a result of this multi-disciplinary focus, DigiVog has participated in the co-creation of 
competence for the emerging field of online fashion (Figure 8). In the same year that Net-a-
Porter was launched, DigiVog Group founded its first pure play fashion retail brand, 
DigiVog.com. DigiVog.com started out as a discounted retailer and its primary role was to 
acquire, market, and sell fashion merchandise. The brand became the launchpad for getting a 
foot in the door of the elusive high-fashion brands of Europe. In 2006, two years after the launch 
of CreateTheGroup, a digital web agency recognized with pioneering of the category of “digital 
luxury”, DigiVog expanded vertically into e-commerce design and consulting for high-fashion 
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brands and has since launched the online businesses of more than 27 high-fashion brands from 
Europe and US.  
 
Figure 8 DigiVog Group: Capability Development vis-à-vis peers (2000-2012). 
In 2009, DigiVog Group opened a full-price pure retail brand, Digi1.com. Digi1.com features 
full-price, curated pieces from current collections of emerging fashion designers. While 
DigiVog.com is a traditional type pure play retailer, Digi1.com is an experimental marketing 
platform. The idea is to select emerging designers with high brand and commercial impact in the 
future, and “nurture” their collections online by testing and experimenting with multiple digital 
marketing tools to see whether the brands can achieve a following and commercial ascent to 
warrant development of an e-commerce website.  
In 2010, DigiVog completed the final iteration in its cultural competence by starting Pure 
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builds e-commerce businesses to invest the Group with exclusive responsibility for managing 
their digital marketing operations.  
6.1 Building Credibility through Distinction 
Despite the rich fabric of ideas for changing the fashion field to an online mode of 
organizational adaptation, DigiVog went through challenges that were similar to those faced by 
other entrepreneurial start-ups. Financial investment was one. DigiVog started out with very 
restricted financial assets and two rounds of financing, each totaling $10 million. The two 
consecutive rounds were used to create DigiVog.com, the firm’s first pure play retail brand.  
The idea to start with and off-price business arose as an experiment. The founders anticipated 
that if the fledgling start-up was able to acquire substantial quantity of product from high-fashion 
brands, DigiVog.com can become an entry point to the communications and marketing 
departments of high-fashion brands. The executive team was going to use the new pure play 
business as a platform useful to build a competence in running a fashion brand online. The 
Director of the Partner Division explained this thought process:  
“Our initial idea was compounded by our next idea: to build the shopping mono-brand web 
presence for them. Then, let's make them evolve in the direction of perceiving that their main 
asset is the content they generate and this asset can be easily transferred to the Internet. This 
asset is also visual and this in addition makes it easily transferable. The content that they 
generate online made them solve the issue with the final customer”.  
The CCO narrated the difficulty of these first steps in gaining credibility in the brick 
industry. "We could not just go to people like Armani and say; Mr. Armani, here is the money 
and this is the product we offer. If we did it, by the way, we would not have sold it. And, if we 
bought it, we would not have sold it, because we did not have a customer".  
The common problem of earlier models, like Bluefly, was lack of credibility with designers. 
DigiVog's executive board decided that an “easier access point" into the high-fashion houses of 
 151 
 
Europe was to begin by buying luxury branded apparel from top-end brick retailers that traded 
directly with designer brands and sold their excess inventory.  
DigiVog was incorporated in Italy, one of the largest markets for sourcing of fashion 
merchandise. The domain of origin was a sourcing advantage to the firm, and a cultural 
advantage to earlier models, such as Bluefly, and contemporary peers. "We had an advantage”, a 
co-founder said, ”because we started off in Italy, which is the Mecca of designer clothing. There 
are a lot of quality brands there that you don't necessarily find in the US", noted the chief 
executive officer at DigiVog US. “[…] probably of the 100 biggest retailers in the world, 20 or 
30 are based in Italy. It is a highly fragmented market."  
Another early advantage for founders was their decision to create a pure play fashion brand 
that made a clean break with the culture of off-price fashion department stores which bought 
from each other at the end of season, instead from fashion brands. "If you do the wholesalers," 
said DigiVog's US CEO, "you do not get the same quality of the final product. We did have one 
wholesaler, who helped us start out, but again, it was a high quality partner in which one of the 
oldest high-fashion firms in Italy had a major stake."  
Acquiring the right assortment from the 'right' partner was a critical first step for the fledgling 
firm. “Fashion retailers in Italy are shopkeepers”, a senior officer in charge of merchandising at 
DigiVog Group explained. “In Italy we did not have, like in France or the US, the department 
store culture. You have probably more shopkeepers in Milan than in the whole USA.” Unlike the 
US-born Bluefly, whose management relied on standard purchasing agreements with off-price 
wholesalers, DigiVog's buying team understood the future value of curated merchandise 
selection and approached smaller boutiques that had "already done the selection and you did not 
have to select anymore".  
 152 
 
After two seasons, equivalent to one brick fashion year, DigiVog gained access to the 
merchandising departments of fashion brands and started negotiating with their teams to acquire 
fashion merchandise directly from the brands. The product was sourced from a combination of 
partners; smaller high-end retailers, fashion boutiques, and few wholesale accounts. In 2001, 
DigiVog had bought fashion merchandise totaling over 200,000 individual brand items. The 
speed of reaching this acquisition competence is similar to Net-a-Porter’s with its added 
knowledge of fashion industry insiders.  
DigiVog’s founders thought that the point of entry in the fashion industry would be to 
persuade fashion firms to sell their last season merchandise online. The founder insisted that 
during this entry experiment, the culture of the pure play brand should be distinct from the 
acquisition tactics of department stores.  
“The idea was, high-fashion never dies. […] I do not want to set up an outlet. We did not 
feature in our store online the original price point at which the product was sold in the stores.  
You are buying a dress from Alexander McQueen which is not seasonal. Let's transmit to the 
final customer that when they are buying something which is 1 season old, you are buying 
something which has a lot of content within it. This helped fashion companies to be less afraid to 
sell us end of season merchandise.”  
The “fashion as an art form” proposition from the founding team represented a new cultural 
reinterpretation of the meaning of commercial fashion. Contemporary peers, like Bluefly, 
according to one of the co-founders, were “never able to buy anything from fashion companies 
directly because they were too aggressive”. One method used by Bluefly in imparting this 
“aggressive” cultural model was to show the price at which the merchandise was sold vis-à-vis 
the original retail price. DigiVog displayed a creatively constructed ‘DigiVog price’ and never 
showed an item at the “discounted price”.  
6.2 The New Hierarchy of Cultural Distinction  
 153 
 
DigiVog’s founders thought that the presidents of high-fashion firms in Europe, typically 
also serving as their designers, would appreciate the value of the “fashion as art” proposition. 
The proposition could communicate to fashion brands that Internet method of distribution and 
marketing could create new sources of brand value to established firms. This was a markedly 
different practice of securing commercial access through creative proposition from the earlier 
models of Bluefly and eLuxury. “Bluefly said,” one founder recalled,” we will give you money 
for your product. We said, we will give you value.”  
Aside from the originality of the price construction, DigiVog’s team deliberated that it was 
important to continually reinterpret Internet technology in the process of discovering new 
sources of value to fashion brands online. The lack of support to experimenting with technology 
in eLuxury and Bluefly reinforced behaviors of complacency similar to those exhibited by 
manufacturers in brick-and-mortar contexts. “They did not spend the money well on technology” 
said one co-founder. “Instead of making an additional effort in strengthening the assortment, 
they invested a lot in advertising the poor assortment. When you address a fashion audience, you 
basically have to get the right assortment”. Conversely, eLuxury was an example of a pure play 
retailer with superb assortment derived from direct relationships with LVMH’s brands, but poor 
communications. It “needed more personality and more character,” the CCO of DigiVog Group 
said. “You need to build content around what you sell." 
DigiVog’s Chief Commercial Officer recalled in 2010 that after the financial crisis hit in 
2008, major fashion firms were selling their excess inventory because “they are in need”. 
DigiVog’s team thought that sample sale retail models were culturally beneficial to fashion firms   




One executive suggested that in some cases the approach that sample sale retailers have to 
acquiring fashion merchandise is unfavorable to fashion brands and is similar to that of 
mainstream brick-and-mortar wholesalers, such as Wal-Mart.  “The price positioning of Levi's in 
the US is half what it is in Europe”, said he. “Why? It is because Levi's had left the arena of 
quality. In a different way, on the Internet, this could happen to fashion. If things go wrong, the 
Internet is highly-competitive, customer-driven, price-comparison. These guys may be trickling 
down status. These things take out of exclusivity. And, exclusivity is why the fashion system 
works.”  
DigiVog’s founders exhibited unusual maturity and depth in the knowledge they imparted 
regarding the brick fashion system. According to executives, the first comparative problem 
introduced by the Internet mode of marketing and distribution was that it was difficult to 
measure competitiveness online. Unlike competitiveness in the brick-and-mortar fashion industry 
which was related to the average ticket or, the average purchase value of a store, taking 
comparable assortments, online, there was another component to establishing cultural value that 
made comparisons between different players more complex. “What in the physical world is 
location”, one executive said, “in the online world is traffic and the type of traffic you generate, 
is the type of location you will have”.  
DigiVog Group’s CCO explained that the commercial team mapped out as relevant only 
these online peers that exhibit understanding of fashion industry culture that is similar to 
DigiVog’s. Typically, the largest profit generators online were other multi-brand retailers, like 
Neiman Marcus or Saks. The remainder was populated with smaller multi-brand retailers with 
specific “appeal”, according to the executive.  
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DigiVog’s commercial thought that for high-fashion firms the key to operating in a 
technology-enabled environment was to integrate “the right” assortment with the appropriate 
content. Executives at DigiVog believed that some pure play peers understood the cultural 
significance of communicating and content creation, offering new sources of brand value to the 
fashion industry, while others did not. Successful peers developed a lot of content around the 
product introduced on their website.  
While the CCO of the Group criticized the mainstream commercial approach of Vente 
Privee, pioneer of the sample sale model that launched in France in 2001, he also thought that the 
Gilt Groupe—the largest competitor inspired by Privés model, was culturally beneficial to the 
fashion industry. Vente Privee conceives of itself as a “members-only online shopping 
destination that offers premium brands at fantastic prices every day”. However, the company 
offered selection that apart from fashion items also included daily sales of appliances, 
electronics, and household items.  
Gilt Groupe identified Vente Privee as their mainstream competitor. Executives at DigiVog 
went a step further. The merchandising team did not consider the spread of mass retailers as 
Vente Privee to be a beneficial development for fashion firms. Said the CCO: 
“If the model spreads, fashion will disappear as a concept. I think that [the US sample sale 
retailer] was a bit inspired by Vente Privee – a huge company.  Vente Privee is much bigger than 
[the firm]. They sell anything from refrigerators to Bottega Veneta, to Peugeot cars. With the 
Vente-Privee model the fashion will disappear, because they are making fashion a commodity.” 
Gilt Groupe, conversely, offered a number of beneficial advantages for fashion brands. The 
US Director of Marketing at DigiVog agreed with the CCO in Milan that Gilt was able to create 
at the core of its brand a proposition that offered a way in which brands could enhance their 
social value on the new channel in the future. Gilt’s proposition combined superiority in brand 
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offering with exclusivity of proposition. The high-fashion orientation of the firm created visible 
recognition for brand and it was easier to validate this player as a culturally beneficial new 
entrepreneurial partner for fashion firms. Because of the unusual understanding the two 
competitors DigiVog.com and Gilt Groupe shared about culture in the fashion industry, their 
original business models were validated by fashion brands despite the focus on selling heavily 
discounted product.  
DigiVog’s executives liked Gilt. The definition of beneficial competence of this peer was 
conceptualized in the ability of the model to ”give the customer and the market very strongly the 
message that they are very good at what they do. There is the perception that they are telling a 
very nice story, a fairytale.” 
DigiVog’s team was at the same time critical to other pure play peers. The CCO of DigiVog 
Group argued that Net-a-Porter, for example, deliberately tried to mimic the behavior of large 
department stores and this problem occurred because the founder of Net-a-Porter was locked-in, 
or, “entrenched in a way of conceiving fashion and the internet in my personal perception, as 
conservative. I might be wrong, of course: the establishment conveys the idea that if things have 
been going this way for the last 50 years, maybe this is the way they should go. So, maybe she is 
completely right. But, what she has done on the web is in my personal perception, mainstream.”  
For DigiVog’s executives the appeal of their pure play peers to fashion brands finally 
depended on the cultural reasons why the consumer visits any particular online retailer. Said the 
Director of Marketing: 
“If you take our customer and you compare it with Saks and Net-a-Porter, you may find 
similarity and overlap, but the reasons for which customers go to each channel is different.  
DigiVog.com – you are looking for assortment 60% of the time and for price point -40%. Buying 
on Valentino.com, you are doing it even if you are the same person – for a different reason. If 
you buy, even Valentino, on Net, you are doing it for selection, editorial, brand positioning.  On 
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Valentino.com, you are buying just because you want to have the contact with the brand; 
something that Net will never give you. From an objective standpoint, we are competing in the 
same arena, but we are fulfilling different needs of maybe sometimes the same customer”.  
A Strategy of Acquisition: Balancing Between Commerce and Exclusivity 
The first brands that agreed to sell their product to DigiVog.com are two well-known high-
fashion houses, with very different bottom lines. One of the brands made $50 million and the 
other had $1 billion in annual sales for 2011. These first buys were intentionally designed to be 
contracted against cash payment. DigiVog's founding team did not want to push consignment on 
their first clients. This was a key decision in building trust with merchandising executives at the 
brands.  
The push of department stores for consignment agreements in the 1980s transferred the 
merchandise risk to fashion brands. The Buying Director in the US office and former Head of 
Buying for the headquarters in Italy observed that brands had a hard time trusting DigiVog with 
commercial results, but with each ensuing season executives would observe the benefits of a 
consignment deal in place of a regular sales agreement and "realize that they would do more 
money with a consignment agreement. It's worse for them in terms of cash-flow, but it is actually 
better for them in terms of the return on the wholesale price. [...] Basically, our suppliers prefer 
the consignment when they realize that we are indeed going to sell very well," she said. 
After two to three regular fashion seasons, DigiVog’s first partners opened up to exclusive 
renegotiation of the terms to consignment. The former Global Head of Buying referred to this 
period of a year and a half as "a crucial period in which we consolidate the relationship". During 
this period the relationship is nurtured by delivering on the commercial promise of performance 




This lifecycle of merchandise acquisition can be contrasted with the US, where the company 
established presence in 2007. In Italy, the firm has long-term buying and concession contracts for 
quantities with fashion firms by merchandise, and the approach to buying in that context has 
become more routinized and quantitative over the years. "In Italy", says the former Buying 
Director, "we have a 10 year experience, so we have much bigger volumes, more numbers". 
Buying officers also generally need only approach the Logistics or Warehouse manager; the 
issue never gets passed to Commercial or Marketing departments, as it did in the beginning of 
DigiVog’s tenure with fashion brands.  
In the US, despite the fact that the market is more open to the adoption of new technological 
practice, DigiVog does not yet have consignment agreements with fashion designers. The 
relationships are nurtured directly with marketing and design teams at the brands and the 
approach to the acquisition of merchandise is more qualitative in the sense that buying specialists 
are only looking for "specific brands".  
Due to the differences in the trust component with brands, the organizational structure of 
DigiVog at headquarters also differs from the one in the US. In Italy, there is a division between 
business development and buying. In the US, both teams are integrated. DigiVog buyers 
approach a brand’s Sales Manager and, in rare occasions, the Marketing Manager. The contact is 
established by attending trade shows, or hiring fashion consultants with access to fashion brands. 
"Once I have the appointment", said the former head of buying, "I try to convince them that we 
are the best. [...] we preserve the image of the brand, we never slash prices. We never scream the 
brand name; it's a much softer process."  
DigiVog established commercial presence in 2007 in the US, and by the time it entered the 
online fashion space, fashion brands here were already approached by multiple pure play 
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retailers for merchandise acquisition. DigiVog was well known in Europe, but less so in the US. 
Just as they did earlier in the European context, DigiVog's buyers in US had to persuade fashion 
clients that commercial results will "kick in" in no less than 2 seasons for sell-thru to improve. 
New Kind of Merchandiser: the Eyeballing Rule in buying fashion in the us 
A quick look at the acquisition and pricing of US-born brands at DigiVog’s New York office 
allows a glimpse into the cultural capabilities developed by DigiVog in the process of acquisition 
of brands thirteen years ago, when it was a fledgling new company. The approach to pricing of 
merchandise from acquired brands in the US office is painstaking, artisanal, and driven by 
assumptions of quality and brand awareness. 
“We were the only people doing buying back then. There are a lot more now," says the Chief 
Executive Officer in the US. When DigiVog Group opened its US office in 2007, the company 
was competing in a context ripe with rivals. When local brands from the US were introduced as 
part of the DigiVog.com portfolio, the team experienced the problem of having to build their 
brand in yet another fashion context. The sell-thru of new brands remained historically low for at 
least 3 to 4 seasons. The US CEO remarked that “the problem is not in the brand, but in 
DigiVog's brand”, particularly because the type of marketing strategy the company practiced, did 
not at all involve “banner-based push marketing.”  
DigiVog's team started to experiment with online placement of fashion product purchased 
with fashion clients in the US. The idea remained that to develop a strong relationship with a 
fashion brand, the team had to cherry-pick merchandise from the fashion client and assess the 
possibility for moving into deeper engagement to design the brand’s e-commerce business 
property, and manage the future marketing strategy for them.  
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DigiVog's merchandising team in the US was invested to carry out the policy with US 
fashion brands in terms of negotiations and with the responsibility of having to carefully picking 
merchandise. This task was not always easy and there were no guarantees that in 2 or 3 years the 
consignment agreement would lead to commercial success for DigiVog, or the brand. It came 
down to trying and trust. 
"For very local brands, I have to try; I am not sure that it will sell, but if I see that it is very 
well distributed around; if I read Women’s Wear Daily and see many pics with the brand's 
clothes... of course, you have to try... it is also a matter of sensibility", says the Global Head of 
Buying at DigiVog Group. The Global Head of Buying stressed how with each of these brands 
the approach in terms of cultivating trust and, in the process, affecting their online culture is 
different.  
"Catherine Malandrino, Halston, Philip Lim, Proenza Schouler. [...] Sometimes, we need to 
work on developing the relationship.  Some of them just have a lot of stocks and they say-we'll 
give it to you. Others, like [mentions a well-known US fashion designer], we worked with them 
for two years for Digi1.com. This brand is a small brand, but it is well distributed. I asked them 
for two years to sell me the stock, but they always said that they cannot since they have 
exclusivity agreement with other competitor, blah, blah. In the end, fifteen days ago, they sold it 
to me." 
Selection of items and pricing are both qualitative, artisanal processes. Pricing is a laborious 
process for the merchandiser. Going through the list of brands with which recent merchandise 
acquisition contracts have been signed takes eight hours and is done on an item-by-item basis. 
When items are bought directly from brands, the process of pricing includes cataloging of orders 
at the warehouse level, reviewing merchandise codes, and setting pre-markdown DigiVog prices. 
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The minute attention to cherry picking of US-born brands was evident in how the buying and 
merchandising teams in the US curated each new item from a brand, placing it under a relevant 
category on DigiVog.com, and figuring out the content for the item.  
With long-standing partner brands pricing is made on the basis of the personal curation 
preference of the merchandiser. A senior merchandiser explained that sometimes the team would 
"boot an item to a random price". This meant that the merchandiser will look at a picture of the 
product - just like the buyer would before deciding what brand to buy - and decide that, “if it is 
expensive, but looks ‘naah’, I will put a lower DigiVog price on it.”  
One example of this rule of thumb referred to by DigiVog’s executives as “eyeballing” is 
how the team balances between commercial appeal and exclusivity when setting prices and 
discounting on very expensive brands. If very expensive brands, well-known or not, had low 
sell-thru, merchandisers suggested the markdown on the basis of their own feelings about what 
price would make the brand sell.  
Senior merchandiser disclosed that a low sell-thru for the generally more contemporary 
brands in the US may be due to promotional factors. “Maybe the brand wasn't promoted enough, 
problem of selection, problem of pricing,” she noted. The fuzziness here necessitated reporting 
the problem to both the buyers and the marketing team. Possible responses to the situation would 
be further experimenting. Buying of this particular brand may stop or different promotional 
campaign would be introduced by the marketing division.  
One example for the application of this rule-of-thumb is an ad-hoc eyeballing of cashmere 
products by two merchandisers. Among the brands with a low sell-thru are well-known European 
and US fashion brands, such as Marc Jacobs, Thomas Meyer, Maison Martin Margiela, Mizrahi, 
Tom Ford, Jil Sander, Malandrino, CNC Costume National, Robert Rodriguez, and Just Cavalli. 
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Because these brands are very well known, the executives decide to keep them at a very low 
markdown.  
The ad hoc meeting then proceeds with eyeballing individual brands “just to double-check if 
the rate of markdown is perhaps really applicable to all”. This ostensibly simple operation takes 
no more than twenty minutes, yet every piece of merchandise from a particular brand that may or 
may not have a high sell-thru and may or may not be associated with a recent collection hit, is 
carefully examined on a spreadsheet. The senior merchandiser suggests that, “at this time, let's 
not have a target. Right now we want to up the sell-thru.” The junior merchandiser asks: “Is there 
normally a target?” The senior colleague suggests that the targeted price for a brand, including 
the markdown on that price follows only one rule. “Once you reach a critical mass, we have to 
pay much closer attention to the markdowns we apply”. The example shows that the percentage 
of a markdown on a brand is flexibly defined by the executives. 
This level of detail was an important ingredient in cementing the relationship with the firm’s 
first clients in Europe. The attention to detail in brand acquisition and pricing in the US allowed 
DigiVog to achieve more trusted relationships with brands and generate a momentum for 
advancing the partnership to the level after finding out if the brand can generate e-commerce 
revenue.  
Chapter 7: Evolution of Cultural Intermediation on the Internet: Teaching Fashion 
Brands to Manage a New Identity 
7.1 Rhetoric and Signature Elements 
"So, for me e-commerce is everything;  
the buying, the selling, the web marketing and the tech." 
CEO, DigiVog USA 
When DigiVog executives describe how they were able to launch 27 e-commerce businesses 
for 27 high-fashion partners, they often say that fashion brands “permitted” the company to go 
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ahead. The marketing team in the US, for example, explains the cultural capability behind the 
process of partnering with high-fashion brands as “help”. “What I know for sure”, an executive 
explained, “Is that this business depends on the client; whether they want more or less help with 
managing the store. We provide them with a set of tools that allow them to be independent. But, 
they are not experts in e-commerce and we devise together a strategy for best managing the 
online store”. The Group Marketing Officer added a commercial distinction, “We are offering to 
help the brands, as stipulated in the contract that we are signing, basically a percentage of sales 
generated online.” 
To “help” became an important rhetorical tool utilized by DigiVog when the business 
development team asked during those first discussions with a fashion brand, why would a well-
known fashion company in this creative cultural field choose to have an e-commerce store and 
engage in digital marketing? “It's a good question”, explained the director of Partner Division 
responsible for putting more brands on-board. He explained that there are two goals with 
creating an e-commerce property for fashion firms. The first goal has to do with revenue and 
commerce. A positive response to the question reflects that a fashion firm is willing to engage in 
a conversation with DigiVog executives to open up to accepting a new cultural dimension in its 
creative practice in which there is a marked significance of being commercially viable as an 
entrepreneur in the new space. Commercial viability had to be understood in a similar way that 
executives in brand “C” looked at electronic commerce; as a straightforward goal of making 
money online. "They [the brands] have seen the numbers. It’s that simple," the CEO of DigiVog 
USA noted.  
A second goal of proposing e-commerce to fashion brands was to improve the knowledge of 
brands regarding the positive impact from an e-commerce website on brand awareness and 
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marketing. Fashion firms had been struggling to manage these value added activities away from 
brick-and-mortar wholesale and publisher partners. The Internet was presented by DigiVog 
executives as a new platform for “liberation of content” for fashion brands. DigiVog’s founders, 
led by the CCO of DigiVog Group explained to their first partners in 2006 that the fashion 
industry is “by definition a content creator. Fashion firms are like media companies”.  
Part of the policy of pricing in fashion brands was related to charging high margins for their 
product to offset the extremely high costs of marketing. High margins charged for intangible 
assets related to history, heritage, quality, and craftsmanship that went into the creation of the 
appeal of the final merchandise. DigiVog’s executives hoped that they could help brands 
understand the new cultural value coming from reduced marketing costs of publishing and 
sharing high-quality content on the Internet as part of their new marketing culture. The CCO of 
DigiVog explained that digital web design appeals to the artisanal roots of the industry leaders. 
“The upside is exploiting and enabling content for your final customer in a way in which this 
final customer can understand. Like in any other industry, knowledge is the main way to better 
understand the value of what you are buying. For the fashion industry, knowledge is transmitted 
through content. Put the creator, the designer in contact with the final customer via this new 
channel. You have the unbelievable opportunity of buying a piece of art and dress up with it.” 
In 2006, the fashion industry had already been exposed to the concept of the “corporate 
website”. Corporate websites served as a prime real estate online for informing the public about 
the history of a brand and the reasons why it titles itself as “exclusive”. After social media 
became the channel most frequently associated with vast social reach that warranted it 
legitimacy, notoriously distressed members of the French maison community, including Hermes 
and Christian Dior, gradually discovered that good things came from becoming owners of a 
Facebook page or running a runway collection linked to their social media page via YouTube.  
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Dior, in fact, created one of the first YouTube fashion virals, produced by bloggers. A former 
executive in charge of e-marketing at Dior discussed the merits of the idea with Dior’s CEO 
Arnault. He boldly argued in the meeting that the idea of using the new medium was “to create a 
buzz. And to create a buzz, you need to engage bloggers. If you do other things, like classical 
media, it's different. Online, bloggers are the key. And the way we did it, we invited personally 
15 bloggers from US, China, France. They came to Paris. The most important Paris blogger – she 
came. We had a lot of things to explain about the Maison Dior, to create a new type of link. We 
spent 2 days with them.” 
Once traditional players such as Dior were “sold”, social media technologies became 
considered “harmless”, as one Hermes executive put it. Louis Vuitton and Burberry’s marketing 
team quickly followed suit, starting YouTube and Facebook projects. This swift change of heart 
did not occur with e-commerce. Creating an e-commerce page was an unknown, complicated 
ordeal and no fashion house wanted to do it first. For fashion firms to accept having e-commerce 
page, a lot of them had to do it.  
The Director of Partner Division explained that by knowing the degree to which fashion 
brands fought to be independent from the wholesalers in the 1980s, DigiVog created a successful 
pitch that over the years inspired many brands to follow suit:  
“The first and only reason is— everybody is doing it. In the fashion business, this is the herd 
mentality. The second is, what do you want to deliver in terms of product image? A department 
store is by definition a wholesaler with its own buying team defining what they want to buy. 
Online store is of course managed by the brands; it is they who decide what pieces they should 
put in the e-shop. They know that out of one particular exclusive dress, they may only sell 1 
piece, but it is a way to convey a brand image.”  
The founding team explained in their pitch to fashion brands that as social media and social 
commerce technologies continue to evolve, their corporate website would be able to contribute to 
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only 20% of the brand value (Figure 9). An e-commerce website is better positioned to help in 
the branding process. It contains an updated datafeed of product that can be made searchable on 
the largest web engines. The product along with the editorial content can be incorporated into 
marketing campaigns promoted on social media and social commerce websites. The evolution of 
these digital technologies creates a possibility for broadening distribution of the marketing and 
brand related message of fashion firms. 
 
Figure 9 Interpretations on New Practice as Beneficial Innovation. 
Fashion firms would enable new sources of brand value by developing their own digital 
promotional campaigns and decorating them with their own content as it applies to their seasonal 
product. “Fashion firms were, in fact, able to understand the market beyond marketing”, said the 
CCO. What they had forgotten, added the CEO of DigiVog USA, was that their real audiences 
were “customers [who] judged the quality of their product every season” and that one of the roles 
of e-commerce was to remind brands of that advocacy.  
7.2 The Launch of Collaboration   
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DigiVog had to make certain choices regarding which brands to approach. Generally, the 
executive team listed two main problems that would inhibit their future partners from signing a 
partnership deal with the firm. The first challenge was to make fashion brands think 
operationally and in terms of commercial decisions that would bring commercial success. 
“Despite the fact that you are very visionary company and a very visionary designer”, noted the 
CCO, “the Internet would expose you to the customer in a way that you’ve never experienced 
before; much more deeply than a store or an advertizing campaign, which is always, always, 
always executed with no clear achievement offline”. The Director of Partner Division at DigiVog 
explained this problem:` 
“The point is, the fashion system works with an advertizing budget which is set up to work 
with very high mark-ups and margins. The unsold products sold at a lower mark-up can easily 
cannibalize the brand perception and your ability to mark-up your product for lifetime. The 
fashion houses were very careful not to lose brand equity.  This was the swift way for us to do it. 
We had to find an easy touch point between Internet and fashion. There was a way to selling 
fashion online which actually protected the brand and protected the merchandise.”  
The other problem was the existence of long-standing, siloed separation of culture between 
marketing and e-commerce, in those occasional cases where fashion companies actually had 
marketing or online commerce departments. The Chief Commercial Officer at DigiVog Group 
explained this challenge: 
 “If you look at it from an organizational chart perspective of a fashion house in Italy, above 
certain percent, you will find that there are no Marketing Directors around: in Armani or Gucci. 
It’s something I could never believe once I’d seen it. Marketing direction of Dolce & Gabbana is 
basically in charge of identifying the price point of products of comparable brands. Everything 
for Gucci, Armani, Dolce & Gabbana – what a company would call Marketing, they call 
Communications. I’m Gianni Versace. I never actually care if you prefer white dress or a black 
dress, because I am the maker of the dress. But, why should I hire a Marketing Director? I just 
need to hire someone to communicate you my vision of things. That is the way they see it.” 
In order to show to fashion firms that DigiVog understood their operational context and rules 
of engagement, in the early stages of the development of its e-commerce capability, the company 
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had to establish its own PR and Communications team. The PR and Communications manager 
was based in Italy along with eight other line managers located in Europe, China, Japan and the 
US. The allocation of this unit to the organizational structure allowed the company to achieve 
status that was perceived as “similar” to the identity of high-fashion European firms.  
This is how The Director General of Altagamma validated DigiVog’s enabling role for 
fashion brands, alluding to the similar “thinking” of two unlikely categories of partners: 
“The founder and his crew share the same culture of the luxury company. I believe that to 
meet the need of a high-fashion firm, you need to be part of the same culture. They are not 
people dealing with just logistics and just with IT. They have the ability of defining the technical 
solution, but on top of that they share the vision and fully understand the needs of the fashion 
company, in terms of quality and service that has to be provided.” 
Early on, before the Partner Division was created to work on negotiating the technical 
characteristics of future e-commerce properties for partners, the founding team decided that the 
developing capability in “eyeballing” product that sells warranted leaving the decision for the 
selection of fashion product to DigiVog merchandisers. This particular cultural approach left the 
possibility for a backlash from future partners. Merchandising divisions at fashion labels could 
argue that only certain products should be put online, because they represented the highlight of 
the season.  
“So they would be affected”, said the US CEO, recounting his answer to internal discussions 
in DigiVog where founders wondered how to go about negotiations, if their future partners 
pushed for less commerce, and more ritual presentation of their product. The US CEO had 
developed an answer: 
“The biggest challenge was to let people understand that the online store was another sales 
channel and it was not going to cannibalize their product in other channels.… the beauty of 
being online is that you only see one article; you never see racks of things. Buying 100,000 
pieces of a t-shirt that the designer thinks is ugly does not tantamount to putting them all on a 
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rack. Further, we can complement the item with other, more popular pieces from the collection; 
like, a $10,000 dress that the designer loves, but we’ll only stock 2 pieces of it. So, that resolves 
the problems that could be had in a physical store.” 
Knowing the shortcomings in the behavior of these creative organizations actually facilitated 
the partnership choices DigiVog executives made. DigiVog’s Chief Executive in charge of brand 
relations investigated the pyramid of turnover generated by fashion firms and observed that it 
was very flat (Figure 10). The number of fashion firms that operated in the $ 1 billion segment of 
the pyramid was less than 20. Gucci, Christian Dior, Vacheron Constantine, Chloe, Louis 
Vuitton, and Hermes were some of these brands. They tended to be publicly listed, and owned by 
diversified holding Groups. One example is PPR, a French multinational holding firm that has 
substantial shares in fashion luxury brands such as Brioni (100%), Gucci (100%), Yves Saint 
Laurent (100%), Sergio Rossi (100%), Boucheron (100%), Bottega Veneta (100%), and 
Alexander McQueen (51%).  
The CCO observed that when fashion brands were positioned at the lower tier of the 
pyramid, with annual revenue of less than $500 million, they tended to be privately owned and 
bolder in their choices. When fashion firms got to the midpoint of the revenue segment, they also 
tended to have a Marketing Director. Fashion brands positioned at the lower point typically did 
not have Marketing direction. These were crucial cultural data for DigiVog. 
 
Figure 10 “Openness to Creativity” Pyramid 
1 
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Sales less than 500m 
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The CCO sketched out an inverted relationship between turnover in fashion brands and their 
openness to taking new strategic decisions: 
“Once in a while, you trim your distribution; you want the highest quality, most exclusive 
distribution. This is necessary, but it cuts your revenue. So, what do you say to your 
shareholders? Well, the designer thought that adding the product in this direction is not so nice to 
the brand, but the shareholder says: fire the designer. If you are Burberry, you are not anymore in 
the position of being pure. You need to make compromises.  I am sure that in the head of 
Christopher Bailey or the Marketing Director there is something saying: would be nice to have 
the product just presented the way I want. But, how do I explain this to the analyst? If you are on 
the top, you already will have too much to compromise and this will reflect your internet 
strategy.” 
The CCO would eventually posit to the executive team that smaller high-fashion brands 
which tended not to have marketing divisions could learn faster that there were advantages to 
organizing as Internet retailers did; by integrating e-commerce with online marketing operations.   
The goal was to find a representative sample of high-fashion firms bold enough in their 
decisions and with little, if any, experience in digital operations. Firms that did not have a 
Marketing Director were interesting to DigiVog because their founders tended to micromanage 
their operations, but were forthcoming generally and “tended to sort of tell you what you want to 
know”. The CCO suggested starting selecting brands from the $500 million sales bracket for 
introducing e-commerce capabilities. The expectation was that if a certain critical mass of 
smaller fashion brands decided to collaborate with DigiVog, this would incite reaction from large 
established firms and trigger positive peer response.  
From 2006 to 2012 DigiVog has focused on developing collaborations with fashion firms 
positioned at the bottom of the inverted pyramid of less than $500 million revenue. The majority 
of these firms were the prêt-a-porter fashion houses of Italy. They tended to be tightly knit in 
localized associations and it was easier to establish positive word-of-mouth with them. 
DigiVog’s first e-commerce client was a high-fashion Italian brand which did not have a 
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marketing director and the owner was controlling closely the entire process of developing the 
digital identity of the website, including choosing and updating the merchandise.  
When DigiVog entered the US market in 2007, the company was able to capitalize on its 
European reputation by gaining the trust of three US high-fashion brands that had won Vogue’s 
and CFDA’s designer of the year awards in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, DigiVog also achieved an 
important milestone. The Group launched a Joint Venture partnership with PPR dedicated to 
designing and managing the e-commerce and digital marketing practices of several PPR luxury 
brands, the first of which is fully owned by the conglomerate. The peer behavior of fashion 
brands in adapting to changes en masse had finally paid off. 
7.3 Requirements for Collaboration with Fashion Brands 
Before DigiVog launched negotiations with high-fashion brands, there were a few “minimum 
requirements” a potential client had to meet. Unlike other companies that provided e-commerce 
building services for luxury brands, such as CreateTheGroup or GSI Commerce, which required 
from their clients yearly fee designed as a percentage of online revenue, DigiVog Group did not 
use this principle in working with clients. The CEO of the US office explained that this decision 
was incorporated in the contractual agreement because the cultural goal of DigiVog Group is to 
achieve long-term, branding benefits for both partners.  
“I will be your partner for the online store but if you do not reach some pre-specified 
minimum level of turnover which justifies for me the percentage of revenue share, I will charge 
you anyway a min amount of money on a yearly basis to justify my revenue share with you. We 
don’t do this. When we define a brand not strong enough in terms of potential annual sales 
online, we do not go ahead with business plans.” 
The first step in investigating the potential of the partnership is a qualitative analysis of the 
“message” and the “image” of the brand. These two variables relate to the distribution channels 
in which the brand is present and the marketing approaches and campaigns that are implemented 
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by their Communications divisions. The analysis takes into consideration if the brand has a 
corporate website and how it is used. If the brand already does some online campaigns, as digital 
runway shows, or supports social media activities on Facebook or with bloggers, the relationship 
increases in importance, because the brand appears to be open to the digital channel by way of 
experimenting.  
The other step in the analysis is to measure the average ticket, or the average purchase value 
made in the physical stores where the brand is sold and the variation of the average ticket across 
markets. This quantitative exercise allows forecasting the expected average ticket value online. 
Even though the merchandise may be very expensive, the average ticket is an important measure, 
because as the CEO of the US office noted, “the average ticket will tell you what sort of 
merchandise assortment the client actually buys. When you get the information about average 
ticket, you already know what the brand stands for in terms of proposition; what is the value of 
the brand.” 
In 2006, one of Europe’s most coveted high-fashion brands, established in 1994, signed an 
agreement with DigiVog for the development of their first online store. In 2007, a prêt-a-porter 
clothier agreed to be the second to have an e-commerce website created by DigiVog. This brand 
is to date one of the largest clients of DigiVog, totaling sales of $1.3 billion in 2011.  
After reaching a decision on the similarity of brand culture and the practical issue of money 
making online, the next step would be to sign a long-term contract in which the brand agreed to 
adopt DigiVog’s own proprietary e-commerce technology model. DigiVog’s Chief Technology 
Officer and Global Technology Evangelist in the US office recounted why this internal cultural 
acceptance was key for the relationship: 
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“We focused on internal development of the platform and we have developed our platform 
ourselves. We always saw a business as complex as DigiVog, in terms of inventory management, 
flexibility in the management of pricing, different markets, different payment options, is 
something that is not easily found in e-commerce platforms, meaning that you cannot find it in as 
flexible form as you may wish for a business as DigiVog. Something that changed the field 
completely is when we extended the platform to take care of the rest of the e-shops under us in a 
completely separated way in a logical sense, but using the same platform.”  
DigiVog.com was developed as an online store around which the technology team built an 
infrastructure consisting of internally managed warehouse, fulfillment and delivery services. The 
CTO explained that DigiVog.com, “[our] biggest brand” is treated, culturally and in terms of 
business process, like "any other site." This cultural perspective is how DigiVog discusses the e-
commerce properties of client businesses. The Chief Technology Evangelist explained that 
DigiVog sees the e-commerce businesses of its clients as products and divisions. “What we call 
product is our websites,” he said, “and divisions are basically the online stores that we have”. 
DigiVog’s executives culturally associate their high-fashion partner businesses as proprietary 
internal divisions of DigiVog.  
Prior to starting fashion client projects, DigiVog’s founding team discussed the prerequisites. 
An in-house technology team was created whose role was to continually acquire core digital 
technology skills. The founders planned that this internal team would grow organically with 
developments in e-commerce technology and leverage external force to keep up with subsequent 
demand from fashion firms.  
Planning ahead of developing a particular cultural competence was a typical approach for 
DigiVog. A senior executive at the US office explained that “planning ahead” was a form of 
hedging against uncertainty. Planning ahead was done only after the founding team closely 
examined emerging online cultural technologies and was “very strongly internally convinced” to 
invest in developing tools, solutions, platforms, or collaborations.  
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DigiVog’s marketing and merchandising team always learned from extensive analysis of 
contextual trends, situations and proposals. The internal vision had to be aligned with 
experiences from learning.  An example of this selective experimentation is an episode from the 
US office in 2011 in which DigiVog's marketing executives turned down a proposition from a 
startup with an impressive list of online retail clients to survey a random sample of Internet users 
on the user-friendliness of pure play retailers’ shopping fronts. Despite the very high customer 
retention rate (99%) that other online retailers were able to achieve by doing the survey, 
DigiVog's marketing team considered the offer from the perspective of long-term impact on the 
brand.  
The Marketing Manager noted that even though “mega brands like Nordstrom have more 
resources to free for such an instrument, they would have no time to reflect on the consequences 
of carrying out this instrument and also on the possibility of designing the instrument on their 
own.” It was decided that the $18,000 that DigiVog would have to pay for this survey could be 
used for testing more “innovative instruments”, such as collaboration with social-commerce 
players.  
7.4 Transfer of New Culture to Fashion Brands 1.0: The Partner Division 
When the first e-commerce properties for fashion firms were developed, DigiVog Group 
decided that the future will deliver enough fashion business to warrant the building of a new 
organizational unit to deal with the evolving expertise. Because a lot of work on the creation of 
the e-commerce website involved web design, the founders regarded the new e-commerce 
expertise as a creative enterprise in learning.  
For DigiVog the work on building e-commerce properties for fashion brands was both a 
commercial project, and an “art design” project. The founders assembled a team to creatively 
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design, logistically implement and technologically maintain this new division, which became the 
Partner Division. The Chief Technology Evangelist (CTE), among the founding members in 
2001, recalled the role of creative recombination in opening the division— “we took something 
from business development, project management, and technology and that provided the focus 
that was needed to make this project start.”  
In 2006, DigiVog's technology team began to conceptualize the cultural business model for 
the partnership division. The first challenge was to use their limited headcount and build the e-
commerce property of their first high-fashion client by relying exclusively on the in-house 
expertise of only three persons. One was in charge of technology and, says the CTE, “[…] there 
were two more developers, the broad skilled ones. By the end of the project, it was four people.” 
In 2006, the small team decided on changing the name to “Platform Support Division. That was a 
concept that was not present before, and we had to change things in order to add the concept of 
division,” says the CTO.  
The launch of the first partner e-commerce website in 2006 required DigiVog's development 
team to regroup, recoup and re-consider what will be the appropriate organizational support to 
future partner brands. The team was facing a very unusual situation.  
In 2006, there were only a handful of high-fashion brands with e-business operations. 
DigiVog’s Platform Support Division had to create a technology that fitted the internal 
organization of firms with much smaller operations and catalogs than DigiVog.com, the Group’s 
first pure play brand. The team also did not know what goals fashion executives would find 
relevant in managing their future e-commerce property.  
The challenge of the small Platform Support Division was to translate what e-commerce 
means to their high-profile clients and align the concept with existing cultural expectations of 
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fashion executives on the Internet as a commercial and marketing channel. DigiVog's CTO 
recalled that “we had tools, but they were not relevant to be used for different stores and by 
people who did not have knowledge of internal rules in DigiVog. They [the tools] had to be 
smoothed around the edges before we could expose them to the client.” Among the main 
concerns of fashion directors was “dilution” of their brands online. The immediate focus 
therefore became “focusing on the art of the website.”  
The difference of cultural goals between fashion brands and their future turn-key agent, 
DigiVog, prepared the Platform Support Division to work as an organizational intermediary that 
tests, experiments, and, possibly, collaborates with fashion brands. Today, this mini-division has 
grown to be the largest organizational unit in DigiVog. The unit is called “Partner Division.”  
 
Figure 11 Partner Division  
(Source: Internal documents) 
The Partner Division (Figure 11) is the main organizational unit in DigiVog that gets to 
mediate new culture to brands and direct the relationship with fashion brands. The division has 
three distinct areas of expertise: merchandising, editorial, and partner management. Merchandise 
planners at the Partner Division have the rare opportunity to select the actual items for the 
client’s e-commerce website. In 2011, the unit consisted of three merchandisers who were 



















The editorial content unit includes eight people collaborating on creating, designing, and 
sharing editorial content for the e-commerce website. Content is shared by sending regular and 
promotional newsletters to registered email users of the brand website. Newsletters typically 
promote new collections or special community branding campaigns. Finally, eighteen partner 
managers operate and analyze the day-to-day performance of e-commerce operations of the 
partner.  
The process of building the e-commerce website as a creative asset is kicked off by high-
level negotiations between DigiVog and the brand. The early phase of the negotiation includes 
DigiVog’s Chief Commercial Director and Group Business Development Director and the CEO 
or the General Manager of the fashion brand. The organizational roles that the parties choose to 
kick off the negotiations for the creation of this digital asset reveal how important it is for 
fashion brands to enter the new channel.  
The CCO of DigiVog emphasized why the Group wants the project to be launched on such a 
high executive level. “The project is not generated by the CIO”, he said. “Sometimes you've got 
a Commercial Director, and sometimes, people from Marketing. This varies a lot.”  
The contract signed subsequently between DigiVog and the client invests DigiVog with the 
responsibility to create, design, run, and maintain an e-commerce website for a fashion brand. 
Upon creating the property, DigiVog assumes responsibility to perform operations related to the 
technical aspects related to running campaigns for improving the visibility of the brand online, 
such as Search Engine Optimization (SEO) and Search Engine Marketing (SEM).  
The fashion brand further agreed to reinvest a share of their annual sales revenue from e-
commerce for refinancing costs associated with running SEM and to potentially finance other, 
new marketing activities that DigiVog may stipulate at a later time. The contract dictates that a 
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“partner manager” in charge of e-commerce will be provided by DigiVog, if the partner wishes 
so, or by the partner. Experience with most partners indicated, said the US CEO, that even 
though the contract terms called for the recipient firm to “have to hire an e-commerce manager if 
an e-commerce manager is absent, this function is fulfilled by an internal partner manager at 
DigiVog”.  
Between 2006 and 2012, the roles that eventually became appointed as e-commerce 
managers by General Managers or CEOs at fashion firms, were amazingly varied. Across the 
board, anyone short of being a General Manager or CEO, Business Development Manager, 
Brand Director, Owner, Commercial Director, and even Creative Director, were initially 
appointed by the brand as managers of their future online business. The company roles of these 
appointees indicate that these people are chosen to lead a brand-related function and have ritual 
responsibility for e-commerce and no operational involvement in any commercial or marketing 
activity related to running the new business online.  
The idea to have two levers in the partnership, one represented by the Account Manager at 
DigiVog and one by an e-commerce director in the brand emerged when the former Director of 
Brand Management understood during the negotiations stage that: 
“We can't really figure out a way in which we can understand each other in terms of what 
exactly a partner manager does. Basically, DigiVog Group and the brand should do the things 
that they are individually best at doing. They [Partner managers] tendentiously do the buying, 
and should be guided by the brand. They [the brand] know what they sell [best]. …they 
consistently liaise with our Partner manager in order to get the creative, such as banners and 
newsletters done by us.”  
To mitigate the problem of understanding each other, the Partner manager at DigiVog Group 
figures out the product assortment jointly with the merchandising or, in the rare cases when it 
existed, e-commerce director of the brand. The idea is to choose assortment that will work 
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online and produce positive sales results. The Partner manager at DigiVog acts more like a retail 
manager rather than a digital marketing manager in this setup. At the same time, part of the 
organizational responsibility of the DigiVog Partner Manager is to produce creative assets for 
the partner, such as e-newsletters. 
It took many hours of handcrafted labor to create and editorialize the weekly newsletters for 
the 23 brands in 2011. Each brand typically sends out 1 to 2 newsletters each week. The 
localization of these 30 newsletters into seven languages came up to 210 electronic newsletters 
a week. This was a large scale operation in content creation and the content of promotions and 
product of course had to be differentiated by brand. The creative process for the production of 
promotional electronic newsletters for brands was differed significantly from the routinized, 
quantitatively driven, SEM activity which was typically handled by no more than two people.  
Electronic newsletters were important first part of the relationship with a brand partner. In 
DigiVog.com experience, brand related newsletter campaigns contributed anywhere from 10 to 
30% of sales. “It is insane not to use them”, explained one executive the rationale for adding 
this activity with brands on top of SEM. DigiVog insisted that each brand in the portfolio 
should approve a copy of the proposed newsletter. One executive explained that some division 
of labor between DigiVog and the brand was necessary ”because newsletters are vehicles for the 
brands in the end. They approve all of them and in some cases, they make them themselves.”  
The problem was that most partner brands from Europe had a setup where digital activities 
were either nonexistent between 2010 and 2011, or else, larger firms, sometimes had Creative 
Services Divisions, which approved all content related to both channels; paper and digital. 
Negotiations with the brand prior to e-commerce creation were a critical informational 
interview where DigiVog learned about these contextual specifics.  
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The CEO of the US office perceived the Partner Division as the “most relational department 
that we have aside from the buying department. The partner managers are skilled with processes 
and external relations”. A partner manager at DigiVog was broadly skilled and could propose 
commercial plans to the partners. They coordinated deliveries to local warehouses from fashion 
brands. Partner managers also acted as fashion merchandisers by taking prime responsibility for 
placing merchandise on the partner’s website and updating sizes, styles, and content.  
Partner managers at DigiVog also had to behave as brick merchandisers in fashion firms 
and propose the product to be placed on the website. “Obviously,” said a senior executive who 
once took charge of store management for the US office, ”you can't tell your partner, as a 
traditional merchandiser in a fashion company, would, ‘hey, next season buy a little bit more 
than the last season’. The job of merchandisers here is to propose sales budget, markdowns, and 
plan assortment on the web.” The partner manager had evolved into a novel kind of 
Merchandiser who had the ability to control and curate fashion product directly on the fashion 
brand’s e-commerce website for the year in question. The role of partner managers at DigiVog 
was explained by another senior executive as: 
“relationship management: internally and externally. They are the point of the brand 
entrance; like account managers. This seems like a structure that is fairly unorganized, because 
we can see that every Partner manager has unequal amount of people underneath [e.g., some 
have more than one Jr. Partner Manager reporting to them].  But, this is an example of how 
we’ve organically evolved to build the company around people, as opposed to vice-versa. The 
most that we do is having 2 people per website. We have done that when the brands are part of 
the same family. It is important to get one person that is the one that our partner trusts.  They 
do not do store management on a daily basis. They rather coordinate the details for new features 
on the clients’ websites and the commercial calendar.”  
Other ways of expressing the importance of the partner manager was provided by the CEO 
of DigiVog US, who once held that role at headquarters. 
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“One of the reasons why there should be only one partner manager per client is because the 
partner manager, in a sense, kind of becomes the brand; becomes the brand ambassador. That is 
even reflected in the way they dress. They instinctively know what the brand likes. There is of 
course a dialogue and they translate the outcomes from this discussion as a request to the 
content teams and the producers.” 
Despite the rapid processes of learning-by-doing to which DigiVog’s Partner Managers 
were accustomed when working with brands on SEM and newsletters, the cultural acceptance 
of the Internet as a novel commercial and marketing channel arrived exceptionally slow in the 
minds of their fashion partners. In 2010, DigiVog had created flagship e-commerce properties 
for more than 20 brands. The Partner Division Director noticed that he did not understand 
“exactly what do the 23 e-commerce persons from the brand do on the other side?” The 
executive noted that the majority of fashion partners which had appointed internal digital 
managers showed only normative support of the Internet idea. When senior partner managers in 
the Partner Division presented data to newly hired e-commerce managers in fashion brands 
showing problems with conversion or traffic, these executives rarely had an enthusiastic 
response assigning or coming up with a course of action to remedy these problems. 
The executives at headquarters understood that their preference for partners with little or no 
knowledge of e-commerce and online marketing may have backfired and their ideal partners 
had to be at least conversant with these approaches. The latter case was difficult to come by in 
inexperienced fashion brands whose executives had just barely accepted an outsider to show 
them how to run their business. In 2010and 2011, fashion brand executives still tended to 
appoint people from the retail side of the company, thinking that they would have no problem 
running an Internet business. The situation was not ideal for DigiVog’s Partner Division, 
because a brand representative from brick retail would seldom have ideas aligned with digital 
marketing and e-commerce. As DigiVog executives discussed the problem of commercial 
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online performance, consensus emerged at headquarters that “in the ideal case, this person … 
knows the right people to talk to about marketing budget and merchandising products. They 
have understanding of the product and the marketing side and are internally well-connected.” 
In May 2010, group executives began discussing the possibility of offering partner brands 
an increasingly specialized and tailored menu of options for managing the online channel. 
Along with the work on SEM, the Partner Division managers began considering new elements 
in the marketing mix with brands that were already experimented with at the Group’s two other 
brands, DigiVog.com and Digi1.com. These new activities were related to promoting affiliate 
programs to fashion partners, web campaign development, and more creative involvement in 
curation services with publishers, editorials and banners.  
Another discussion emerged around probing limited social media outreach for Partner 
brands.  The CCO recalled discussing with DigiVog’s founder ways in which to point to their 
partner brands the need for integrated managing of social media channels, such as Facebook, 
and offer social media advice in future agreements. “I didn't want to discard Facebook entirely 
in terms of things we want to cover”, said the CCO, “because in time we may offer the 
possibility for brands to have a shopping page directly on Facebook.”  
In proposing new sources of cultural value to their partner brands, DigiVog executives were 
drawing from their own experiences with integrating campaigns involving different creative 
assets for their two main brands, DigiVog.com and Digi1.com. When Partner Manager 
Executives proposed to link the shopping page of a high-fashion brand to DigiVog’s own 
Facebook page in 2010, they thought deeply about the brand-related consequences this decision 
would have for the client. The idea was to see whether fans of the brand that were fans of 
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DigiVog on Facebook would be inspired to visit the brand’s page by clicking on the link from 
Facebook, and if this kind of “curiosity” brand traffic would result in a purchase.  
Partner Division Executives argued for more vigorous, on-the-go advising with partner 
brands. They wanted the speed of action required from their counterpart e-commerce managers 
on the other side to influence them in changing the setup of their organizational structures to 
more culturally sensitive to the Internet. The Partner Division Director became certain that 
advising brands on SEM would not be culturally appropriate anymore, because DigiVog Group 
had developed considerable contextual knowledge in more qualitatively-driven aspects of 
digital operations, such as marketing and branding.  
“They need to establish a seamless online reporting structure”, said the Director. “This 
reporting structure should have an online PR team; a person from their PR department. It could 
be 2 people – for Facebook and twitter. And at the same time someone in charge of the dialogue 
with bloggers”.  
The problem with the idea of offering even more value-added activities to nurture creative 
expression with brands was twofold. First, fledgling brand managers would be overwhelmed by 
the changes. Second, the Partner Division was built in mind with a limited digital marketing 
competence. The Partner Division Director and the Director of Global Marketing discussed the 
options for replicating digital marketing functions already supported on Group marketing level 
and transfer them to Partner Division.  
No other “2.0” technology company on the Internet in the emerging cultural field of fashion 
had ever attempted to develop turnkey solution based on its own experience and offer it to 
social entities that were intrinsically indifferent or scared of adopting a cultural identity that 
divorced them from their place of brick-and-mortar comfort. The Partner Division was about to 
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decide to offer fashion brands two ways to manage their cultural identity online - in online 
marketing and in e-commerce.  
Given the lack of knowledge or desire for understanding on the part of fashion brand 
appointees about running digital marketing campaigns, DigiVog executives decided to replicate 
at the Partner Division level digital marketing functions related to producing editorial content, 
electronic newsletters, and social media campaigns, instead of automatic transferring of future 
task requests to the global marketing department at DigiVog. “The Partner Division is 
becoming its own company”, a senior executive said.  
DigiVog had launched Partner Division in mind with transferring to European and US-born 
fashion brands the ability and the knowledge to create and run “big, virtual, and imaginary” new 
messages online. The renegotiation of the cultural mediating role of DigiVog now took a step 
into the direction of a two year reorganization of the Marketing Department on a group level 
which eventually spun out in two experimental teams working seamlessly to contextualize the 
marketing expertise of the company to fashion brands.  
7.5 The Emergence of the Editorial Role in DigiVog: Special Brand Agency (SBA) 
In mid-2010, the complex organizational structure of DigiVog Group expanded with the 
addition of “Special Brand Agency” (SBA). SBA (Figure 12) was constructed as an 
independent unit in the direct purview of the Global Director of Marketing and was first located 
under Group Marketing. In order to expedite the testing of new ideas, SBA built on the 
contextual competence of functional expertise in the firm. SBA had six distinct areas of 
competence. All six areas were new to the area of collaboration with fashion brands. These 
competencies extended beyond search engine optimization (SEO) and search engine marketing 




Figure 12 Special Brand Agency 
(Source: Internal documents; approximation.) 
For the first time in the existence of the new cultural field, an online fashion retailer was 
offering its partner brands, for which it also happened to produce and run e-commerce business, 
an added area of responsibility related to creating, running, and managing social media 
editorials, style editorials, and fashion editorials. The main proponent for extending the 
competence of DigiVog group to the publishing industry was the CEO of DigiVog USA. He 
indicated that DigiVog would be launching SBA as a new mechanism for editorial mediation 
for fashion firms in the digital space of fashion. He considered that the long-held practice of 
buying print advertising with traditional publications served to fashion brands as a form of 
cultural support. This form of cultural mediation was, in his mind, dated, expensive, 
impractical, and would lead to no measurable results with the advent of Internet technologies. 
 “The reason why we do marketing this way is because it is more cost-effective than 
traditional marketing methods. First, the conversion rate (CR) we get from a website form of 
marketing is much better. It is one thing to be on a website, where the product is really relevant 
to this channel. Strategic branding has become a much more relevant form of marketing, rather 
than putting a banner on some random website.” 
The experimental unit had three employees in 2010 and its success depended on the ability 
of its executives to find special projects for fashion brands. Editors in the SBA unit covered 
fashion, style editing, and social media. The CEO of the US office explained the role of the 


















area of expertise; a fusion of “…more than a copyrighter and more than a stylist, but kind of 
these both things at the same time. She is a really fashion person who knows how to write.”  
Editorial content coordinators also specialized in producing conceptual specials on trends. 
Content coordinators and the fashion editor were frequently contracted out internally by the 
Commercial Department to do trend research. The content coordinator was in addition 
responsible for producing content related to special projects exclusively for the online blog on 
DigiVog.com. The Special Projects Coordinator rounded the small group. He came up with 
ideas for developing relationships with fashion brands for projects involving exclusive 
production of merchandise items for DigiVog.com, capsule, and vintage collections.  
One of the “special” creative projects that led to the formation of SBA was with a new 
fashion label, born in Manhattan’s fashion district in 2010. The project emerged as an 
experiment for conceiving of new sources of brand value on the Internet and was realized on an 
impromptu basis; because the CEO of the US office was fan of the designs himself. 
Negotiations with the brand started when the CEO’s own professional interest sparked after 
observing the runway show of the brand in 2010. “They're fairly unknown”, he said of the 
opportunity, 
“and they wanted to grow their business and become more internationally well-known. 
What can they do? They are a company that makes $5 million a year. They were tiny company 
and they could never take hundred thousand dollars and spend it on a page in Vogue, which is 
basically what a page in Vogue costs. What they can do is for $25,000 in this case, sell their 
product on DigiVog and use its global customer base. In this case, we did them a favor, because 
I kind of like them. Honestly. So, they gave us $25,000 and we bought product worth $25,000. 
So, they gave us the product and we gave them the exposure.”  
With this first special project of the new SBA unit, DigiVog Group developed an array of 
dedicated value-added options that later expanded with the addition of other partner brands. The 
young label received an editorial mention in the online blog on DigiVog.com and the creative 
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photography for all product merchandise online was paid by DigiVog Group. The collaboration 
included a dedicated interview that was accessible on the front page of DigiVog.com and led to 
the mini-page of the brand. The brand’s merchandise could be purchased on a dedicated mini-
shoplet designed temporarily and exclusively for the brand by the Partner Division.  
When coming up with plans for creating special projects with particular brands SBA’s first 
decision had to be that the fashion brand had a cultural identity that was “relevant” to the 
cultural identity of DigiVog Group. This decision was tendentiously the decision of the Head of 
the SBA. These first negotiations also established the critical mediating role of DigiVog as a 
source of brand value for fashion brands. The SBA team was aware that brands promoted with a 
mini-shoplet on DigiVog.com were exposed to more visibility than would have otherwise been 
possible had they approached digital communications independently.  
“They would not even know who to contact in the first place”, said plainly the US CEO. 
”And, if they knew, they would not get the same rates or the same added value.” As a show of 
success of this practice in the process of deepening collaborative relationships with fashion 
brands, in 2011, SBA started to privately advise young and older fashion partners on how to 
spend their entire budget earmarked for online marketing with the help of DigiVog Group. 
Special Projects were, shortly, brewed as a potent channel that DigiVog Group could use to 
communicate its fashion authority in the new cultural space and offline.  
Another example that corroborates to these developments was a special project between the 
US office and a contemporary US fashion designer. The origins of this collaboration were 
similarly conceived as a local experiment by the US CEO and the Director of US Marketing, 
who both happened to be fervent buyers of the brand. The designer himself was considered to 
be “part of the family” in the US office. Collaboration with the label started already in 2004, 
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when he designed a special jewelry collection for DigiVog.com The collection was well 
received and the most expensive piece of jewelry sold for $6,000. The relationship with the 
designer was considered “special” also because one of the former PR Directors at DigiVog 
group became PR Director for the designer in mid-2003. The new collection was an exciting 
undertaking also because the idea for the jewelry theme emerged after an informal chat between 
executives and the US office and the designer himself.  
This collaborative deal included a number of feature elements. The exclusive collection by 
the designer featured t-shirts that were considered by the US executives to be “basic”, but the 
underlying message of the campaign was crafted as a statement against consumerism; 
representing what the designer considered to be his own fight for a balanced “Social Media and 
Social Network” era. The designer was responsible only for the feature logo design of the 
project. The production of limited edition T-shirts took place in Italy and was contracted out by 
DigiVog. The designer also requested that his socialite friends model for the outfits that were 
going to be put on the promo webpage.  
The testing of new practices for these new kinds of special projects was an exciting new 
project for the company. The process involved a constant back and forth between a designer and 
the Marketing Director and the CEO of the US office. The Marketing Director kept a log of 
creative marketing solutions proposed to the fashion brand during negotiations. From this log 
later emerged the ongoing practice in the Marketing Department in the US office to obsessively 
document their trial and error campaigns with fashion brands. This was also one of the first 
projects that involved cross-fertilization of marketing practice between the online and the brick 
channel and as a consequence, recalled the CEO of the US office,  
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“there were a few things that did not quite work well. First, was a logistical issue related to 
lead production times. The samples did not come on time; in fact, only 10-15 samples made it to 
his friends. The second, is a technological preference that we had with regard to the Facebook 
application that to be developed to link to the collection. [We] proposed to make the product 
such that it becomes a virtual wearable product. However, the designer did not like this idea. 
This was too bad, because the technological solution was cool.” 
The experiment with the jewelry designer, for example, envisaged many details that the US 
CEO considered to be new and “cool”. The project ran as an independent shoplet accessible via 
the front page of DigiVog.com. The mini-shop was accessible to registered users of 
DigiVog.com for six months. The front page banner that heralded the arrival of the campaign 
was going to run for a month. The brick and mortar part of the event stipulated that on February 
10, 2011, the designer would introduce the special collection by holding an event on which a 
comprehensive list of designers, models, socialites, and editors of publications were invited. The 
day was picked to coincide with the first day of Fashion Week NYC. DigiVog’s US office paid 
for the event and collaborated with a local PR agency for party invitations to be sent out.  
Publicity costs for the brick-and-mortar event as well as the online organization of the event, 
the mini-website design, the upload of merchandise, and the newsletter were also covered by 
DigiVog’s US office. The risk undertaken with the creation of this event was many times higher 
than the actual financial costs for both brick, and online presentation. The CEO of the US office 
made a point about this dimension of collaboration, “$50,000 is the cost of half a page in Vogue, 
as a point of comparison.” As with most special projects between DigiVog and fashion brands, 
the relationship was based on a revenue share.  
This event was designed to be a high risk event, in spite of the fact that the fashion designer 
in question was personally acquainted with executives in the US office. The CEO of the US 
office was concerned that other parties will want to invite a very similar sample of participants 
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for day one of Spring/Summer Fashion Week 2011 and, as a consequence, not all socialite 
participants or editors would show up.  
DigiVog’s US executives were confident in their ability to achieve one overarching goal: 
widening the coverage in the local press about the capabilities of DigiVog US in designing 
special projects for fashion brands. Coverage from personal style bloggers and online fashion 
publications was the principal avenue for extending the visibility of the DigiVog brand. In 
retrospect, by covering creative costs for the events, the US office was paying a ‘cultural 
difference premium’ that served, as the CEO of the US office explained, as “first steps into the 
direction of strategic branding with fashion labels and nice side project[s] that keep people 
interested and add color to [DigiVog].”  
7.6 Here comes a new marketing platform: Digi1.com  
The successful development of relationships between SBA and young brands convinced US 
marketing executives to push headquarters to put a “face” to a new capability in the company 
focused on emerging fashion brands. The result was the founding of a dedicated cultural 
platform for collaborating with young brands, Digi1.com. Digi1.com was founded in November 
2009 as a full-price pure play fashion retailer.  
The development of this capability suggests a glimpse into the progression in the evolution of 
DigiVog as a technology-fashion company. Culturally and operationally, the new brand 
Digi1.com relied on global merchandising, buying, marketing, and technology teams at DigiVog 
Group. Whereas DigiVog.com was established in 2000 as a multi-brand discounted fashion 
retailer, Digi1.com was a full-price fashion retailer that picked up only highly curated product 
from emerging designers and served as a launchpad awareness and brand platform for the 
opening up of these designers’ future e-commerce businesses. 
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The Director of Digi1.com described the new company in 2010 as DigiVog.com’s “child”. 
A defining characteristic of Digi1.com is the focus of the executives in this start-up on close 
cooperation with the brand in producing content. Content, such as video, photographs, and even 
interviews with brand designers and owners were always co-produced with brands. The 
production and placement of publishing content online was conceived as an added dimension in 
DigiVog’s cultural toolset that reflected the growing importance of editorial production as a 
source of new brand value online. The Director of Dig1.com explained how she sees the role of 
Digi1.com as a marketing springboard platform for young and emerging brands: 
“Let's say that DigiVog.com is the place of huge variety of a lot of merchandise that is not in 
the stores at the moment. So, let's say, vintage selection or end-of-season.  Digi1.com is in 
competition with all the boutiques out there that may have certain items from the selection. Here 
we compete on customized content. We give every brand featured on Digi1.com an opportunity 
to transmit the value of the brand through the content that is built in. In other words, use the 
Internet to transmit the value of the brand. We also offer an integrated approach in which we 
have a section for video, etc. and use the internet technologies to build the brand.” 
Digi1.com started out, per one executive, as an “experiment in the making”. The company 
was started only after DigiVog’s executives in the US, the company’s innovation hub, gained 
more expertise with in-house marketing and branding by running campaigns for DigiVog.com. 
Digi1.com represented an evolution in business competence for DigiVog and delivers on two 
major goals outside of DigiVog.com’s original cultural model. The first goal is to acquire brands 
for full-price distribution. To achieve this goal required a different set of buying and 
merchandise skills and attention to brand value. The second goal is to market new fashion brands 
to younger Internet-oriented audiences and achieve brand loyalty and commercial results.   
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The popular GQ Trends explained the cultural identity of Digi1.com as “a more exclusive 
enclave with niche brands and labels at the higher end of the fashion spectrum.
19” The cultural 
identity of this new launchpad for experimentation was thought out as a virtual space that 
presents “a selection of artisans and cutting edge brands for men and women with dedicated mini 
stores”. Executives at DigiVog also announced to the industry that Digi1.com “is the only place 
on the Internet where one meets craft and experimentation”.    
Digi1.com was conceptualized by marketing executives at DigiVog as an ‘incubator’ for 
brands. The incubation period is the time it takes for the merchandising and marketing team to 
assess the sales potential of young labels to have an individual e-commerce site. Digi1.com uses 
the digital branding and marketing competence of its parent, including the ability to sign deals 
with publishers and online magazines for powering community branding initiatives for 
designers. Group Marketing helps with planning and execution of both online and offline 
marketing campaigns for designers. The Marketing Department helps in carrying out special 
projects. DigiVog Group’s Press Office was contracted internally to support offline PR projects.  
As with any new venture at DigiVog, the functions that were perceived to be crucial to the 
development of a venture, such as Buying and General Merchandising, were under the direct 
purview of the change agent coming up with the idea for the venture. In this case, this role was 
carried by Digi1’s Brand Director. Serving also as one of the founders for the Group, the Brand 
Director played an important role in realizing the potential of younger brands since 2003, when 
DigiGroup acquired its very first e-commerce partner. She realized that big brands had enough 
critical volume to sustain their own e-commerce business, “but we decided at that time that there 
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was room for buying in-season merchandise from even a smaller brand and even niche brand in 
this case the brand needs to be supported in terms of creating the traffic”.  
On the Internet, Digi1.com is the first e-commerce brand platform that was created as a one-
stop-shop for a full branding and marketing service for emerging fashion designers. The launch 
of Digi1.com can be conceptualized as a cultural validation of DigiVog’s growing contextual 
expertise in digital fashion. This time the venture would have its focus on branding and 
marketing. The added capability is part enabling and part critical – Digi1.com’s buying and 
merchandising team chooses the designers it wishes to promote and delivers their individual 
brand message by using online marketing tools learned by the company over the years in 
building its own brand in the digital fashion system. 
The idea of “helping” brands continued to be an important narrative in the development of 
relationships with fashion labels. One key concept that DigiVog executives wanted to develop 
culturally with the launch of Digi1.com was “curation.” When brands were selected for online 
collaboration, their commercial and design teams were offered the opportunity to become part of 
a four-tier system of collaboration in which their branding and commercial experiences would 




Figure 13 Collaboration in beneficial practice between Digi1.com and Fashion Brands. 
The first step in the system was to develop a customized e-commerce shoplet for a brand. 
Each collaborating brand became digital “owner” of a shoplet, accessible to consumers via 
Digi1.com. The visual areas in the brand e-commerce page were created in close collaboration 
with brand executives. Consumers could peruse digital lookbooks and campaign images 
developed by Digi1’s marketing team. DigiVog Group selected and acquired the product 
inventory from the brand’s seasonal collection. The brand was guaranteed by contract to receive 
coverage of what executives at DigiVog referred to as “complete and representative” product 
range of the brand with the idea to elicit commercial and a brand awareness appeal.  
An important aspect of the commercial relationship at this stage was that the ownership of 
the merchandise was retained by the brand, but the selection of merchandise was decided on, or 
“curated”, by DigiVog’s merchandising. The aspect of “helping” the brand out came into view 
when the buying team decided to purchase merchandise from smaller brands upfront, because 
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they were, as the Brand Director put it, “cash hungry”. When acquiring young brands, it was 
important to know the vulnerability of the fashion system in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in 2009 and be able to offer “help”. In negotiations with young fashion labels, Digi1’s Brand 
Director frequently substantiated her analysis of the fashion industry by narrating her knowledge 
that 
“small brands have a problem which is compounded in economic crises, as retailers try to 
reduce the inventory from less known brands. Internet is a way to remain in the distribution. 
…When we find a new brand, we try to read if there is the right commercial value. 1) The right 
price range, 2) content in terms of wearability, 3) interest from press; the brand needs to be a 
press darling”.  
As a matter of proposition, the third tier of collaboration guaranteed to young brands that 
Digi1.com would include only of a limited number of high-end brands sharing similar cultural 
and marketing positioning. Part of selection process was for brands to present data showing that 
they had invested in “innovative or artisanal” production and had limited brick-and-mortar and 
online distribution. The perspective of the Brand Director was that instead of supporting a wide 
selection, as DigiVog.com or Net-a-Porter.com would, Dig1 featured a deeper selection from 
each of the brands, in a boutique-like fashion.  
Selection of merchandise was frequently done spontaneously by the small team of 10 buyers 
located in local offices in Spain, France, Japan, and the US. Editorial staff in DigiVog US, for 
example, would read a fashion magazine and find a new brand, whose look they found fresh and 
suggested to Digi1 buyers. When the Digi1’s Brand Director herself attended fashion shows, she 
was sometimes taken with certain new trends and brands; “we are very open to include new 
brands in DigiVog.com”, she explained, “because variety is our value”.  
This marketing model made it a prerequisite for selected brands to have very limited 
distribution online. If the brand was “hip, high-fashion and new”, but already was featured 
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profusely on other fashion retailers, it was difficult for commercial executives at the brand to 
prove their point of being selected to Digi1’s executives. “We are very interested in Alexander 
Wang for example”, said the Director of Digi1.com.”But, he is well spread online right now, 
which makes it more complicated to put it on Digi1.com, let's put it this way”. These tactics of 
selection and cultural positioning in the space made it possible for DigiVog to gain exclusive 
online distribution of the brand and be able to regulate and control the marketing message. 
The fourth tier in this social-marketing partnership specified the “communications” 
dimension of the collaboration. The experience gained by DigiVog Group with developing 
special projects with brands, as part of SBA unit mission, permitted Digi1 to offer many options 
for designing brand specific web marketing campaigns. The campaigns would not only run on 
Digi1.com’s “Magazine X” blog, but would be distributed through multi-partner strategic 
campaigns between DigiVog and publishers in the online ecology.  
Online marketing initiatives in Digi1’s portfolio were, as per the Brand Director, “A mix of 
everything”. DigiVog Group had grown to routinize certain baseline tasks that were necessary 
for increasing traffic to the new retailer property. “Newslettering” was one initiative most 
faithfully embraced by the Group in keeping regular contact with customers. This type of online 
communications was produced together with the brand. Digi1’s team imparted to young brands 
that when designing online communications it was necessary to mix content and commercial 
proposal in customer newsletters.  
One example is the process in which Digi1’s buyers selected runway snapshots from 
Undercover, a young high-fashion brand. Digi1’s Director explained the importance of this 
cultural tactic for the marketing message imparted by the brand: “We organized the video from 
the catwalk online. Next year, we plan the same for Jil Sander for women and Aider Ackerman 
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for men. This is a mix between product and content. Both journalists and customers find content 
for their use at these projects.”  
Alexander Wang eventually joined the other young brands with own e-commerce shop on 
Digi1.com. Digi1’s marketing team featured a similar video adaptation of the runway for the 
brand in February 2012 (Figure 14). For customers this time, however, the option had expanded 
to “reserving” products from the collection on their wishlists. 
 
Figure 14 Alexander Wang- Digital Branding on Digi1.com 
The Director of Digi1 considered that the customer base of the new retailer was a more 
specialized offshoot of DigiVog.com. It was inevitable; to gain validity in the online 
marketplace of fashion, the new fashion brand had to advertise DigiVog.com’s cultural heritage 
in the background. “From our customer perspective”, she pointed out, “we know that the value 
that the final customer sees in [our first brand] DigiVog.com is the variety of brands – from very 
 198 
 
large to very niche brands. It's a kind of a 'bible' of so many brands and we know that our 
customers recognize us for this.” 
At the same time, Digi1.com was different from the Group’s first retailer online in that its 
executives started extensive professional relationships with industry leaders in the brick-and-
mortar space, such as the Italian Alta Roma and the British Council. These collaborations 





Chapter 8: Collaboration and Experiment: two sides of Innovative Intermediation 
8.1 The Shift to Marketing by Participation 
“Marketing as a whole is more of an art than a science. Logos for example are art, they're 
not a science. The Apple logo is art. There is no formula that says that a logo should feature 
fruits, because then a company would be successful.” 
CEO, DigiVog, US Office. 
By 2010, the digital ecology of fashion had changed profoundly. New start-ups were created 
with the ability not only to sell fashion products, but also to aggregate merchandise from other 
online fashion-technology firms and to curate looks editorially by collaborating with fashion-
technology merchants. These newly founded firms became known as social-commerce 
publishers. They had developed a set of tailored cultural services able to integrate the fashion 
product of players, such as DigiVog with their own editorial content and package it into digital 
marketing campaigns. 
Publishers in the digital space of fashion can be distilled in two categories – brick-and-mortar 
magazines that have migrated online by founding digital divisions (Vogue.com, Elle.com, 
MarieClaire.com, or InStyle.com) and pure play publishers, born online. Pure play publishers are 
also of two types. The first one is represented by independently held online forums that create 
and develop purely editorial content around fashion. Online magazines, such as Refinery29.com 
or Nylon.com, are examples this category of online-born publishers. 
The second kind of pure play publishers are firms such as DesignerApparel.com, 
ShopStyle.com, Polyvore.com, and the now-defunct SocialCom.com, founded by Google. They 
combine two functions. The first is to provide a focused search around a fashion category, brand, 
or style. The second role is to independently curate fashion product picked by their own fashion 
editors - a function that was recently started out in social commerce firms.  
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Culturally, the role of social-commercial publishing on the Internet has evolved from the 
cultural roots of price-comparison engine (PCEs) business models. In late 1990s, PCEs were the 
places where shoppers went to learn about the options of finding products as diverse as 
fragrance, flowers, or computers searching for the lowest price on the Internet. Price-comparison 
engines crawled the Internet for relevant results presenting the searcher with a list of retailers or 
independent brands online that sold the product ranking retailers them in order of pricing.  
Because of the ambiguity of their earlier function, fashion firms have found it difficult to 
accept these players as content editors. As the CEO of a pure play fashion retailer born in 2010 
explained, fashion firms did not understand that online technology has expanded the social 
function of the Internet, opening space to   
“…move the point of purchase and align it with the point of advertizing. Before, you had 
advertizing on TV, radio, whatever, and there would be a separate place that you'd go and 
purchase the items. Online, you have a really good opportunity to align those things and have 
them in one place. Here is an editorial, advertorial and advertisement for a product and click, and 
buy it.” 
Very few fashion firms were early adopters of social-commerce. One of them, Marketing 
Director for a large European-born fashion brand, considered that the pairing of content and 
product would be an important cultural tool for fashion brands in the future and would change 
the way a fashion brand perceived the sources of its own brand value.  
“[It is] valuable to communicate with people through content; building community thru the 
content. There is a lot of value of driving this activity off-site (meaning where the community is) 
and drive them to the website, as opposed to try to make everybody to come to an e-commerce 
site to partake. So we try to get people from Facebook or twitter or ShopStyle where they already 
are, to come to our website.”  
In their current business model interpretation, social-commerce startups in fashion combine 
the business model of price-comparison engines with a proprietary search algorithm that filters 
the latest “hip” styles in fashion and visualizes the results by “marrying” a fashion product with 
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editorial content (F. show visual). Social-commerce publishers have not only expanded the 
search logic behind their search algorithm that is the main source of their commercial revenue, 
but have also developed new collaborative practices with pure play fashion retailers.  
Asked about his interpretation of the cultural identity of the model, the founder of the world’s 
largest social commerce firm, ShopStyle.com, explained that “ShopStyle is a fashion search 
engine. We are the largest fashion search engine globally: US, UK, Germany, and France; we 
recently launched in Japan. We have about 7 million monthly unique users and we actually drive 
traffic to retailers and brands. The transaction itself happens on the retailer site. Think of it as 
Google for fashion”. Social-commerce publishers, as ShopStyle prefer to focus on the search-
related aspect of their cultural identity. 
ShopStyle alone drives $300 million a year to its pure play fashion-technology partners by 
generating web traffic for them through search. Social commerce players ignite large audiences 
that visit their content related pages, as look books, trend reports, blogs, and Facebook fan pages. 
The community participates in reading about and sharing the content created by the online 
editors of the firm and by individual consumers. ShopStyle consistently ranks as the second and 
third largest source of traffic for its retail partners. During its lifetime, starting in 2004, 
ShopStyle has established long-term relationships with pure play fashion brands, brick-and-
mortar department stores with digital divisions, and even with established fashion brands.  
ShopStyle is the first social commerce player that introduced social community as part of its 
business model by linking users, pure play retailers and fashion brands in a curated ecology 
where users can create community looks, as well as participate in brand contests. “I think we 
were pretty early in the social media space”, says the founder, “when we launched in 2004, we 
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came in together with both social commerce and search. [We] are a content and commerce 
company. The goal is to curate content such that it is more findable.” 
There are also examples of social commerce firms that prefer to focus on the social 
component of their business model. Polyvore is a community-centered social commerce website 
that empowers users to build “sets” by pairing brands they like into outfits and aggregating 
similar sets into style galleries. Users discover styles and brands by tapping into Polyvore’s 
extensive product range acquired by the firm by signing datafeed agreements with online 
merchants. In addition to this “pure” affiliation identity, Polyvore’s executive team developed a 
brand-centered collaborative program, called “contest” campaign. Pure-play merchants and 
fashion brands pay to Polyvore a pre-negotiated lump sum for the design and delivery of a 
tailored brand awareness campaign.  
The typical source of revenue for social commerce firms is to sign commission-based 
agreements with pure play fashion retailers. These agreements stipulate that a social commerce 
publisher can “pull” the full catalog feed from a retailer’s website (called a datafeed) and rank 
and display the product in search results for a commission. When users search for a product or 
brand on ShopStyle.com, the results are displayed in a vertical line, consisting of product 
description, brand name, price, and name of the pure play retailer that carries the desired product 
and brand.  
The commission rate is negotiated as a share of the monthly sales generated in the process of 
referring potential browsers/clients to a specific retailer. Because the revenue received by the 
publisher partially determines the ranking of a product of an online retailer, social publishers are 
incentivized to perform commercially.  The embeddedness of social publishers in the ecology in 
digital fashion sometimes allows particularly important partners, such as DigiVog, to be able to 
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call up their account executive and incentivize them to agree to “bump up” -as one social 
executive put it- the results in exchange for increasing the commission on a brand or product.  
The social embeddedness in this example is important because consumers often choose to 
click on the top results displayed in the product gallery which forwards the consumer to the 
online fashion retailer that appears in search results. Social commerce firms differ from their 
price comparison predecessors, because they choose to display their preferred places to shop, 
based on the depth of their collaboration with online fashion-technology retailers. Price is no 
longer the selective filer in generating results. The algorithm designed by social commerce 
engineers also takes other selective variables into consideration, such as relevance of the brand, 
style, or product, and name of brand and the retailer. This new selective role of online publishers 
makes them an important link in the collaborative chain of the ecology of digital fashion.  
The continuing importance of social publishers as curators of fashion search, led to the 
introduction of new revenue streams by some of the key firms in the ecology. The online 
editorial team at ShopStyle, for example, expanded investment in producing magazine-like 
content by starting the “Style Guide” issue that goes live twice a season and frequently has bonus 
material with fashion product for curated galleries, such as “Holiday Trends”, “NYFW Trends,” 
and “Back to School Trends”.  
In 2010, the social startup Polyvore introduced marketing campaigns that combine search 
with community shopping. A version of this online community was later emulated by ShopStyle 
which titled its user-operated community page “Looks,” where users would cherry-pick products 
and brands from online fashion retailers with which the company collaborates. Polyvore’s 
original idea explored the identical idea of creating a space where users could search and pull up 
fashion styles they liked from retailers with commission agreements in place (Figure 15). While 
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commercial search traditionally is motivated by revenue, this new type of social search was 
more likely to lead to designing new sources for value creation to brands and online fashion 
retailers that agreed their product to be available for user sets. The sets can be perused by other 
users, who could emulate them or purchase them.  
 
Figure 15 Polyvore – the integration of community shopping and search. 
8.2 Transfer of new culture to fashion brands 2.0: Pure Partner Unit 
The emergence of social commerce publishers motivated DigiVog Group to create the 
newest externalization in its competence with regard to fashion brands. Pure Partner unit was 
created in 2010 with the goal of affecting the cultural architectures of established brands. 
DigiVog Group wanted to leverage new types of value-added partnerships that were in the 
making at the time with social publishers. The scope of these activities ranged from simple 
advertising deals with publishers that could be handled in bulk, such as pricing on banner space, 
to running the online marketing and brand-related campaigns of fashion brands, alongside 
running their digital commerce operations.  
The soft launch of Pure Partner team was scheduled for May 2010 and after two months 
during which executives probed new areas of consulting for their fashion clients, such as 
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affiliate and community branding, the Group Marketing Director decided to house the team 
permanently under the Partner Division. The process for this latest involvement with changing 
the culture of established brands was gradual. The CEO of the US office explained that 
“because most of the brands are still “children” Pure Partner is starting out slowly”. The partner 
brands did not have fully developed digital teams and DigiVog’s business development and 
online marketing team had to persuade each e-commerce partner of the usefulness of adding 
more digital activities on top of the contractually covered SEO and SEM. 
 
 
Figure 16 Partner Division with Pure Partner team included. 
 
Source: Internal documents. Legend: */**: Internal agent and Special Projects and Editorial Content 
were transplanted from Group Marketing. 
The Director of Partner Division identified the role of Pure Partner team as a “one-stop-shop 
for everything digital” for fashion brands. This new founded creative function considerably 
differs from the slogan by Bluefly in 1996, per which the then-pioneering firm was to become 
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new teams, such as Internal Agent and Special Projects and Editorial Content, were replicated 
into Pure Partner from Group Marketing (Figure 16). The role of executives in these two teams 
was crucial. They had to negotiate and start partnerships with a large number of cherry-picked 
online publishers, because individual fashion brands needed far greater presence in online 
media and editorial space of publishers such as InStyle.com and WWD.com than they had ever 
planned for. The head of Pure Partner team was also going to assume responsibility for media 
buys in the traditional sense of online advertising for banner space.  
The core message imparted by Pure Partner team to fashion brands was to curb their use of a 
proliferating number of digital agencies and the Director of the Partner Division noted in 
negotiations the importance for developing a cultural perspective to the online channel that was 
identical for the both types of partner: 
“Fundamentally, your digital strategy should not be … one agency doing affiliate, another 
doing SEM, and another doing social, YouTube videos.... it's a mess. Rather than that, it would 
be appropriate to say, OK, on the 17th of Sept, we will be launching the new collection. What 
can we do with that? OK, social, affiliate, SEM, YouTube, twitter. For social we can say, OK, 
on Facebook we have more fans than in our online store and perhaps we can leverage that to 
even try to drive traffic to our site. Let's first talk about this event on Facebook, an hour later, 
let's tweet about it, and 3hrs later, let's send an email to the registered users of the e-site, 
because the hope is that as the time passes between the one channel and the other, people would 
have generated traffic to our site and registered themselves to receive email. Ideally, we need a 
360 degree servicing and view. This is what Pure Partner team wants to do.” 
For a larger part of 2010 and 2011, Pure Partner became an ideational exercise. High-
fashion brand partners had multiple agencies in charge of their social media activities and their 
brick-and-mortar PR teams had accustomed to treat Facebook as their personal press release 
platform. Involvement with fashion partners about new types of social and commercial 
marketing, as per the Manager of DigiVog’s Web Marketing and CRM team, was harder to 
accomplish, because:  
 207 
 
“…social has gotten completely out of our control and is handled by the brands' Press. In an 
ideal world, there needs to be 360 degrees approach. There may be a fashion company that 
actually does a 360 strategic plan, if it internalizes the whole process of organizing SEM, web 
marketing and social media together. But, there is no way for these firms to get a foothold in the 
digital branding domain independently as the major retailers [e.g., Neiman Marcus].” 
In creating and developing this new area of expertise, DigiVog relied on two approaches. 
Both delved into collaboration and trust. The first approach was to develop and put in place 
mutual collaboration agreements with social-commerce publishers that offered those partners 
the ability to retain high-fashion brands and curate editorials for them. The second goal was to 
approach fashion brands by the tried and tested method of leveraging on existing trust and e-
commerce partnerships with them. The US CEO explained the approach: 
“We would rather leverage on these existing competencies across the organization, rather 
than take the web marketing and CRM and rip it apart. We use the negotiating power of 
DigiVog Group in order to obtain lucrative or better placements with magazines or online 
publishers for advertising at prices that are a lot better for fashion brands. Due to the leveraging 
power of DigiVog, the brand will be better off, instead of trying to negotiate this price by 
themselves.”  
In time, DigiVog’s Partner Division manager hoped to lift the climate of digital distrust by 
showing fashion executives how successful co-branding projects have been for the company’s 
two pure brands. 
8.3 DigiVog: A multiple insider.  
Collaboration between DigiVog and social-commerce publishers came naturally to DigiVog 
executives. DigiGroup is among the first fashion-technology firms that fired up collaborative 
agreements with social commerce firms. The idea to work with LinkShare, ShopStyle, Polyvore, 
and other magazines and blogs originates in the contextual awareness of DigiGroup’s founders 
that a culturally significant “niche” had to be constructed for fashion online. The goals of 
collaboration were to carve out this new cultural space by using the overlapping competencies 
that were explicitly created in both kinds of start-ups.  
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When social commerce publishers arrived, DigiVog executives were prescient to argue that 
the boundaries between publisher and retailer and between editorial and commercial roles will 
soon be blurred on the Internet. “We do see that when it comes to retailers”, offered ShopStyle’s 
CEO,” some of them are very good editorially and in terms of the content they provide. Net-a-
Porter, one of their core principles is to unite the two functions of magazine and shopping. You 
see high conversions from retailers doing just that”.  
The emergence of these new partners offered the US office as a cultural innovation hub to 
minimize the ambiguity from having to approach fashion brands for turn-key solutions on its 
own. The US Marketing Director noted how product alone, the specialization of fashion retailers, 
could not create social value for brands online because,  
“In the end of the day, a brand needs to give a little bit more than just its product […].  
Content becomes essential because the only way for us to reinstate or reinforce the idea of the 
brand to your fan or to your audience - whether it is a video, whether it's behind the scenes, 
whether it's interview – you are constantly reinstating, you're constantly telling a story, you're 
constantly branding. How much content is needed? It depends on the brand. If it is a (pure play) 
multi-brand, it will primarily rely on the kind of story you want to tell about yourself.” 
For DigiVog, the decision to collaborate with social commercial publishers was an 
opportunity to expose their fashion clients to a novel approach to advertising and marketing. This 
opportunity was layered with a substantial rejection risk. DigiVog’s Marketing Director noted 
the unwillingness of fashion brands to engage with new types of publisher mediators. 
“Fashion brands are not exposed to this form of collaboration because they hate publishers. 
As a partner, my perception is that some of our brands are forward thinking and they are not 
afraid to take radical steps... brands like this, which have this built into their culture, it would be 
very easy to work with them and for them to be receptive to these ideas.”  
To confront this problem of trust, the Marketing Director in the US office requested that the 
company’s main mediator for establishing collaborative relationships, LinkShare, should include 
a new column in its monthly specifications of affiliates for DigiGroup. This dimension would 
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involve selecting affiliate partners that were cleared as “appropriate” for high-fashion brands. 
Executives from both partner firms deliberated that the status of “brand-appropriate” would 
mean that an affiliate should not only generate sales, but is also proficient in writing fashion 
editorials and product related content. For LinkShare, this unusual request meant to start 
introducing more qualitative editorial outlets, such as blogs, forums, and social networks. 
Before marketing executives at DigiGroup embarked on a collaborative experiment or 
included a publisher into their affiliate network, they directed an informal discussion with the 
publisher “cleared” by LinkShare to incite the other side to disclose data on key aspects of their 
cultural business model. This discussion was centered on five orientation questions (Table 5): 
Social Commercial 
1. Why did you start the business and 
what do you expect to achieve from it? 
2. What makes you and your model 
profitable and unique – technology, 
community features? 
3. Why would consumers visit your page 
and not any other publisher’s? 
4. What is your revenue model and  
4.1.  What are the streams from 
which you derive most revenue? 
5. What is likely to become the most sustainable and sought after revenue model in the 
future? 
Table 5 Sensemaking in Collaboration – Orientation Matrix developed by DigiVog in collaboration decisions. 
“Only after establishing these questions can I ask more quantitative stuff such as revenue, 
unique visitors, community members, conversion rates”, remarked the US Marketing Director at 
DigiGroup. One aspect that the executive got from this conversation is to figure out the balance 
that the publisher had constructed between social and commercial goals. A prospective affiliate 
had a chance of being included as a “brand appropriate” if they had built an integrated creative 
approach to publishing that included multiple revenue streams combining advertizing with 
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production of fashion content from page banners; email banners; blog and community activity; 
technical agility, such as powering the online shopping sections of other pure publishers; and 
creation of value-added services, such as contests. 
The fashion brand that first decided on the exposure to a social publishing marketing 
strategy was DigiVog’s first e-commerce partner. With this decision by an established fashion 
partner, DigiVog was the first online fashion firm that created an exclusive private affiliation 
project via LinkShare. Part of the enticement package by DigiVog was to present the brand the 
advantages of being an insider to the online digital ecology in fashion. If the brand were to go 
through LinkShare on its own and ask for a similar service level agreement, only the account 
management fee for servicing the agreement would be in excess of $10,000. DigiGroup had 
presented the terms of its original agreement to the brand with a lower ballpark. At the same 
time, the marketing team convinced account executives at LinkShare for an integrated deal for 
three additional high-fashion clients at a similar partner-specific fee. This was the first 
partnership in which a high-fashion brand had agreed to collaborate in online marketing 
initiatives guided by online born digital experts. 
The list of affiliates for the private label program included some 50 channels. The strategy 
behind this is to diversify the exposure to risk associated with the performance of "appropriate" 
affiliates. Only around 15% of the “brand appropriate” affiliates were expected to generate sales.  
Since the partnership was focused on introducing new sources of cultural marketing value to 
fashion brands, since the practice of using affiliate networks was new to the brand, DigiGroup’s 
marketing team decided that a combination of commercial and brand awareness campaigns 
would be appropriate for this first partnership. Another important part of the acquisition pitch 
was the comparative presentation of the advantages of using the private label program for other 
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high-visibility brands, which were considered luxury in their respective segments. DigiGroup’s 
Marketing Director presented to the brand a comparative case study focusing on to three 
similarly positioned fashion brands. The executive also added 3 technology-fashion retailers as 
well as 3 high-tech companies, including Apple and Google.  In this comparative pitch, the 
change agent showed how these firms are using affiliate for sales and for brand visibility. 
With this combination of goals, DigiVog’s Marketing Director hoped to set a standard of 
experiment that would achieve a variety of goals for the client brand and expose the incumbent 
to the new culture of 'learning by playing' that underpinned the cultural business strategies for 
growth of new entrepreneurs. During the first year of the affiliate program in 2011, the 
cumulative commercial results achieved via the various placement channels exceeded a little 
over $10 million. This was a measurable success for the brand given the small size of the 
affiliate partner sample in the experiment.  
The results during this first test-drive year of the private affiliate program were 
communicated internally to the Group Manager for Pure Brand, who in turn, convinced the US-
based e-commerce manager at the brand's office in New York that the positive commercial 
results are beneficial for the brand enough to continue investing in private affiliation. Based on 
forecasting the likely commercial outcome for year 2012, the US marketing team redrafted the 
terms of the agreement with a guaranteed ROI for the brand of 3,5% and “guaranteed” sales 
contribution from affiliates of 7,5%.  
8.4 Collaborations between social commerce start-ups and technology-fashion companies  
The CEO of ShopStyle conceptualized that collaboration between social commerce firms and 
online fashion retailers was the key ingredient to discovering new sources of cultural value for 
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fashion brands. The executive noted that collaborating with peers was actually as important as 
trying to sign on individual fashion labels.  
“One of the things that we found effective is collaborating with others. Or maybe someone 
has audience that doesn't know [us] or people were using [us] do not know the partners brand 
very well. So we're doing contests and collaborations. One of the recent contest and 
collaborations we did with Diane Von Furstenberg, Tablet Hotels and [us]. So we brought these 
three groups of fans together. Let everybody sort of touch each other and bring everybody 
together”.  
This quote explains why integrating the cultural goal of two different types of organizations 
becomes more important as the cultural field evolves. For social commerce players, negotiating 
with pure play fashion brands online allows to acquire contextual knowledge about the partners 
and expand their cultural and business proposition.  
Contests are one recent example of extending the reach of online brands by tapping into the 
vast user groups on social commerce publishers, such as the 17 million unique monthly users on 
Polyvore. In July 2011, Polyvore held a campaign with Levi’s that encouraged users to create 
and publish “sets” featuring the brand’s latest design “Levi’s CurveID”. Polyvore announced the 




Figure 17  Polyvore – community branding with Levi’s and with Prabal Gurung. 
With Prabal Gurung, contemporary lifestyle brand, Polyvore designed an awareness 
campaign that included other online partners of the firm, New York Times Magazine at 
NYTimes.com/magazine, and “T” Magazine. Unlike brick-and-mortar advertizing, where 
partners turn to relations of pure display advertizing, social commerce firms partake in a new 
form of marketing by involvement with their partners.  
Polyvore’s contest page for Prabal Gurung contained an editorial with a short introduction by 
the designer via video in which Mr. Gurung walked the audience through the challenge. The 
editorial challenged Polyvore users to “play high fashion stylist and put together images below 
from both the Prabal Gurung spring/summer 2011 collection” and directed them to “Be sure to 
use the least three images from the collections featured above”. Social involvement was spurred 
by the idea that users would compete against each other’s sets to culminate with Gurung’s choice 
of two winners with a ticket to his February 2011, fashion week show.  
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Commercial partnership agreements between social commerce firms and online technology-
fashion start-ups are typically mediated by an online marketing platform that introduces one 
partner, say DigiGroup, to a large prospective pool of publishers, ranging “from well-known 
destination[s] that offer consumers a range of shopping opportunities to a blogger that’s just 
beginning to attract an audience”. LinkShare.com is one of the leading affiliate marketing 
mediators online. The firm connects publishers, as ShopStyle, with online fashion-technology 
retailers, as DigiVog.  
LinkShare is DigiGroup’s most important platform partner for affiliate marketing. DigiGroup 
is a premium account holder at LinkShare. Two account managers, one Creative Services 
specialist, an analyst, and a legal team from LinkShare handle affiliate relationships for 
DigiGroup. LinkShare picks up an account management fee for recurrent services, such as 
weekly sales analysis of marketing affiliates to DigiVog’s US marketing team.  As a premium 
account holder, DigiGroup has more than a thousand affiliate partners, from small personal style 
blogs to magazines. Each affiliate has access to banners, text links, product placements and 
promotions by DigiGroup and drives a portion of online sales for the Group. 
“In order to converse about your expertize”, explained the meaning of collaboration with 
publishers through LinkShare the US CEO, “you have to use the help of someone who has 
authority in many different fields”. For DigiGroup’s Marketing team, LinkShare facilitates the 
time to decision on commission negotiations and provides a representative sample of the 
Internet’s most commercially successful publishers. The partners can direct probing queries to 
each other for selective disclosure of tacit information related to service level agreements that 
LinkShare has with other online peers. To maximize the sharing of contextual information in the 
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space, this type of disclosure is available only to pure play peers holding a “premium account” 
status.  
Part of the recurring conversation between the two players is constructed to occasion a 
mutual importance between the two partners and communicate the key position of each in the 
ecology.  The Marketing expert in the US office would frequently reiterate to LinkShare account 
managers that “As you know, we are a luxury brand and we'd like to keep an eye on how we’re 
presented in each channel.” DigiVog’s marketing team members also like to go over DigiVog’s 
technical expertise. “We are also finalizing our promotional engine”, explains one marketing 
executive at the US office to LinkShare’s account team. “The idea of the promotional engine is 
to come up with a list of promotions that we could then tailor to each of our affiliates. For [one 
of our brands] for example, this would be a great conversation. How do we boost their ROI by 
AOV promotions, given that they are available in so many other merchants?” 
8.5 Why Experiments in Digital Fashion Work only when directed by Insiders to the cultural 
field 
The digital field of fashion is a nascent entrepreneurial community-based domain of online 
practice. Newcomers to this field are expected by the online community to understand the 
cultural meaning of the entrepreneurial practices they advance, even if these start-ups are 
launched by powerful brick intermediaries in fashion, or online pioneers, such as Google. 
Frequently, experiments started by such well-known cultural business models, fail to attract the 
interest of fashion brands and the support of insiders from the community. There is something 
special about being part of the online ecology of fashion that stirs the development of 
competence for its individual members.  
Brick-and-Mortar Media Publishers and Digital Fashion: Time Inc. and StyleFind.com 
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On a morning in December 2010, a lively discussion started between the head of 
merchandising, the director of marketing and the local CEO at DigiVog. New developments in 
which old media companies on the web purchased social and commercial start-ups had prompted 
the US executives to make sense of possible commercial and marketing related scenarios from 
these acquisitions to the online fashion ecology. On January 19th 2010, Time Inc. had announced 
that InStyle.com, one of its largest fashion publications online, had acquired StyleFeeder, a 
personal shopping engine. The media firm had disclosed that the acquisition went forward 
because the startup specialized in new developments in “pattern recognition technology” which 
improved the existing algorithms for recommendations on clothing, shoes and accessories from 
thousands of online retailers (PRNewswire, 2010). The three executives however thought that the 
main reason for acquiring StyleFeeder was to use its knowledge of e-commerce in order to 
“power shopping on InStyle.com”.  
In November 2010, using the pattern recognition technology of the acquiree, Time Inc. 
launched a social-shopping website, StyleFind.com and media channels online described this 
new property as the “first stand-alone shopping site” (Adage, 2010, 
http://adage.com/article/media/time-folding-stylefind-people-instyle-sites/231580/) launched by 
a traditional media publishing conglomerate on the Internet.  
The US executives were curious to investigate the cultural background behind the recently 
launched custom curation by StyleFind to customers in the US. The three executives compared 
how curation was executed in comparison with how online-born pioneers in the space, as 
ShopStyle, were doing it. The Marketing Director found StyleFind.com to be “overcurated”. He 




InStyle.com had been, “schooled around curation and creating awareness for the content that 
it curates”, he said, ”This is one of the basic and most fundamental functions of a publication”. 
The director of merchandising pointed out that ShopStyle and Polyvore, have a more 
“democratized” approach to featuring brands and allow retailers and consumers to 'discover' each 
other by trusting that they would deliver search results based on relevancy. The collaborative 
philosophy of publishers bred by brick media, thought the executives, was to place the brand 
choice on the online editor first and only then turn to design a search system giving some 
measure of preference to the choices of their online retail partners regarding which products and 
brands to advance in search queries. This behavior contradicted the basic cultural logic on which 
online fashion entrepreneurship was founded.  
“In terms of the overall strategy—push or pull –”, said the Marketing Director, “this is not 
our gist; nor does it work to collaborate this way”. The marketing team at DigiVog had 
painstakingly documented the reasons for collaborating with other peers online. Beginning with 
the desire to be found, the quest for partnering with other similar organizations in the emergent 
space was always focused on the desire for beneficial help. The Marketing Director recounted, 
“For multi-brand retailers … it is like a food chain. If you are searching for DigiVog, you can 
find it in two ways: one, you search for a brand; or two, you search for DigiVog. Google's 
algorithm has become more complex, with intelligent crawlers; you have relevance that comes 
into play. And, once you've seen the actual offering you have been looking for… then, the 
question of credibility and dialogue starts. So, your affiliates now have to say:  
DigiVog- your number one source for fashion! Once you come here, you get to DigiVog.com! 
…It is a continuous improvement. It is an evolution. The way Google runs and improves the 
algorithm is changing, too; they keep getting more and more advanced to avoid fraudulent 
rankings by people who mentioned us thousand times in their pages. So, as Google keeps 
evolving, even we need to keep evolving.” 
In contrast to the self-run strategies of StyleFind peers, explained the Marketing Director, 
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“ShopStyle is more social plus shopping. So, there is social, there is content, and there is 
shopping (product). The “holy trinity” of digital branding, I might add. But, if we go to 
StyleFind, it has an element of pure editorial, where fashion editors say, these are the bags of 
2011. They for example, talk about chunky platforms and then they say “shop all”, and would 
have the editors pick “all”. I remember, when StyleFind was launching, they were supposed to 
have 50% product and 50% content.” 
Social commerce pioneers were born with the idea of exploring the two dimensions of 
entrepreneurship online, creating brand and commercial value for their clients and themselves. 
Over time, this cultural goal evolved into creating product editorials for their merchant partners, 
fashion-technology retailers, in order to increase awareness and experiment with revenue gain. 
As a new member of the online ecology, StyleFind.com had to drive revenue online. “Curating 
content to the max such as presenting expensive merchandise from individual brands that 
happens to be this or that blogger’s favorite”, exclaimed the merchandising director, “is unlikely 
to drive revenue, and unless the shopping site that is supposed to sell this curated content also 
happens to be a well-known brand”.  
 The clients of the new player were traditional brick-and-mortar retailers, such as Nordstrom, 
Saks Fifth Avenue, TopShop and Kmart. At their brainstorming session in December, the 
marketing executives at DigiVog predicted that without openness to collaboration with the 
members of the digital domain, StyleFind would fail to attract unique monthly traffic to its 150 
merchant partners.  
The collective prediction was confirmed. In the remaining year before Time Inc. folded 
StyleFind’s operations, most of the traffic to StyleFind.com originated from fashion readers of 
InStyle.com and People.com, the two largest Time Inc. publications online. The curator site 
attracted 722,000 unique visitors in December 2010 and a slightly smaller unique population of 
498,000 in September 2011. These numbers were but a modest representation of InStyle’s visitor 
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traffic, which for only November 2011 had registered 1.4 million visitors (ComScore.com, 2011; 
Adage, 2011).  
The reliance on a fashion editor’s judgment reduced the likelihood that merchandisers and 
online marketing experts at StyleFind.com would seek relationships with online publishers, 
bloggers, and central technology-fashion merchants, like DigiVog or Net-a-Porter. The lack of 
sustained relationships in the digital space of fashion minimized the exposure of newcomers as 
StyleFind to accessing the tacit rules of conduct fashioned by insiders. ShopStyle’s online 
editors, for example, would frequently “check in” on DigiVog’s marketing team in New York to 
see what picks in the online portfolio have surfaced as “hot” during the week and showcase the 
selected styles and brands on its editorials.  
StyleFind’s editors would sometimes send generic emails to the Director of Marketing saying 
asking if he agreed that a product or a brand from DigiVog’s online collection could be featured 
as an “editorial pick of the week”. DigiVog’s Marketing Director did not think that this very 
limited relationship with online merchants would be helpful to StyleFind’s longevity in the 
digital space of fashion: 
“They can promote whatever product they want. This is at Net-a-Porter, this is at DKNY. 
When we click on this dress, this shows us the link to the page that is actually linked to 
LinkShare; their site id. This is a fairly decent model, because they are using the datafeed from 
NEP, DKNY, from DigiVog.com, and they are choosing the products and displaying them. But, 
again, I don’t think that NEP has anything to do with the selection, because our products for 
example have been chosen by editor’s picks quite a few times. I just get an email saying: ‘hi, 
how are you? We’d like to publish this product on our website as an editor’s pick’.” 
The lack of direct contact between the merchandising and marketing team at StyleFind with 
large brand-bearers, as DigiVog, presented the business with an organizational deficiency not 
envisioned as a problem by their teams at the launch of the creative online venture. Because 
there was no established contact with fashion-technology merchants that carried a brand, 
 220 
 
StyleFind’s customers frequently encountered a “sold out” message at the other side of an 
editorial link. “If the editor would have called us”, said a merchandising executive at DigiVog, 
“we would have said that the product is out of stock or whatever.”   
DigiVog executives reflected on the frequent crisis of availability of a product as a factor 
limiting revenue options for new publishers that contributed to a crisis of legitimacy for their 
online brands. DigiVog’s Marketing Director insisted that if StyleFind was embedded in an 
ongoing revenue-share with DigiVog, this crisis of legitimacy for the publisher would be averted 
because DigiVog’s technology was designed to suggest other similar products. “What you see 
here”, the executive said,  
“is a classic example of one person trying to do everything.  The editor has put together the 
product, has written the content, maybe the designer has put together the page, but there is no 
interaction between her and the merchant. If she would have picked up the phone and said, hey, I 
want to choose this product or something. That obviously is going to be a pain in the ass; every 
day if you want to change the look on the website can be a problem because you will have to talk 
to the actual retailer. We know our products really well. You power the content and we power 
the product. “ 
Publishers that transferred their brick-and-mortar perspective of “going-it-alone” on the 
Internet were not successful because they did not speak with brands or fashion merchants online, 
and their executives were unaware this behavior would have implications to their business. 
DigiVog’s marketing team saw the seamless technological opportunities provided by the Internet 
as favorable to nurturing and experimenting with relationships with other peers, on top of 
running branding and marketing campaigns. Doing it alone, as one executives in the digital 
domain said, was “not in the DNA” of peers populating the space of digital fashion.  
Online Technology Pioneers and Digital Fashion: Google Inc. and SocialCom.com 
Online pioneers with core cultural businesses outside of fashion were not impervious to the 
failures of old brick-and-mortar publishers. In 2011, the world’s largest search engine company, 
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Google Inc., announced that it is launching a new social commerce publisher, SocialCom.com. 
Apparel had been the fastest growing segment in digital commerce for the three preceding 
years, and executives at fashion-technology brands and social commerce speculated that the 
decision of the company to go forward with a fashion venture that explored the latest online 
commercial technology was motivated by a need to diversify its revenue stream. One social 
commerce executive thought that the simplest explanation for founding Boutiques was for the 
new social-commerce player “to become the starting point where people look for fashion”.  
SocialCom.com was founded as a fashion search engine and was perceived by its team 
members as a “personalized visual fashion shopping engine.” This self-identification stemmed 
from the cultural logic of visual search on the basis of which SocialCom.com was founded. The 
start-up was launched in November 2010 by Google after the parent company acquired Like.com 
in August 2010. Like.com was launched as a visual search engine for products in 2006, after 
years of efforts by its parent company Riya to monetize on facial search recognition. Like.com 
experimented with other curation-oriented product sites for fashion, eventually acquiring, 
opening, and then, folding shopping personalization engine Covet.com; street style social 
network Weardrobe; and, visual styling tool Couturious. The acquisitions allowed Google to 
redistribute natural search traffic related to fashion away from other social commerce players and 
claim validity in online fashion as a curator and editor.  
DigiGroup’s Marketing Director disagreed with the explanations for the launch of Boutiques 
offered by other peers online. He conceptualized SocialCom.com as an experiment. He asserted 
that the launch was done not for commercial diversification on part of the parent group, but for 
“checking in” with the rest of the digital community in fashion.  
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“Fashion is going to be decimal point of what the total turnover of Google is, simply 
because there is only so much volume that you could drive through women's fashion. But, what 
Google.com is for search they want to make SocialCom.com for fashion. Once you search over 
there, you can shop by designers, bloggers’ favorite items. We are now trying to put more 
brands onto SocialCom.com, because knowing that this is Google, it will become popular very, 
very soon.”  
In essence, the goals on which SocialCom.com was founded disagreed with the intentions 
that StyleFind’s executives had in mind when launching their venture. While StyleFind was 
created to start-up a new slice in Time Inc.’s involvement in Internet-based ventures, 
SocialCom.com was an experiment in translating the legitimacy of the parent company, Google, 
as a search innovator into the domain of digital fashion.  
SocialCom.com’s business development executives quickly established commission 
contracts with fashion retailers and qualitative criteria in approaching them. True to its data 
collection culture, the team was aggressive about signing in retailers with access to top-dollar 
fashion brands and was quick to develop a qualitative scale on which DigiGroup scored 9 out of 
10 points as a datafeed share partner. An executive called this 
“a retailer screening process. It is quite qualitative, actually. As a department store may or 
may not feature certain brands, we have a team of editors, fashion editors, if you will, who 
decide what retailer we should feature. They have very fashionable product and they carry a lot 
of it. We would like to have certain products that these affiliates have.”  
Boutiques achieved this bargaining power after just one month online. SocialCom.com was 
important to the online ecology, because due to the scope of its operations, success or failure was 
going to have repercussions to the entire digital community. In fact, when Google decided to fold 
the venture after six months, the Director of Marketing at DigiVog was unenthusiastic about the 
long-term effects on the entire organizational ecology in online fashion. “The demise of 




Six months past the dismantling of the start-up, the marketing team at DigiVog assembled to 
reflect on the reasons for the fold of Boutiques. The team in New York did not think that closing 
off SocialCom.com was a failure. The previous assumption that this was an experiment, asserted 
DigiVog’s executives, was in fact bolstered by Google’s decision to close the digital doors of the 
venture.  
The Director of Marketing argued that the parent firm envisioned testing new avenues for 
improving on their core area of cultural competence, search. “...A browser, a search engine, and 
an operating system – this is what Google is”, he said. “It is not a fashion search engine or a 
premium content aggregator. It is, simply, the three things above. And, whatever they create or 
build to mimic the fancy social media fad of the moment, they will ultimately use it to improve 
the areas that they are most competent on.” 
The wide-ranging impact from the six-month operations of Boutiques spurred social 
commerce publishers and merchants to search for and discover gray areas in the practice of the 
start-up. Whatever the problem preceding the closure of SocialCom.com was, it seemed to 
dovetail notably with limitations in the practice of StyleFind.com. One executive at the US 
office asserted that the start-up had practiced “inconsistency of designer presentation”. 
SocialCom.com had featured three separate parts on its website devoted to designers. One was a 
niche featuring “Designers;” the second was a niche devoted to “Designer Boutiques;” and the 
third part consisted of items “Inspired” by high-fashion designers and brands.  
Executives at SocialCom.com maintained that “Designer Boutiques” was explicitly 
sanctioned to display the curated fashion product by the fashion brands whose product had been 
featured. The “Designer” area, on the other hand, consisted of an alphabetic designer list, which 
just as in StyleFind’s case, was taken from the datafeed of pure play fashion retailers to which 
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SocialCom.com had access on LinkShare. SocialCom.com’s business development staff did not 
ask for explicit permission from these merchants. The “Inspired by Brand X” section of the 
website consisted of a selection of fashion products that were “hand-picked”, as per one 
executive, by Boutiques' online merchandisers. The logic of curation here depended on the tastes 
of merchandisers at Boutiques.  
Visually, the “Inspired By” section was compelling. Upon triggering the mouse over a 
product from an inspirational brand, the customer saw few other brands which were pre-
determined to be culturally similar in quality, price, and design with the brand in question. 
Frequently, however, brands put to the consumer’s attention were at a much lower price point, 
questioning the assertion for brand-related cultural “affinity”. Brands hand-picked by 
merchandisers in this section were also not aware that the products of other brands are listed on 
Boutiques’ front as “inspired” by them.  
SocialCom.com placed great importance on the names of the designers to which its results 
pointed out. The logic of “personalized” search of this fashion search engine was not clear-cut, 
as pointed out in the cases of other social-commerce players. According to one executive, this 
was “part of the secret that we have.  We do try to show the most relevant product based on what 
we think should be relevant to a given search.”  
While the “inspired” aspect of the system could be pointed out to be “democratizing” the 
access to fashion representation of other brands, the three categories of “creative” designer 
representation were designed as a mechanism for bypassing negotiations with fashion brands and 
pure online retailers that carried selections from these brands or had exclusive online distribution 
with them. DigiVog had been successful in part because the company understood the tacit rules 
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of conduct for fashion brands in their brick domains of incumbency and adapted them to the 
online domain. More technology was not solving the problem of relevancy of search. 
“The unique value proposition for the digital publishing industry today”, DigiGroup’s US 
Marketing Director explained,” comes from making choices for customers and merchants easier 
and more relevant based on curation”. Even though the technology of price comparison search 
had enabled the business model of social commerce to gain traction in the digital marketplace, it 
was the human commitment to handpicking excellent editorial content, selecting appropriate 
designers, and negotiating brands to be featured in a curation, that the online pure play 
community in social commerce collectively decided to use as a validating factor on their cultural 
success. 
SocialCom.com had been in business for only six months when it folded its operations. 
Shortly after the demise of Boutiques, Burak Gokturk, the co-founder of Like.com, reflected on 
Google Commerce Blog that the idea for developing SocialCom.com was indirectly related to 
enhancing the shopping experience on Google Shopping. Like.com’s team proceeded to 
incorporate the visual search features for which Like.com was unique into Google Product 
Search “to inspire and facilitate easy, enjoyable browsing and shopping. As we continue to 
integrate technology and lessons learned from SocialCom.com into Google Product Search”, the 
co-founder explained, “we will be redirecting shoppers from SocialCom.com to Google Product 
Search. The former Like.com team, alongside the Google Product Search team, will drive new 




Figure 18  Google Shopping – the result from the SocialCom.com experiment. 
Prescient about the future, a few months before SocialCom.com folded, the Marketing 
Director of DigiVog’s New York office, decided to help out a launch project with a startup 
entrepreneur, who he thought, “is proposing to do what SocialCom.com should have been”. The 
nascent entrepreneur at that start-up had sourced 30 well-known retailers and 10 individual 
designers to personally curate their individual webpages. A publisher online, whose business is 
essentially built on search and affiliate fees, had never before been launched to engage on a 
purely collaborative basis with fashion brands. Even though the start-up ended up folding its 
business operations, the conclusion from the ensuing developments in online fashion retail 
suggested that collaboration between community members was a crucial aspect in promoting 
survival and success of entrepreneurs. 
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8.6 “The 2.0 stuff20”: Community branding (CoBRA) 
Both SocialCom.com and StyleFind.com were able to get access to the datafeeds of online 
fashion retailers through their paid access with LinkShare. The newcomers took advantage by 
linking to, displaying and featuring search results for brands and products without the need to ask 
brand owners or online technology-fashion brands that carried them for access. Insiders to the 
ecology were prompted to quickly consider new “in-house” practices to be shared only between 
co-contributors to constructing the meaning of digital fashion.  
In early 2011, a designated team at the US office, consisting of the Director of Marketing, the 
Special Projects Manager, the Director of Merchandising, and the CEO, initiated a search for 
new partnership ideas with social-commerce publishers. DigiGroup was about to expand 
direction as “the global internet company for the leading fashion and design brands” and the US 
office decided to position its team at the forefront of initiatives that would graduate the company 
from spending only the technical portion of its clients’ digital budgets to coordinating the entire 
online marketing budget of their fashion partners.  
The idea that emerged in meetings with publishers was that any new types of partnerships 
had to translate into practice that only fashion-technology insiders would be willing to 
experiment with entrepreneurially. The Marketing Director explained that he sees new types of 
partnerships as “more integrated”, or featuring more high-value activities and with a longer, 6-
month, duration period extending gradually to over 1-year partnerships. Collaborating 
entrepreneurs in the ecology expected that after they establish the cultural value of the new 
practices in the ecology, traditional publishers in the industry would open up for collaboration in 
                                                          
20
 CEO of DigiVog US when asked about new practices in beneficial branding in the community. 
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the long-run and rethink their culture with regard to how they understood branding of their long-
term fashion brand clients. 
“Our unique proposition is the following”, said the Special Projects Director in the US office. 
“You have great content, but we have a great product. The successful idea is to match both”. The 
new practice was presented in early 2011 to headquarters in Milan and was titled “co- 
marketing” by the team. Community branding was launched as an emergent practice in online 
fashion. The idea was that community branding campaigns would be executed collaboratively 
between online entrepreneurs with complementary skills in product and content creation and 
delivery.  
The Director of Special Projects at DigiVog defined community branding as a distributed 
social practice in which 
“a product [is] integrated editorially with a shopping area that becomes a communal 
dedicated space with products powered by DigiVog.com. It is usually a section that is editorially 
curated. The partnership always involves an editorial component. We usually try to involve the 
editors of the magazine or community. This would be anyone involved in fashion content or 
lifestyle content on this magazine or site to collaborate with us.”  
The partners met up to discuss collaboration themes, remuneration and design. These 
meetings were followed by preparation of the theme for the campaigns, for example, “hot neon 
picks.” The role of social publishers, such as blogs, social commerce start-ups, and magazines, 
was to serve as content curators in the collaboration. Pure-play technology-fashion firms, as 
DigiVog, were product and brand curators. Editors from the publisher’s side created the content 
for the theme. Merchandisers from DigiVog chose the fashion product, style, and brand and 
integrated it with the editorial content.  
Each community branding relationship is designed to be singularly specific to the individual 
partner. The curated shopping page is culturally significant to each partnership and showcases 
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the strengths of each partner visually. These are called “community branding pages”. The unique 
e-commerce design expertise of DigiVog also allowed building a dedicated, exclusive web space 
on which content and product would be integrated for the duration of the campaign.  
Community branding is designed as a departure from traditional affiliation programs. It 
introduces a non-commercial, editorial component to a conventionally commercial relationship 
where one partner, the publisher, is paid by the merchant to promote a brand or a product. 
Affiliation is a key part of the "food chain" in online fashion, because by promoting somebody 
else’s product thousands of smaller web advertisers were able to earn commission. “Affiliation 
works as revenue-share”, explained the Director of Special Projects, 
“But, the minute the fashion editor in Polyvore or ShopStyle decide to create a customized 
page picking products from us, this can be something in-between affiliation and community 
branding. The community branding partnerships create a situation in which there is an exchange 
of visibility between DigiVog.com or any of our client stores and the partner; magazine, any 
affiliate that would like to start such partnership. We decided to create this dedicated page hosted 
on the partner’s site. This is a way to get awareness from the readers of the magazine. We also 
give visibility to this partner on DigiVog.com.”  
One of the inherent challenges of community branding was that its intended design made it 
harder for established brick brands to understand the marketing value of a "community branding 
page" curated by two online-born partners. The 4-person team believed that even though 
DigiVog’s fashion partners were moving investment into the digital channel, the cultural policy 
of their e-commerce teams was not yet aligned with embracing these new sources of value for 
their brands.  
“We do hold our clients' ad money. What we would like [is] to play an even more significant 
role in the budget. Most of this goes to technical channels, but we can push through consulting 
role into other channels.” the CEO in the US observed. DigiVog’s marketing executives were 
certain that a large part of negotiating with the creative ore-commerce directors in fashion 
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partner firms would involve changing this culture. To get fashion brands to consent on 
refocusing large part of their digital budget online would unprecedented in the history of this 
creative industry and mean that new culture can be co-developed between new and old creative 
ventures.  
In order to persuade brands to take on these “alternative” forms of collaboration with online 
publishers, the US team asked Pure Brand division to solicit interest from at least one DigiVog 
partner brand. In 2010, one of the oldest Italian high-fashion brands in the Group had requested 
more information about new types of online marketing, but after a series of short conversations 
“the insight was lost” as one executive put it. The US office insisted that when approaching 
fashion brands, Pure Brand team had to persuade fashion owners to see new digital partners as a 
distinct and important new social group vis-a-vis established magazine intermediaries in the 
industry.  
Pure Brand approached two brands that had been with the firm since the launch of its e-
commerce consulting operations in 2006. One of the main challenges during negotiations was to 
solicit the consent of these brands to allow DigiVog’s merchandisers to pick and place fashion 
product from their e-commerce datafeed on the community campaign page with a social-
commerce publisher. DigiVog’s team had exclusive access to the product feed of its partner 
brands. Proprietary arrangements between the brand and the group specified that DigiVog’s 
internal account management team had full access to curating and updating the brand’s online 
fashion product.  
To get the two brands to agree to taking a product out of their online datafeed took long 
hours of phone negotiations between merchandisers from the New York office, Milan, Pure 
Brand account managers and the online store manager of the brand. The US office obtained the 
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support of the two brands by pitching to their merchandising executives that disclosing 
information about their e-commerce datafeed would result in creating new sources of brand 
value that are created in the online ecology of entrepreneurs in fashion and are unique to an 
Internet-specific advantage.  
Pure Partner Unit and PaperMag  
The earliest community branding campaigns signed with online fashion magazines featured 
niche fashionista publishers Tablet, BlackBook, PaperMag, and GenArt. These campaigns 
started for the US marketing team as experiments “on a very, very small scale and with little 
money,” as one executive put it. The goal of the projects was for both partners entering into a 
relationship by community branding to achieve brand awareness, broader target audience, and 
cost savings.  
The directions for collaboration with PaperMag and other online players developed 
organically in discussion between the two marketing teams. DigiVog’s marketing team made 
sure that in this creative exchange its fashion merchandisers would have decision-making power 
over what fashion styles to feature for an editorial ”look” and how many fashion brands to 
display. “We pick up four looks from the magazine; no more”, said the Director of Special 
Projects. “They send us the four looks. They then ask us: ‘can you curate a look-event whereby 
you pick from your designer collection pieces that complete and most closely correspond to this 
palette and link it with e-commerce for people to shop?’”.  
As negotiations for contract extension went forward in late 2010, the US marketing team 
proposed to PaperMag to host a “look of the week”. The “look” was a theme suggested by the 
magazine and the fashion product was curated by DigiVog’s merchandisers who changed fashion 
product according to the overarching theme of the week. The partners agreed to the selection of 
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fashion styles limited. This was a vital prerequisite for the community branding relationship with 
PaperMag and smaller online publishers, because having to choose among fewer brands 
calibrated the browsing behavior of customers, introducing them to specific partner fashion 
brands at DigiVog (Figure 19). DigiVog’s US merchandisers mixed up the selection, showcasing 
new styles from the fashion portfolio of its two largest brands, DigiGroup.com and Digi1.com. 
Negotiations were starting at headquarters to get exclusive consent of all 27 brand partners for 
their inclusion into “community branding” campaigns with other online entrepreneurs. 
 
Figure 19 Collaboration in community branding between DigiGroup and PaperMag. 
“Now, this is the most beautifully executed community branding campaign”, said the 
Director of Marketing of the campaign with PaperMag. 
“In the beginning of each month, they choose the looks that they want us to curate the 
selection around. They say: ‘you guys know best what items you have online as long as you 
make sure you align with the look.’ They will send us the scan of the desired looks and we will 
go out and look for products that are exactly similar to the ones desired. And, we will publish 
that on the paperstore.com. So, if you go to this co-branded page, you will see various products 
that you can shop. This mini-shoplet was also designed by us. This widget is not only created but 
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controlled by us, so from an editor’s point of view, she doesn’t have to worry about anything. 
What she does is: if this looks sells out next week, it will automatically be changed by another 
product with a similar look, which we’ve already chosen to put in the system.” 
Fashion editors at PaperMag returned the sentiment by indicating that the longevity of the 
relationship was determined by the ability of DigiVog to surprise them with styles on each 
weekly occasion throughout the year: "We always try to stump them; one week we gave them a 
still from The African Queen, but sure enough they supplied us with lots of Victorian lace collar 
shirts and khaki button downs. They've got everything!” 
DigiVog offered three types of brand contribution to a community branding partnership. All 
of these include design and building of a mini-shoplet hosted by the publisher; an editorial about 
the partnership on DigiVog’s internal blog; exposure through banner ads on selected online retail 
properties of the Group; and a newsletter coverage of the partnership. The marketing team also 
specified the number of weeks during the one-year period, during which PaperMag was allowed 
to display special promotional offers on behalf of DigiVog, such as up to 10% sales on new 
collections. These offers were available to customers exclusively on the mini-shoplet on 
paperstore.com.  
At an added cost to online publishers, the marketing team offered help with social network 
marketing for the community campaign. These services required negotiating complex web 
marketing media buys and placement of banner ads on select fashion portals (e.g., style.com, 
elle.com).  In cases where the partner, here PaperMag, was unable to pay for the added benefit of 
auxiliary online marketing channels for promotion of the partnership, DigiVog’s team required 
that an extra “featurette” was placed on PaperMag.com. Clicking on any particular category 




Figure 20 Community branding: content development and curation by PaperMag for DigiVog.com. 
At the end of each collaboration period, the partners extended the terms of the experiment in 
community branding for another year in advance. In this particular year, the Director of 
Marketing in the US decided to augment the existing offer to PaperMag by increasing the 
percentage of revenue share during informal renegotiation talks. It was important to tease out 
these new forms of community collaboration. The idea was for both partners to play with as 
many components of the relationship, as possible. “We keep the relationship, as this evolution is 
taking place, even though it does not generate much in sales”, the executive offered, “because it 
does not cost us much. We could tell PaperMag that if it is a highly sought after partnership, 
maybe we would have a minimum commitment where we would pay them, say, $5,000 / month 
to sponsor such a display regularly.” 
In addition, the Director of Marketing offered that keeping the partner happy allows DigiVog 
to assume the leading role in construing the mix of creative assets in a campaign. “I know for a 
fact,” he said, “that the amount of visitors that PaperMag gets and the amount of sales we will 
get is not as important as PaperMag being powered with this e-commerce /fashion /editorial and 
shopping functionality. If it is like that, then the terms could be in my favor.” With this implied 
positioning, the two parties are able to arrive at a situation of interdependence that exhausts the 
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likely potential of exit by any one of them and, at the same time, fosters the search for discovery 
and sharing of new practices and creative assets. 
8.7 Changing the culture of old fashion intermediaries 
The Challenge  
During 2011, the second experimental year of community partnerships, DigiVog’s US team 
recognized that there is another untapped opportunity to discover in entrepreneurial collaboration 
in community branding. The team would apply their unique contextual experience in social 
affiliation, pair it up with their skills in e-commerce and online marketing and promote the 
beneficial results of community branding collaboration to established fashion publishers. The US 
team lobbied headquarters to commit to an increasing share of revenue to brand awareness 
actions online with focus on convincing brick publishers gone online of the importance of 
community branding to aspects of brand awareness and commercial growth. The recently 
founded Partner Division and Pure Brand Agent were already in talks with established fashion 
partners that were likely to accept community branding. DigiVog’s US marketing team launched 
talks with large fashion magazines, such as Marie Claire, Elle, and Vogue.  
The growth envisaged for these collaborations was planned as a yearly increase in excess of 
1 million Euros. “We need to start working with Vogue”, explained the rationale the Marketing 
Director in during the short brainstorming meeting with his team, “but not only to do banner 
campaigns. Instead, do an integrated partnership in which every 3 months, for example, Vogue 
will choose one look and DigiVog.com's merchandisers will put out merchandise for this look”.  
The problem was that at the time there was no precedent for a traditional fashion publisher 
to consider a partnership with an online technology company “posturing” as a knowledgeable 
fashion retailer in which the latter curates fashion product on publisher’s own website and for 
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publisher’s own editorial campaigns. The brunt of work in initial community branding 
experiments with established publishers was incurred exclusively by online peers. In January 
2010, Gilt Groupe struck a deal with Vogue USA to host a sale of selected items from the 
January issue of Vogue and covered the larger share of campaign costs. Vogue US was the 
passive decision-maker; it had limited financial engagement and substantial clout in the 
partnership. Vogue editors got access to Gilt’s online inventory and chose the fashion products 
for the campaign (Figure 21) Gilt Groupe was responsible for investing in creative digital 
material, as links and banners, and for promoting the collaboration The start-up also paid for 
outsourcing the job to www.lookbooksapp.com, a “pro digital studio” that hosted the 
“marriage” of product from Gilt.com with editorial picks from the January issue of Vogue.  
 
Figure 21 Community branding: Collaboration between Gilt Groupe and Vogue.
21
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 Caption: the caption below the product page says: “Gilt Groupe has partnered with Vogue on a very 
special project – Vogue’s “shop the issue” by Gilt Groupe. In this first-time collaboration you can shop 
for fashion inspired by the “Steal of the Month” page in the Vogue January issue and buy everything 
Angela Lindvall is wearing, and then some. All of the ready-to-wear looks are all under $500. ”  
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DigiVog’s US team pushed for editorial and product-related clout in partnering with InStyle, 
Elle, or Vogue. The team was frustrated with the fact that banner advertizing was the preferred 
online marketing practice of brick publishers. To make up for industry-wide dwindling print 
advertising budgets after 2008, banner advertising took over as legitimating vehicle for fashion 
brands in launching their Internet identity and continued to be major stronghold in the 
advertising budgets of established publishers on the Internet.  
"Even though our company now harbors access and manages the online marketing for some 
of the most coveted brands in the world”, repeated the Director of Marketing in meetings with 
his 4-person change team, “traditional editorials do not want to accept the behavior of their 
online social commerce counterparts. Publishing firms think; what is the cost of that and how 
much can be charge for it? Media industry has started to realize that it is productive to link 
product and content. But, they will never change, however they progress, unless DigiVog tells 
them how it works”. 
Fashion brands preferred to spend money on banners. The practice was part of their online 
heritage of placing adverts in the paper editions of their intermediaries. The lower costs of 
placing adverts with their publishers on the Internet made the old practice stick. Giorgio Armani, 
for example, spent more than $3 million a year for buying dedicated advertizing space in every 
paper issue of Vogue. In comparison, a basic banner with Style.com in 2011 cost the 
Communications Division 10 times less. With the recession, Communications executives were 
ready to spend a lot less online.  
Online technology firms in fashion did not favor the use of banner display campaigns in their 
own marketing campaigns. The gap between online ad spending and consumption of digital 
media hovered around $20 billion a year and banners were considered “bad for branding and for 
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business”. DigiVog’s Marketing Director team in New York, a critical change agent in guiding 
DigiGroup’s collaborative approach with traditional publishers, was frustrated when 
headquarters frequently approached the US team with requests from fashion brands for banner 
advertising costs. “We have decided – the Director of Marketing said - “display ads are 
obtrusive”.   
“It's uncalled for... even if technology has changed, at the end of the day it is still the most 
offensive way of advertising. You go to NYT.com and suddenly you get this stupid car in your 
face. I don't want to see that! It is better to spend money on awareness but not purely of the 
banner ad form. We could do some banner ads in the future, but accounting for the total 
outgoings thru revenue share... like buying a page in a magazine and linking it online. Something 
that is more integrated. Let’s do something that is more meaningful than just a stupid ad.” 
The US team approached the challenge head-on. The Marketing Director’s expectation was 
that old intermediaries “are accustomed to dictate the rules of the game for branding by selling 
exceptionally expensive ad space and treat it like Manhattan real estate. So, when [DigiGroup] 
approaches Elle and asks to do a 10% revenue share, Elle does not know what the shopping 
section will result and asks “Who is DigiGroup? How dare you tell me this?”  
“So, when you are trying to offer something that is an integrated solution with the end 
consumer in mind”, countered the Director of Special Projects,  
“each department in Vogue needs to internally justify how the offer is good for them. The 
Editorial Director needs to figure out how the offer is going to be justified editorially. Business 
Development needs to know; OK, is this is a new partner that we are adding? Sales need to know 
– well, they are going to have 10 thousand impressions on my site, but are they going to pay me 
so much money? So, to be honest, these discussions can go on for 6 months easily without any 
problem.” 
The Director of Special Projects saw future collaboration with brick fashion publishers as a 
special case of community branding, in which the need to change the culture of old 
intermediaries was more essential than any short-term acquisition of implied or perceived 
“privileges” from them, such as special rates on advertising space. The team decided that the 
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terms of collaboration would be designed as revenue-share agreements. This was going to be the 
first time that an online fashion start-up would charge publishers for their performance. “We can 
give you this much money”, discussed the Marketing Director in brainstorming meetings.  
”The revenue depends on you and your content. You need to work for your revenue. We need 
to wake them up to the fact that $ 1 million imposes a ceiling. If banners are thought out as a 
purely short-term thing, then having this practice is okay. But, there is no sustainability in this 
approach. This is partly why we need more sustainable practices. When there is a curated 
shopping section, people understand that there is product proposal built around content, which is 
also sponsored by the magazine. We will never leave our idea of community branding or 
editorial integration. We would rather combine it with display.” 
The 4-person change team pushed for integrating negotiations between the often siloed 
editorial, sales and business development divisions in brick publishers. The Director of Special 
Projects advised traditional publishers that their success online depended on their ability to 
source product from high-fashion brands present on the channel, as opposed to creating content. 
The vantage point of the industry had shifted to collaboration between publishing and merchant 
brands, said the Marketing Director’s in talks with the business development and editorial teams 
of established publishers. He frequently pointed out internally “the magazines should be happy 
that they are given the opportunity to work with brands. The fashion partners in our portfolio will 
increase from 24 to 40 in only three years. And, if we see that this type of project works for a 
multi-brand store, like ourselves, we'd be the first to propose you to our brands”.  
The second element in the negotiations was to spell out to traditional publishers that a 
growing number of DigiVog’s fashion partners were on board for community collaboration with 
smaller online-born publishers. The gist in these negotiations was to explain to senior editors 
that a ‘go-it-alone’ approach would expose them to traction problems in the online ecology, 
similar to those experienced by Time Inc.’s StyleFind, due to their lack of contextual 
knowledge. Here the point was to define the capabilities of online specialization of DigiVog: 
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“Publishers such as, say, Marie Claire, can either choose someone like stylefind.com to 
collaborate with on finding styles and eventually linking to a third-party retailer, or can directly 
work with an individual brand or a retailer. We have the widest, deepest selection on the net. By 
going to us, you do not need to go to the aggregators. We have to be the one-stop-shop for all 
your needs”.  
The collaboration proposal set performance-based commission rates for publishers 
determined by the total traffic from a banner to a partner website. The CEO of the US office 
argued that in the event that a publisher was unable to guarantee the payment of the designated 
commission due to poor performance of the campaign, its online team would have to carry the 
burden of proof “to work harder so that our brands can jump on the wagon.” The proposal also 
specified that community collaboration with brick publishers should be initiated and sought by 
DigiVog only in those special one-time cases when a new fashion partner launched e-commerce 
with DigiVog. The campaign would introduce the new e-commerce website by showcasing  
selected fashion product by the brand in question, and matching the product to an editorial copy 
produced by the magazine’s editorial team.  
During the initial stages of community branding negotiations with publishers in 2010 and 
2011, established publishers were reluctant to discuss terms of digital engagement that exposed 
them to the expected risks of commercial performance. The real problem in this proposition, 
according to one executive, was that publisher’s executives were accustomed to collecting the 
money from an advertizing deal, rather than earning it. “The publisher has never had to earn 
advertizing dollars”, he said. “The publisher has created so much content in their lifetime that 
they can now say, OK, $10,000 or $50,000 for a full-page ad”. The Director of Marketing 
supported this group think:  
“If I want to do a community branding partnership with all the magazines, it's not a problem 
at all! If a new partner, comes to the editors of Vogue and says: ‘I want to power your shopping 
section and all the products that your editors curate; I am going to send my merchandise to you; 
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you can put it up, so people can shop them. And I am going to give you $1,000,000 in fees’. You 
are not going to tell me no! The problem is not whether the concept is being accepted or not; the 
problem is that the whole concept is that we want to work with a partner who is not – like we 
feel – taking our advertizing money and saying, now I've got nothing else to do with you.  This is 
the traditional behavior that they have.” 
An established publisher would typically agree to terms of service with an advertiser on the 
basis of cost per impression (CPM). This metric refers to the rate that an advertiser, say 
DigiVog, agrees to pay per 1,000 views of an advertisement regardless of any sales that viewing 
the banner generates. Each appearance of the image in front of a user counts as one impression. 
In a CPM deal, the hosting website, typically a publisher such as Vogue.com displays the banner 
against payment for total amount of impressions.  
Online publishers preferred to collaborate on cost-per-click (CPC)- the amount paid by an 
advertiser to an Internet publisher each time that a viewer clicked on a link in an advertisement. 
A click transferred the viewer to the advertiser’s website. This type of contract is also known as 
pay-for-performance advertising, whereby the payment is triggered by a mutually agreed upon 
activity, such as a click-through, registration, or sale. 
“Vogue US does not want to engage in a more meaningful collaboration,” one online 
executive considered. CPM was a one-way deal in which the publisher does not take any 
responsibility for the marketing or sales performance to an advertiser. In contrast, in a CPC 
agreement, the “payment is triggered by a mutually agreed upon action” that presumes that value 
is sought by both partners. The attempt to develop mutually collaborative relationship with 
traditional publishers was difficult more than the negotiations DigiVog held with established 
brands. The team had to persuade traditional publishers to change their cultural approach to the 
digital space by relenting on their most fundamental behavior of doing business.  
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Brick publishers were unaccustomed to the metrics of success presented by DigiVog’s 
team. The team was flustered by the results. Every other online publisher, they asserted, would 
have happily accepted a 10% commission that included the free of charge delivery of high-
value components, such as marketing contests; help with building a social; and, advertising the 
results on social media.  
“Our immediate reaction after the campaign is to measure the results of the campaign”, the 
Director of Special Projects explained to executives at one publisher. “When there is an online 
component of a mini-shop it is easier to measure the results of the campaign. We usually do that 
on a revenue-share basis. This means that the partner gets money for every sale generated”. 
“However”, she continued, “They rarely accept such a position.”  
“I of course knew, what the issue was about”, the Director of Marketing offered,  
“It is the disconnect in the thinking between how a retailer thinks and how a publisher 
thinks. When this person [the publisher] hears of 10% commission, all they can think about is 
CPM. And, I'm like, dude, if you push it, you can earn money thru commissions. And, that 
person thinks, if I push it, and there are 100,000 impressions, I will earn $200. The issue is, that 
even though they do think of all these factors, you just look at a retailer with a $ sign. 
Unfortunately, they don’t think about the editorial and marketing spillovers to their own brand 
and business.” 
The team decided that to compensate for the disconnect in the behavior and thinking of 
large publishers, DigiVog would agree to pay them a two-, three-, or six- month flat fee to 
ascertain their buy-in to accepting the new cultural prerogative of community branding. The 
change team thought that this was an acceptable middle-of-the-road decision until publishers 
were incited to play. “I think the best is to get a big player”, explained one team member. “I 
don't mind paying 50K to Elle, even though this is not going to be the perfect thing for me. But, 
if we strike this deal, then all the smaller guys, who are playing little rascals, will be persuaded 
to work with us and we can then leverage.” 
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The lump-sum that the US marketing team offered to supplement the income of a publisher 
from revenue share was a forward-looking guarantee on the part of the publisher on their future 
adoption of an entrepreneurial approach. The flat fee payment was a cultural difference premium 
that DigiVog was willing to pay as a co-inventor of the new culture, until traditional publishers 
learned to make money by using digital media as a booster of commercial value. 
Pure Partner Unit and Vogue Italy  
Vogue Italy is sometimes referred to as “the world's most influential fashion magazine” and 
is, incidentally, considered to be the least commercial of Condé Nast’s publications (Angeletti, 
Oliva, and Wintour, 2012). The partnership between DigiVog and Vogue Italy was conceived 
by the proposing side, DigiGroup, as a long-term community branding collaboration, the first of 
its kind between a publisher and a technology-fashion firm. The 4-person change team pursued 
two interrelated goals with the publisher. The executives needed to showcase the ability of 
DigiVog to continue acquiring high value assets, aside from its portfolio of more than 20 of the 
world’s most renowned fashion brands. The Group would as well encourage and nurture a long-
term change in the culture of brick-and-mortar publishers to accept editorial help from online 
players.   
The Special Projects Director had to start from scratch in explaining to Vogue’s team the 
rules of engagement of the online channel. She noted that Vogue’s fashion editors would have 
to check in with DigiVog merchandisers each time that they decided to feature a particular item 
from any of the Group’s client sites during the collaboration period.  
“The products that we curate with you can be taken out of DigiVog.com; Digi1.com; or, any 
of the clients we have. Vogue does not have the datafeed, and the consumer goes directly to 
shop on the retailer's front. It is something that fashion editors from online social shopping 
partners do directly on our site; picking independently products to feature editorially on their 
fronts. So, obviously, if Polyvore or ShopStyle decided to do the same [partnership] as Vogue, 
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since we already have partnership with them through LinkShare, and we provide them with our 
datafeed, their editors would select this product directly from the datafeed.” 
Vogue Italy accepted to receive a flat fee for publishing banners related to the community 
branding campaign and signed a revenue share agreement for serving as a marketing 
collaborator to DigiVog. DigiVog’s team in Italy created a mini shoplet hosted by 
www.Vogue.it; Vogue's main digital property of Vogue in EU. DigiGroup also negotiated 
worth fashion partners that fashion products featured in the co-marketed shopping section 
would lead to the respective brand e-commerce website that has the product in question. The 
technical toolset employed in the partnership was an expression of openness to change signaled 
by this traditional organization.  
The collaboration between DigiGroup and Vogue Italy lasted for more than two years, 
between 2010 and 2012. New initiatives were subsequently developed in 2012 and proposed by 
DigiGroup with the idea of extending the comfort zone of Vogue Italy in dealing with online 
technologies and practice. Aside from being responsible for producing the commercial space 
inside Vogue.it and populating it with products from its online brands and fashion partners, 
DigiVog negotiated to a social process of augmenting its own editorial role in the partnership 
by taking the lead on creating online editorials for the rotating “look of the week”.   
“The idea is that there is an editorial component in the collaboration”, said the CEO of 
DigiVog in Milan headquarters. “We totally have their input re: what trends to feature.” The 
CEO of DigiGroup US, among the first proponents of community branding, explained that the 
main driver of the collaboration between these two different types of player “honestly, is 
awareness. You go to Vogue to look at pictures, not to shop. But, the awareness part should not 
be underestimated, because awareness creates future sales. It's a mutual thing. They provide the 
content; we have the product”.  
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This type of collaboration has no precedent in online retail, because it requires that both 
partners have identical interpretation on how to use their complementary capabilities to 
engender integration between product and content. Vogue Italy had understood the cultural 
opportunity of connecting with more and varied types of readers and making both money and 
awareness in the process. The cultural aspect of change for Vogue Europe was its long-term 
agreement to embed new textual links on its front page menu entitled “E-VogueShopping” 
(Figure 22). This was a cultural practice that also was title was the first time that a brick-and-
mortar publisher had agreed to place a commercial digital asset on its own property. 
 
Figure 22 Community branding: Collaboration DigiGroup and Vogue Italia (2011-2012). 
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“No one has done it with Vogue Italy” the CEO of DigiGroup US noted. “We tried with the 
American Vogue, but the publishing industry in Italy is much more developed than the US. 
They can see the value of novelty. The Americans are just after the money.”  
The collaboration between the two players continued in 2012 and focused on particular 
brands that the two partners decided to promote. Vogue Italy supported a campaign for Pink 
Tartan featuring creative online assets designed and sent by DigiVog.com's email system to 
registered users of DigiVog two online fashion brands- DigiVog.com and Digi1.com (Figure 23). 
The newsletter included photo-shoots and creative content designed by merchandisers at the US 
office with some engagement from Vogue Italy. The models, the digital print and the fashion 
products curated by DigiVog’s online merchandisers and editors were designed by Pink Tartan. 
The banner embedded in the email led to e-VogueShopping.it.  
 
Figure 23 Community branding: Digi1 and Vogue present Pink Tartan Campaign  
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By March 2012, Vogue Italy was the partner of choice for DigiVog Group when the Group 
announced the opening of new retail businesses and opportunities. The group, for instance, 
launched its first footwear brand online in spring 2012 and the inauguration of this new retailer 
was broadcasted with a special collaboration between Vogue Italy and DigiGroup via Facebook 
(Figure 24). The campaign was created with creative lead from DigiVog’s online merchandisers 
and editors. The Facebook page of the new footwear retailer highlighted daily footwear product 
galleries in a series introducing the new online company. Each look in the product gallery was 
curated by a “stylist of the week” picked by DigiVog's merchandisers in collaboration with 
Vogue Italy. A click on the gallery presented on Facebook led users to e-VogueShopping.it, 
where the product could be reviewed and purchased.  
 
Figure 24 Community branding: Vogue Italy presents DigiVog’s newest brand along with product curation. 
In addition to having an editorial lead on choosing weekly stylist picks, DigiVog’s online 
marketing team designed a separate Facebook blog in link that led to “Ms. Suzie”, online 




Figure 25 Community branding: Vogue Italy advises on product curation for DigiVog. 
The increasing openness of Vogue Italy to integrating digital assets in their practice is a case 
in point showcasing that the consistent communication of new goals and practice between two 
very different partners can result in the nurturing of esprit de corps between them.  
Pure Partner Unit and Women’s Wear Daily (WWD) 
During the first trimester of 2011, executives at the US office reported on a positive 
“conversation” with Women’s Wear Daily (WWD), one of the most visited publications in the 
fashion industry online, for closing a “CPI type” (cost per impression) deal. The campaign was 
scheduled to coincide with Fashion Week in Italy and trigger traffic from WWD’s home page to 
individual brands from Digi1.com, DigiGroup’s youngest brand. On Monday, Sept. 26th, 2011, 
the home page of WWD was “overtaken” with the creative color background, links to brands, 
and editorial campaign text from Digi1.com. The background displayed a series of dynamic 
images that incited the viewer to visit Digi1.com, view a fashion video by a celebrated 
photographer, and mouse-hover over links leading to the collections of select designers at 
Digi1.com that had given their permission to be featured in the awareness campaign.  
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The technology solution for this deal dispensed with the idea of single banner display and 
instead DigiVog worked with the concept of floating background and text superimposed on the 
background of the other partner. The term called this form of creative brand awareness product 
“overtaking” the background of the partner (Figure 26).  
The campaign was a distinct instance of recombination in cultural goals, financial 
deliverables, and technology. It allowed DigiGroup to use old-style brick-and-mortar advertising 
deal with WWD based on cost per impression and, simultaneously, incites the partner to 'defect’ 
to a culturally novel way of community collaboration.  
 
Figure 26 WWD “Overtake” by Digi1.com 
As a brick-and-mortar convert online, WWD required that the deal is signed on a CPI basis. 
DigiVog’s US team had no interest in creating brand awareness for Digi1.com by paying a 
significant lump sum to the collaborating party in addition to financing the technical solution for 
the community branding community page. The European headquarters were not happy to give a 
go-ahead to the deal, because this entrepreneurial opportunity would register as a financial loss 
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to DigiVog. US executives however argued that they were willing to pay a “cultural difference 
premium” to WWD in exchange for showcasing the practice as an example of the willingness of 
this traditional content mediator to accepting a new culture of collaboration. The acceptance of 
financial loss by the marketing team at DigiVog US, the innovation lab of the firm, denoted the 
willingness of Internet brands to engage in exploration of the impact that this deal would have 
on the future behavior of traditional industry intermediaries. 
In return for this high-risk enterprise, DigiVog’s marketing team signaled to WWD 
executives that they wanted to establish full creative directional control for designing the 
“overtake” solution in this collaboration. The marketing team in the US office reasoned 
cautiously about the impact of the overtake on WWDs culture:  
"Well, the new site format of WWD is much better. If nothing, it will give us visibility… 
Before, it had a click-thru of 1.5%; now, the banner click-thru has jumped to 2.8%. It is good 
that the campaign also coincides with the Fashion Week in Italy. The campaign is both about 
traffic, and more cultural awareness about the brands on Digi1.com. "  
During the months that led to the display of the deliverable online, one episode between the 
partners showed how far DigiGroup’s team was prepared to go to explore the "overtake” 
solution as an exercise of introducing a new culture into the toolset of an old publication.  
On a Friday in September 2011 before the “overtake”, the US Marketing Director was 
informed that WWD had contracted an outside vendor to handle the placement of dynamic text 
links and images for the campaign. The text links were easy to code, but the acceptance of 
having this outsourced to an outside firm held significant importance to DigiVog's creative 
brand 'ownership' in the partnership. During overtake the background text links placed on WWD 
had to link to fashion partners placed on Digi1.com. Placing links for the overtake campaign on 
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WWD’s website involved granting temporary access to proprietary API codes of Digi1.com to 
outsider developers. 
The Marketing Director at the US office requested help from the HQ Marketing Division 
with the issue. “They requested an outside vendor”, she explained to her colleagues, “because 
they say their site is very Rich Media and they need special help with that for the dynamic 
placement of the brands.” The new Marketing Director in US had held the position for a few 
months and had noticed that DigiVog group typically “owned” the creative process of 
developing a deliverable in their online partner collaborations. The request by WWD was 
unusual. She needed a “translation” from the online marketing team. By relating the request, she 
was acknowledging that the delivery of creative components in community branding projects 
has a tacit dimension of leverage in negotiating the terms between partners. 
DigiGroup executives preferred to be responsible for the structural development of 
deliverables on projects dealing with changing the culture of publishers, for two reasons. The 
first was to signal to partners the knowledge of the firm in the substantive area in digital fashion. 
The second was that US executives placed importance on increasing the social reputation of the 
firm with other peers in the space.  
DigiVog Group wished to be perceived by peers and brick-and-mortar intermediaries in the 
industry as a new expert in the fashion industry. WWD was a well-known fashion mediator in 
the brick fashion world, and this strategic branding project had to be executed to the level of 
cultural specification that DigiVog Group required. The ability for the Group to get to do this 
collaborative project with WWD would be a great step forward to attesting to the distinct 
cultural identity of DigiGroup as a technology-fashion brand. This position in the cultural field 
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would be important when the firm collaborated with other partners from the online ecology on 
interpreting the industry-wide meaning of a particular new practice. 
At DigiGroup US prospective governance problems in online collaboration were handled by 
the online marketing team. The team communicated the boundaries of responsibility with WWD 
during a highly technical call between their e-commerce teams. “Will you serve the images as a 
tag or a static image?”, the online web expert at the magazine asked the marketing team on 
Friday. “We will serve the images as a URL,” responded the expert from DigiVog’s online 
marketing team. WWD’s e-commerce person revealed that the links to fashion brands “have to 
be served by a rich media vendor. Do you do this usually?” 
 The DigiVog marketing expert was surprised at this request, “No, we usually do not work 
with vendors when we serve our own site.” WWD’s team then clarified that “Because our 
website is so rich in flash media, an outside rich media vendor can know how to create the type 
very quickly.” 
The implication was that DigiVog’s team did not need to have expertise in producing rich 
media content. Far in the game, WWD’s digital team had gauged this capability by asking: "Do 
you do this usually?" If WWD’s experts had requested from DigiVog’s online team to produce 
rich media links at the start of the collaboration, the US team would have displayed a degree of 
affront by being perceived by collaborators as a pure technology expert. At headquarters, the 
Global Marketing Director was clear on this point.  
“We never promote DigiVog as a service provider. We are not GSI Commerce22. In other 
words, we could probably better use WWD for promoting campaigns of our fashion partners 
                                                          




that Digi1.com hosts.” The reluctance of DigiVog’s founding team to associate the Group with 
an e-commerce agency articulates the history of the company’s tremendous evolution from a 
discounted retailer and-commerce service provider to a technology-fashion group with a 
founding competence in distributed marketing.  
The online expert at the US office clarified to MediaMind, the vendor chosen by WWD that 
"this is the first time we are working with someone else. We usually manage our own 
campaigns". To make the team at MediaMind work faster on the weekend, the expert spent time 
to leverage DigiGroup’s cultural place in the online fashion ecology. During the call with the 
vendor, DigiVog’s marketing team learned that "WWD is not in the business of overdrawing 
their own tech resources for someone else's banner hosting". By outsourcing the ad format to 
MediaMind, instead of allowing DigiVog access to the format for hosting their own creative 
links, WWD maintained its own cultural specifications with regard to the collaboration.  
This was a critical piece of contextual information for the marketing team. It signaled that 
the brick-and-mortar WWD desired a level of control over the deliverables of online projects to 
the extent of outsourcing them to third parties over sharing them with a community branding 
partner. Vogue Italy and Women’s Wear Daily were two very different partners and they were 
open to different kinds of collaboration. The challenge to change the culture of this fashion 
publishing magazine continued in the days ahead. The marketing team could now generalize 
that depending on the domain of their birth, different publishers had contrasting approaches and 
degrees of openness to collaboration with pure technology-fashion companies. 
Pure Partner Unit and Global Media Publisher 
In the end of 2010, DigiVog USA was approached one of the largest diversified media 
publishing companies in the US for a long-term collaboration proposal in community branding. 
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The media conglomerate owned magazines, newspapers and business publishing assets in 
numerous domains that included four of USA’s largest monthly fashion publications. The 
marketing team and the US CEO met with high-ranking executives of the digital arm of the 
publishing corporation, that included the proposed Project Management Leader, the editors of 
two of the company’s largest fashion magazines, and the Chief Revenue Officer. 
DigiVog’s team was partial to the idea of collaboration with this publisher, because the 
media firm was actively experimenting with the online channel and had acquired one of the top-
10 online social shopping pioneers. DigiVog’s team picked the media publisher as well to find 
out how large media firms explored a different new business model. Discussions between the 
four-person change management team in the US with the executive team of the digital arm of the 
media firm revealed the openness of executives to explore DigiVog’s idea of community 
branding.  
The key aspects of the negotiations were to align the vision of both sides regarding the 
components of a potential shoplet to be designed and populated with products on the publisher’s 
two main fashion magazines' online properties. As in other collaborations, DigiVog’s online 
marketing team expected to have relative autonomy in selecting the editorial themes and pairing 
them with fashion product.  
Executives at the US office were impressed with the quality of the collaboration proposal. 
The US Marketing Director concluded that the media conglomerate was looking to “impress” 
DigiVog’s marketing team by coming up with a diverse set of action items for the partnership. 
The conglomerate had partnered in 2011 with two highly visible online startups with an area of 
competency that was similar to DigiVog’s in-house capability in creating shoplets for 
community branding campaigns. The solution developed by these Google Ventures-backed 
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startups allowed visitors to find information and make purchases online from images displayed 
next to editorial content.  
The media company proposed a mix of collaboration ideas, such as "daily deals"; "look of 
the week"; and, "shop the video". The preliminary proposal specified that DigiVog would 
provide clickable fashion product for the media firm’s seasonal Fashion Guide. Another 
suggestion was to develop an image-based e-commerce solution that allowed visitors to browse 
editorial content and "click to purchase" similar items available on DigiVog’s brand websites.  
While the idea of the partnership was appealing technologically to DigiVog’s team, its scope 
did not envisage long-term commitment from the publisher. Another area of discomfort for the 
marketing tram was that DigiVog was only going to be one of many retailers sharing space on 
pages with shoppable product placement on publisher’s online glossies. DigiVog’s team wanted 
to be the primary partner on this deal. The team also wished to be the only executor putting 
together, developing, editing, and curating an integrated set of digital marketing assets - 
newsletters, homepage banners and social media with an integrated shopping section. An 
executive summarized it,  
“[The two magazines] get approximately 2.5 million per month traffic. And, this traffic 
comes from fashion-sensitive shoppers. So, this is a brand-building initiative for us. I realize that 
most of this will be browsing, but when you read about fashion on any of these magazines 
[online] and you can buy it immediately, it's an added bonus. DigiVog wants all that is proposed 
by [the partner] to be shoppable.”  
Some aspects of the proposal were regarded positively by the team. The “custom video trunk 
show”, for example, was a new method for delivery of a marketing message and DigiVog 
executives themselves advocated for using shoppable video content with other online peers. “We 
agree to this; it's part of our strategy,” said the Marketing Director. These similarities in thinking 
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made it difficult to reject the proposal. One executive reported that this media publisher’s team 
was in fact “currently the only people that DigiVog has felt they share the same language with.”  
The deal-breaker in the proposal however was the media firm’s request that DigiVog should 
pay $1 million for six months’ worth of impressions based on a CPI-deal. DigiVog’s Marketing 
Director began suspecting that behind the sophisticated façade of the proposal the cultural 
approach of traditional advertisers to look at advertising deals as collaborative partnerships, still 
held a rule of thumb status. “Their proposal still looked like an advertizing pitch, rather than a 
genuine understanding or focus on e-commerce. Structurally, they still act as a publisher. Which 
is what is wrong with it”, he concluded. 
The proposal was rejected by DigiVog after 2-month deliberation on the count that, as one 
executive said, it was “piecemeal and did not have the full array of integrated ideas that we 
would be comfortable with responding to.” One example was the exposure to Facebook. This 
component of the relationship was designed for one of the largest fashion glossies of the media 
firm, which had aggregated 32,000 fans on Facebook. The proposal specified that DigiVog 
should partner for a summer campaign with the magazine through Facebook, in mind with 
increasing the online fan base of the fashion magazine. The problem for DigiVog’s team was that 
future shoppers would have access to purchasing DigiVog-curated products, only if they were 
“fans” of the magazine on Facebook. This indicated to the team that the publishing firm had 
designed the proposal in mind with gaining legitimacy for its business online by hoarding traffic 
from DigiVog as a recognized fashion player online.  
This was certainly not the manner in which DigiVog evaluated or treated its long-term 
partner opportunities. Community branding negotiations outlined terms of collaboration that 
were for both partners value-enhancing in equal measure. This was how the Marketing Director 
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envisaged the “one big project”; with a powerful fashion intermediary, ready to accept the rules 
of engagement in the online fashion community, and the long-term collaboration priorities 
shared by peers in the online space.  
“Having the brands gives us a lot of power when we deal with the magazines. When editors 
give us something in terms of content, we give them something in terms of product. Obviously, 
after 6 years of partnerships, we are able to tell them, OK let's do these types of campaigns. We 
have 6-year partnerships with Vogue. We are now in a position to tell our brands: look, we now 
have long-term partnerships with these publishers, and work like an agency. So, if you're 
interested in having a digital partnership with them, you can pass through us instead of going 
directly to them. This is a good position for us. We can say to them (publishers) in return; when 
you make the partnership with us, you actually make it with the rest of our 21 brands. These 
brands will always be interested in making campaigns with you.” 
In the two months during which DigiVog’s marketing team discussed the question of 
engagement with the publishers, the four-person change team expressed concern that in the long-
run, large consolidated publishing media firms would end up managing the online marketing 
operations of their fashion magazines as cookie-cutter operations. Magazines held by one 
publishing group typically functioned as independent profit centers and their corporate owner 
preferred to cap on established revenue sources from banner advertizing. Fashion glossies gone 
online under the umbrella of large publishers would become indistinguishable from one another. 
DigiVog’s executives were wary of engaging with a publisher that did “not want to experiment 
too much” with the new players online.  
DigiVog’s chief branding consultant, a long-term fashion editor and industry insider, 
summed up her concerns regarding the impact of the proposed relationship on DigiVog’s partner 
brands. ”We don't want to Nietzsche-fy all of our brands into one property. This is my biggest 
concern”. If signed, the deal with the media conglomerate would have been first of its kind 
negotiated between a brick publisher and a born online fashion-technology company. 
Negotiations were stalled until mid-2011, when DigiVog US experimented with signing an 
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independent marketing agreement with the largest fashion magazine of the publisher. The 
experiment was short. DigiVog’s executives proposed that the community branding deal is 
shortened to 3 instead of the initial 6 months. DigiVog’s marketing team also agreed to pay 
$200,000 to the magazine, even if the goals of driving traffic to DigiVog’s brand websites were 
not met in full by the magazine’s online team.   
After the rejection of the proposal in late 2011, DigiVog’ marketing team decided that in 
future negotiations, they would put forward two points to publishers. Said the Marketing 
Director, “Number one is that, there is a need for e-commerce with each of these players; and, 
number two is that we are the e-commerce provider.” Based on this new policy stance, 
executives at established publishers had to agree on these two points before future marketing 
collaborations were started. The Director of Marketing considered that this statement, firm as it 
was, would symbolize the cultural legitimacy of the Group in the online space. If those two 
points were ever to be agreed upon by established publishers, he projected that “this probably 
will send a huge signal throughout the [online] community”.  
“They will figure out how to take these businesses to the next level”, the change executive 
submitted finally. “The big media firms will get consolidated with the smaller high-tech. But, 







Chapter 9: Conclusions and Contributions: Production of Cultural Knowledge on the Internet  
Research contributions 
9.1 Organizational Sensemaking 
In 2005, Karl Weick and contributors produced a paper for a special issue of Organization 
Studies in which they related the need to “restate sensemaking in ways that make it more future 
oriented, more action oriented, more macro, more closely tied to organizing, meshed more boldly 
with identity, more visible, more behaviorally defined, less sedentary and backward looking, 
more infused with emotion and with issues of sensegiving and persuasion” (Weick et. al., 2005: 
409). The present study strengthens the foundational arguments for redefinition of sensemaking 
closer to practice and calls for rigorous industry-based ethnographic investigations upon which to 
build future studies using the heuristic elements advanced in 2005. 
One of the contributions from this research is to bond sensemaking – using ethnography, 
in-depth interviews and triangulation of industry sources – with Burawoy’s method for sampling 
from a collection of social situations. By generating observations from a collection of social 
situations, the research generates observations on the macro level of the community and allows 
tracking the process of organizing in the emerging domain,  
The ethnographic research in this dissertation is also action oriented. It probes the opinions 
and beliefs of different stakeholders that take part in co-constructing the boundaries of practice 
and capability in this emerging domain. The narrative reveals exaggerated performances and 
behind-the-scenes practices that characterize the actual process of sensemaking going into the 
creation of culture in both of the categories of organizations studied: new technology-fashion 
entrepreneurs and incumbent fashion firms.  
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The stories offered by the organizational actors in the dissertation document instances of 
organizational sensemaking that are infused with emotion. The dominant response of many 
executives, who were change agents in their own organizations, was to talk about how they 
develop and share new practices by being “inspired.” Gilt Groupe’s co-founders appreciated the 
“inspirational” culture in Vente Privee, eBay, and Net-a-Porter. The Global Director of Social 
Media at brand “C” interpreted the success of their social engagement with the ability to “inspire 
people to publish”. DigiVog developed a pitch to “inspire”  - according to the CCO - fashion 
brands in Europe and the US. Google’s goal, both with SocialCom.com and with Google 
Shopping was dedicated “to inspire and facilitate easy, enjoyable browsing.” Finally, when Gilt 
Groupe partnered with Vogue on “shop the issue” in 2010, the idea marketed by the 
collaboration was to “shop for fashion inspired by the ‘Steal of the Month’”. 
This research also corroborates that two other elements in Weick et. al. (2005) framework, 
sensegiving and persuasion, play significant role as organizing principles in the online 
community. It was the creative persuasion of newcomers that eventually motivated incumbents 
to respond to novelty. On a microsociological level, change agents across organizational levels in 
both new and old firms, also had to work their way in convincing their superiors of the positive 
organizational impact from SEO, and later, from social media and co-branding. At DigiVog, the 
persuasion dimension in organizational sensemaking was well documented with the ethnographic 
research. Executives at the US office were in the throes of developing campaigns and practice for 
Vogue, WWD, and one of the world’s largest publishers of monthly magazines.   
The present study confirms Weick et. al.’s proposal in 2005 that sensemaking fills 
important gaps in organizational theory. The dissertation presents additional evidence 
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suggesting that the meanings materialized in the process of sensemaking and the cultural labels 
that eventually emerge from participants serve as a springboard to action.  
9.2 Sensemaking and beneficial innovations in practice at DigiVog 
DigiGroup provides an ideal milieu for documenting sensemaking as a springboard to 
action. The Group was launched as a discounted online only retailer in 2000, essentially with the 
same capability as Bluefly, but despite the important distinction that DigiVog owned its own 
technology platform, the founding team had never in the thirteen years since the soft launch, 
interpreted DigiGroup’s identity as a technology provider. DigiGroup was conceived by the 
founder as “big, virtual, and imaginary” fashion brand. The only difference between it and 
incumbent fashion brands was the different cultural technology that DigiGroup operated with.  
The distinctive pattern of practice that defines cultural sensemaking at DigiVog as a 
springboard to action, is to repeatedly test and experiment with new practices in e-marketing and 
e-commerce. The transfer of culture is a two-step, slowly unfolding event that starts from the US 
New York office, to headquarters in Milan, and only then to fashion brands.  
It was only after six years on the Internet that DigiVog proposed to brands to sign-up for 
search engine marketing (SEM) when signing the contract for the development of their e-
commerce properties. In 2006, the online discipline of building creative content for improving 
searchability via search engines was considered to be the most important marketing practice in 
DigiVog.com. Consequently, it was the first practice that DigiVog Group put down in their 
contracts with fashion brand partners.  
Only after team members in charge of e-marketing, e-commerce and merchandising 
evaluate, interpret, and agree on how to implement a new practice on the two digital brands 
owned by the company, DigiVog.com and Digi1.com, can executives propose to integrate the 
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practice in the creative portfolio of the firm and suggest it to fashion partners by way of 
negotiations driven by Pure Partner.  
The Cultural Difference Premium 
A particular distinction in DigiVog’s sensemaking practice is held by the ability of the US 
marketing team to construct with diverse peers persuasive narratives about the company’s 
multifaceted identity. The “overtake” of WWD’s front page with creative content from Digi1, for 
example, called for a nuanced persuasion of WWD executives to grant the company full 
directional control for designing the solution in this collaboration. In this example, DigiVog’s 
US team had to navigate persuasion carefully and settle on surrendering some control over the 
process to the outside peer MediaMind, despite the easy work it would have taken the creative 
team to design the ad format.  
Despite the decision to surrender some directional control, executives from both 
headquarters and the US office were persistent in their desire to communicate a consistent 
cultural identity to this key partner. “We never promote DigiVog as a service provider”, the 
Global Marketing Director corroborated. The reluctance of the team to concede to identifying 
the Group with a capability the company did deliver on, denotes that DigiVog’s team was 
looking after a larger footprint into WWD’s business online.  
As a result, DigiVog’s US team made sense of this concession as a cultural difference 
premium that would serve as an important “first step into the direction of strategic branding with 
fashion labels”. Aside from the permission given to MediaMind to design the ad format, the 
company eventually ended up paying traditional brick publishers a flat fee in community-
branding. This payment was a premium that DigiVog was willing to risk as a co-inventor of the 
 263 
 
new culture in the emerging field, guided by executives’ hope that traditional publishers will 
adapt to the practice and behavior of the online ecology.  
Complicating the measures of success: Beneficial Innovations 
DigiVog had to accept commercial loss from attempting to impart new practice to old-
timers. The fact that the team could do away without collaborating with brick publishers, but did 
so anyway and paid them for it, shows that the US office was thinking about opportunity in non-
commercial or ”beneficial” terms and symbolized the willingness of other Internet brands – 
which it represented as a multiple insider – to engage in exploration of the impact that this deal 
would have on the future behavior of industry intermediaries. 
Beneficial digital practice is not generally associated by research as the ability to generate 
swift commercial success (see, Tripsas, 2007). A key factor that helped the executive team at 
DigiVog’s to complicate measures of success in the firm was the ongoing opening of the 
boundary between content and commerce allowing experimenting with peers on multiple 
projects. This was the process in which beneficial practice formed. Because DigiVog exploits the 
boundary uniting the two fundamental resources of content production and e-commerce and sales 
by actively collaborating with social commerce community leaders, the company’s team 
supports practices that combine two interconnected goals, commercial success and brand 
awareness, arising as a result of this sensemaking process.  
Despite the fact that commercial success is the goal of every commercial enterprise, 
executives at DigiVog are heavy doers when it comes to complicating the measures of success. 
The independence from headquarters of the online marketing team in US allows the members to 
construct an idiosyncratic way for interpreting and understanding “success” as an exercise in 
mobilizing diverse resources without immediately talking about the bottom line.  
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The idea of collaboration with social commerce start-ups runs as a long-term initiative in 
sensemaking. The founder and CEO of DigiVog Group concluded in 2012 that his twelve years 
of observation and experimenting online have cemented a fundamental sensemaking tenet; that 
the “Internet is best exploited by interpreting it both as a communications tool and a sales tool". 
Due to this openness to experiment with this beneficial belief, DigiVog was the first pure play 
retailer that tried to establish working relationships with pioneers in social commerce. 
Negotiations to collaborate are often started just as a social commerce firm is launched. As was 
customary, DigiVog developed first-hand practices with social commerce-players, testing how 
social commerce exposure first affects its own two brands, DigiVog.com and Digi1.com, before 
suggesting the practice to its clients.  
9.3 Sensemaking and adaptation to beneficial innovations in incumbent practice  
The processes of “sensegiving” and emotion are most evident in the ethnography tracking 
the transition of the fashion industry to a new paradigm, in which the cultural identity of its 
mature incumbents was couched online. One of the weaknesses of incumbent fashion brands was 
their reliance of processes of legitimation that did not render the industry as a viable and 
competitive context after 2008. The use of the runway show as a cultural tool for legitimation at 
a time when the fundamental dependence of these firms on designers had plummeted, is a 
powerful indication for hardliner behavior with regard to denouncing novelty.   
The behavior of fashion brands with regard to accepting the new cultural field betrays two 
cultural predilections in their toolset. The first is the inability of their executives to organize for 
commercial success. The Creative Director of a global fashion consultancy in New York pointed 
out that fashion firms tend to measure success inadequately.  
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“I really think we have to measure these successes over a longer period”, he said,”... often 
people have moments, but can't turn them over time into a successful business. I won’t be 
surprised if [names a young and well-known fashion] crash and burn because there is not enough 
business acumen involved. There is a difference between success in the media and bottom-line 
business success.”  
The second cultural belief of incumbents in the industry was the desire to maintain high 
degree of creative control over their marketing channels by federalizing it to a very specific type 
of intermediary: large vertical wholesalers, brick industry expert, and large paper publications. 
The debate whether to be or not to be online was, in fact, started by the consultants and the 
wholesalers of brands, and still continues.  
One argument in this collective process of coming to terms with a new identity is that the 
success of fashion firms online can be measured with metrics that can only be selectively 
prescribed by advocates of the brick-and-mortar model. Learning from new entrepreneurial 
models was going to be very difficult to accomplish. Consider this opening statement by a pundit 
who declared at a major industry conference that the luxury paradigm fits in a civilizing 
discourse: 
“Where does luxury start? It starts as a tribute to god.  Have the best on Earth as a 
tribute to god. Then, after god we have kings to which it was attached. Luxury became a 
marker of power.  In our modern democracies, we still have the ancient social function, 
which is stand apart; stand above. How we still fulfill the goal of luxury?  The goal of your 
brands is to sustain the luxury.  Otherwise, we may lose the reason of why people think so 
much of our brands. […] We’re in the business of creating desire over time.  How can I 
become art itself? Otherwise, we will be crushed by the mass of people want to be luxury 
brands.”  
More cautious industry insiders argued that the difficulty of applying principles of digital 
thinking stems from the extreme difficulty in understanding them. The Director General of 
Altagamma proposed that fashion firms need to independently figure out what to do with the new 
space, which became the essential sensemaking strategy of brand “B”:  
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“Internet is the new publishing sector. I believe that in sales and in communications, a 
company cannot not take into consideration the Internet. Luxury brands started to think about 
that channel cautiously. Why cautiously? Because the hot tools are in a position to 
communicate emotion, and cool were not. In the last years via evolution and creation of 
social media, the Internet has becoming hotter. It is due to the ability of people in 
communication area to create specific short stories for the web.”  
The result from these varying sensemaking scenarios coined by influential opinion-makers 
in the industry, was a collective disconnect in the beliefs of fashion executives regarding what to 
do with the new channel. At the same time as brands attempted to use the latest advertizing 
tactics, such as showcasing runway shows on YouTube or announcing collections on Facebook, 
their executives explicitly denounced the acceptance of a culture that bridges the commercial 
side of their business with non-commercial, branding practice that may re-construct the cultural 
identity of fashion firms online. Altagamma’s Director General argued: 
”[…] it is a dynamic situation and I know that so far big groups, Gucci or LVMH [....] 
the first approach was based on worry. They felt a strong risk that blogs could be used by 
people, but also competitors or people who for ideological reasons could be against luxury. 
And still, this is one area that a lot of companies are worried about. We will see quite soon 
flourishing of initiatives.” 
Another familiar way to avoid taking an actual entrepreneurial stock in the opportunities 
driven by new channel was to equate online practice with brick-and-mortar behavior. “What in 
the traditional media have been glossy magazines is just a matter of having pictures online”, 
noted one fashion executive.  
Despite their collective action approach in adopting the runway show as an important 
cultural symbol, luxury fashion firms rarely trusted each other, and their dependence ran directly 
into consulting hands from the brick industry, who continued asserting that the best cultural turn 
for brands is to not have any cultural turn at all and to maintain the "ancient social function, 
which is stand apart; stand above." 
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Finally, brick industry consultants advanced a rhetoric, in which success was the function 
of having access to ”secret data [that allows] to understand who is making money; how are they 
making money, etc.” Despite the fact that this rhetoric inspired some brands, such as UK’s oldest 
brand “C”, to become interested in talking to peers online, well-known industry experts, such as 
Noel Kapferer, Uche Okonkwo, 23  and Milton Pedraza 24  maintained that the process of 
discovering the “appropriate” ROI for the performance of luxury fashion brands on the Internet 
was a “black box”. Essentially, the conversation for fashion brands had to end before it got 
started; the Internet was a cultural taboo for executives to take an aim at figuring out. 
As the three very different case-studies in Chapter 4 show, executives in the few fashion 
firms who knew it was essential to follow the cultural organization and practice of digital 
entrepreneurs, became change agents recommending to their bosses a new understanding of 
organizing. As the organization of marketing at the “amateur” entrepreneur in the bunch, UK’s 
oldest high-fashion brand shows, age was not an important factor in accepting new cultural 
values. It was visionary executives, such as the former Vice President of Global Marketing at 
brand “C”, that were driving the transition. 
Fashion firms in the case-studies went through stages of Internet “grief”. Essentially, this 
was a process of sensemaking involving feelings and beliefs emoting indifference, distress, and 
ritual adoption of online e-commerce operations. Brand “B” went so far as to design an e-
commerce website that was as divorced from Internet practice as possible. The CIO at this brand, 
major proponent of the Internet, understood that the e-commerce experiment was an exercise in 
                                                          
23 Okonkwo, U. (2010) Luxury Online: Styles, Systems, Strategies. 
24
 CEO of the New York based Luxury Institute. 
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imitating what online entrepreneurs do without investing in the actual practice that involved 
employing search engine optimization and marketing visibility campaigns.  
On the other part of the continuum, was the Vice President of Global Marketing at brand 
“C”, the type of change agent who learned from observing online technology-fashion firms. He 
learned that in order for an entrepreneurial entity to be successful, it needs to be good at adapting 
to the behaviors of peer actors co-constructing the space. He understood from in-house 
experimenting with social media campaigns, and with the online community the brand had 
started, that there were other variables that mattered in telling the story of success and asking for 
funding from the CEO of the brand. “All marketing activity is creating something with a 
commercial opportunity for a brand”, he concluded, “but it's not necessarily about direct 
purchase”. It was the quality, and not the level of traffic; “occasional browsing” and not 
purchase that constituted engagement with a beneficial practice for the brand.  
Community Branding 
Community branding arose as a beneficial practice in 2009-2010, at a time when brick-and-
mortar fashion firms had no intention of accepting any value-added tools, practice and culture of 
their Internet peers, except for limited experiment with social media (most notably Facebook, 
and twitter). This exercise involves actions from both companies that provide complementary 
strengths and contribute to the advancing of their brands. The practice of community branding 
can involve a fashion brand or selection of product from fashion brands with the idea of 
expanding the reach of the audience for participating peers and contributing to added awareness 
for both, or all of the parties involved.  
Community branding involves the cultural object of curating product and content. The 
practice is ideal for studies that wish to address how organizations in an emerging field affect 
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each other’s cultures by developing certain cultural objects and behaviors with each other (Van 
Maanen, 2011). Community branding emerged as a distributed social practice that explored the 
assumption that it is better for their reach and visibility, if two or more online entrepreneurs with 
complementary skills in product and content creation unite their forces. The US team provided 
precise definition of CoBRA by delineating it as an event horizon that starts “the minute the 
fashion editor in Polyvore or ShopStyle decide to create a customized page picking products 
from us, this can be something in-between affiliation and community branding”. 
Community branding worked best with online peers because the partiers had compatible 
goals and understanding of the beneficial application of this practice. As was customary for 
DigiVog’s team, after the implementation of the deal with PaperMag, marketing in the US 
lobbied headquarters to commit an increasing share of revenue for beneficial innovative practice 
development. The practice was tested with online peers and it was time to try and convince brick 
publishers of the importance of community branding to qualitative aspects of brand awareness 
and growth.  
Community branding is still an experimental practice. It is a “grey” area, in between 
commerce and a beneficial innovation, and is open to the sensemaking iterations of online 
partners in the community (Figure 3). 
9.4 The Role of Collective “Sensemaking” in Recombining Resources for Beneficial 
Growth  
One of the more significant conceptual findings to emerge from this study is that 
paradigm-shifting cultural change on the Internet materializes by small changes at the level of 
individual organizations on the Internet that comprise the entrepreneurial community in online 
fashion. The phenomenon is illustrated by the ongoing unfolding of collaboration between 
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various players with complementary skills in the space: technology-fashion peers, pure play 
merchants and social commerce publishers, and between these actors and incumbent fashion 
brands.  
This result is significant because it indicates that the rapid development of online 
technologies in e-commerce, digital marketing, publishing, and social media can facilitate 
organizational arrangements and collaboration scenarios in emerging collectivities of 
organizations born on the Internet. First, as online technologies increase in complexity, the 
business models with boundary-spanning functions, such as social commerce, can emerge. The 
arrival of social-commercial publishers and the support they have subsequently received from 
online merchants for designing commercial and social campaigns online, indicates the growing 
cultural importance of complementing each other’s capability.  
Second, to reduce uncertainty inherent in developing collaborative practice with beneficial 
goals, technology-fashion companies join forces to bridge their skills and open up opportunities. 
Instead of specializing in one distinct practice, they combine many, for survival. Technology-
fashion peers engage in collective sensemaking process with their social commerce peers 
allowing them to discover complementary skills and experiment with techniques for validation of 
their commercial, marketing, or social-commerce business models.  
Third, collective sensemaking frequently requires from peers in the online community to 
explore weak ties with their peers by tapping into insider sources of tacit knowledge on the level 
of the community. The contextual knowledge gained by DigiVog’s team from MediaMind 
during the “overtake” project with WWD is one example of sensemaking by exploring weak ties. 
On the other hand, collaborations between partners and executives who know each other, as 
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between DigiVog, social commerce start-ups, such as PaperMag and Polyvore as well as with 
established fashion industry partners, like Vogue, have increased in complexity.  
Fourth, in discovering entrepreneurial opportunities, start-up peers in online fashion co-
construct the boundaries of their evolving common practice from contextual experimentation 
Pure play fashion retailers and social commerce publishers have used the boundary-spanning 
nature of their technology models and have created a seamless way to help extend each other’s 
audience and capability reach. Figures 22-27 show that by 2012, community branding 
relationships had grown in terms of number of participants and integration of multiple levels of 
online activity related to the organization and carrying out of a campaign. Community branding 
could include technology-fashion merchants, publishers, personal bloggers, curated editorials 
written by bloggers, merchants or publishers, curated product picked by the merchant or the 
publisher, social media content integration, and even independently solicited campaigns with 
fashion brands – Levi’s, Tory Burch, and Prabal Gurung, among others.  
This process of collective sensemaking is well deduced by the founder of an Internet media 
company, who generously laid out her understanding of the steps inherent in coming to terms 
with how and what to collaborate on in the emerging field: 
“Convergence is adopting a common view; integration is combining parts so that they form 
a whole; innovation is a process by which an idea is translated into a product or service for which 
people will pay.  Is this where we're headed?  Are we going to end up in one black box place?  
My answer is No. We will probably end up with convergence of different kinds of media.” 
Note how the three elements of sensemaking are presented in the framework. First, 
convergence shows the disruptive nature of technological distress in the online community. This 
disruption by technology forces peers in the community to facilitate each other’s access to 
diverse resources and forces them to collaborate. Convergence requires peers to experiment with 
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new practices advanced by other partners in the community, say community branding or online 
contests.  “We need to grasp each to understand the other”, point out Weick et. al. in 2005. 
Second, integration in the online community can be described as the crystallizing of a common 
practice by the community.  Finally, innovation here is presented as the cultural impact from 
applying the new community digital practice.   
This is a novel framework for understanding how sensemaking emerges in new 
organizational fields online, and that the result from technological disruption is the unfolding of 
beneficial practice. Beneficial growth is the result of collective sensemaking  among key 
participants in the new field.  
By applying this process of making sense of each other, the online community has 
developed contextual advantages vis-a-vis established publishers, which have tried and tested, 
and launched and folded their own cultural enterprises. In retrospect, as Chapter 8 shows, both 
Time Inc. and Google Inc. did not imitate with their new ventures StyleFind.com and 
SocialCom.com the kinds of practice and collaboration that online-born fashion-technology 
peers had created. In fact, imitation is not an element of the sensemaking apparatus in the online 
domain. This result is evident in the steps taken by online entrepreneurs to learn from the 
mistakes of earlier models, Bluefly and eLuxury in Chapter 5, and move on to develop the 
precise capabilities that these cultures lacked. 
The fact that these players did not considerate important to orient with regard to other firms 
in the space shows that these organizations had not experienced the instinctual need to depend 
for survival on tiered collaboration with other nascent learning organizations in the new field. 
Brick-and-mortars firms had successful businesses offline and were unburdened by the cultural 
rigor of their online peers in creating new business models based around integration of product 
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and content. For new players, the calibration of an early cultural advantage in the emerging field 
is linked to processes of collaboration and sensemaking. 
Implications and recommendations for practice  
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for future practice. The 
first is that success from a start-up activity can be measured in more than one way in the online 
channel. The interpretation for what is important for a business to achieve within a certain period 
of its launch depends on the interpretation of the founding team and change agents located at 
critical nodes in the fledgling firm, such as the US Marketing team.  
The measurement of immediate success can be conceptualized as exploring knowledge 
rents arising from a highly contextual understanding of a domain that allows a company to use 
digital practice to reach and attune wider audiences to the message of the brand. Community 
branding is particularly suitable for this interpretation.   
The main thing to understand for founders of firms in digital fashion is that in online 
systems where, as DigiVog’s US CEO had noted that “the only channel of distribution is online”; 
investment in one practice – say, co-marketing – can now be associated with multiple goals. Fig. 
3 shows how emerging practices as community branding can be associated with goals pertaining 
to both sales and awareness. The reason for this multitasking of practice is that on the Internet, 
the process between brand awareness and its transformation into purchasing intent is immediate. 
Second, with regard to managing creativity in mature organizations, and particularly in the 
fashion industry, one solution for executives willing to experiment with online practice, is to 
learn to manage collaboratively the parts of their online value chains that are most affected by 
the seemingly persistent shifts in entrepreneurial creativity. Engagement and collaboration in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives with technology-fashion brands and online publishers is a useful 
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cultural resolution for fashion brands to branch out, conceptually, from the grip of their 
ubiquitous off-line intermediaries. Everything that a fashion brand publishes online, including 
product, is content, and one of the most powerful vehicles for creating an online brand is learning 
how to manage content related to communicating brand initiatives in community branding 
campaigns.  
The third implication is that the tools, channels and capability development in digital 
fashion have grown in specificity and social commerce startups, such as ShopStyle and Polyvore, 
are becoming marketing platforms helping to push editorial content and pair it up with a “hot-
cut” shoppable product selection.  
Early pioneers of social commerce, such as ShopStyle, have already expanded their cultural 
business model by harnessing skills in e-commerce to “power shopping for media leaders”25, 
such as Glamour.com Useful similarity of the trend is offered by DigiVog, which externalized its 
e-commerce expertise first by offering fashion brands to build their online commerce. 
ShopStyle’s new competence is beneficial to online fashion retail peers in the ecology. The e-
commerce pages that ShopStyle’s engineering team creates for established fashion publishers 
allow their editorial staff to pull actual fashion product from pure play fashion retailers, add the 
product to style editorials, and make content shoppable on a click. The future development of 
new capability is going to be shaped by models that explore the niche in practice between 
content and commerce online.  
Those actors, executives, and companies in the fashion system, who understand that at the 
core of cultural sensemaking for online entrepreneurs is the pursuit of opportunity for growth 





achieved by collaborating and developing beneficial practice, similarly interpret “success” as 
willingness to collaborate with others and experiment in the space.  
In the end, it is useful to cite the opinion of one of the fashion industry’s foremost experts 
in trending, who recently shared that a different, new form of creativity should be supported in 
the fashion industry; one, where fashion brands are reinvented and revitalized. “And so”, said he, 
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APPENDIX 1: ETHNOGRAPHY AND INTERVIEWS, DIGIVOG GROUP 
 
DigiVog Group  
Interviews (DigiVog US, New York) Dates  
CEO, DigiVog USA  04/02/10  








Chief Technology Officer, DigiVog USA 11/17/10 
Head of Buying, DigiVog USA 01/12/11 
Special Projects Director, DigiVog USA  12/06/10 
Merchandising Director, DigiVog USA 01/12/11 
Web Design, DigiVog USA 01/12/11 
PR& Sr. Web Editor, DigiVog USA 12/08/10 
03/10/11 
Web Editor, DigiVog USA 03/02/11 
Interviews (DigiVog Group HQ, Milan)  
Chief Commercial Officer 06/11/10 
Managing Director Multi-Brand, DigiVog Group 06/11/10 
Managing Director, Mono-Brand, DigiVog Group 06/18/10 
Buying Director, DigiVog Group 02/18/11 
Chief Marketing Manager, DigiVog Group 03/16/11 
Ethnography timesheet (time log=8hr)  
Ethnography Week 1 11/17/10  
Ethnography Week 2  11/24/10 
Ethnography Week 3  12/01/10 
Ethnography Week 4  12/08/10 
Ethnography Week 5 12/16/10 
Ethnography Week 6 01/05/11 
Ethnography Week 7 01/13/11 
Ethnography Week 8 01/26/11 
Ethnography Week 9 01/26 
01/27/11 
Ethnography Week 10 02/03/11 
Ethnography Week 11 02/09/11 
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Ethnography Week 12 02/14/ and 
02/16/11 
Ethnography Week 13 02/22/11 
Ethnography Week 14 03/09/11 
Ethnography Week 15 03/16/11 
Ethnography Week 16 03/23/11 
Ethnography Week 17 03/30/11 
Ethnography Week 18 04/20/11 
Ethnography Week 19 04/26-29/11 
Ethnography Week 20 05/04/11 
Ethnography Week 21 05/12-14/11 
Ethnography Week 22 05/19/11 
Ethnography Week 23 05/25/11 
Ethnography Week 24 06/01/11 
Ethnography Week 25 06/06/11 
Ethnography Week 26 06/14/11 
Ethnography Week 27 07/20/11 
Ethnography Week 28 07/27/11 
Ethnography Week 29 09/05/11 
Ethnography Week 30 09/08/11 
Ethnography Week 31 09/14/11 
Ethnography Week 32 09/23/11 
Ethnography Week 33 09/28/11 
Ethnography Week 34 10/06/11 
Ethnography Week 35 11/02/11 
Ethnography Week 36 11/10/11 
Ethnography Week 37 11/16/11 
Ethnography Week 38 11/21/11 
Ethnography Week 39 12/19/11 
Ethnography Week 40 12/26/11 
 
Table 6: Interviews and Ethnography May 2010-February 2012, DigiVog, NYC and Milan. 
 
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWS WITH TECHNOLOGY-FASHION PLAYERS AND 
EXTERNAL AUDIENCES 
Company/position  Date 
External Audiences (Retail)  
Kurt Salmon Associates  
Sr. Partner 




The Doneger Group  
Senior Fashion Advisor 
02/22/10 







Other Enablers (DigiVog ecology)  
ShopStyle.com  03/09/11 
SocialCom.com (anonymous) 
Director Brand Development 
03/30/11 
LinkShare  03/31/11 
Gilt Groupe  
VP Premium Services 




Fashion Stake  
CEO 
08/27/10 
Rent the Runway  
Head Accessory / Bridal Buyer; Founder 





Senior Brand Strategist 
10/29/10 
Table 7 Interviews September 2009-August 2010 high-technology players  
 
APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEWS WITH HIGH-FASHION FIRMS 
Company/position Date 
1.Brand “A” (anonymous)  
HR Director, USA 04/16/10 
Debt Agency Director, USA 04/16/10 
Retail and Marketing Director, USA 04/16/10 
2. Brand “B” (anonymous)  
CIO, Italy, Milan 11/11/09 
06/15/10 
3. Brand “C” (anonymous)   




Digital Media Manager 05/21/10 
4. Brand “D” (anonymous)  
Global Communications Director 06/18/10 
Global Digital Director 06/10/10 
Digital Marketing Specialist 06/10/10 
E-commerce Director, USA 08/12/10 
5. Brand “E” (anonymous)  
CIO, Italy, Milan 07/11/10 
Web Manager Italy, Milan 09/16/10 
e-Commerce Manager 10/16/10 
6. Brand “F” (anonymous)  
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e-commerce Director, The Netherlands, Amsterdam 07/09/10 
7. Brand “G” (anonymous)  
e-commerce Pilot Manager, Italy, Milan 02/20/10 
8. Brand “H” (anonymous)  
Customer Experience Manager, France, Paris 05/19/10 
9. Company of We (2010)  
Founder, CEO  
10.Brand “I” (anonymous)  
e-Commerce and Digital Marketing Director, New York 01/20/10 
Table 8 Interviews September 2009-August 2010 Brands (Incumbents) 
